Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

78. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, March 9, 1966, 1835Z.²

4252. Subj: US/UK talks on Libya.

A. Opening Session, March 7

1. Leading for Brit side, Geoffrey Arthur of FonOff stated he believed there might be some misunderstanding of effect of defense review on British intentions and military capability to honor UK treaty commitment to Libya. UK intended to honor its commitment, but, as information British intended to provide during course of talks would indicate, implementation of defense review decisions would make this task more difficult. After mentioning that withdrawal of all British ships from Mediterranean would markedly reduce deterrent insofar as treaty was concerned, he stressed that Canberra strike force at Akrotiri was retained as a deterrent for contingencies involving Libya as well as CENTO and Kuwait. He hoped this US/UK group could identify problems and (a) agree on nature threat and circumstances in which Libyan Govt might need help from outside and (b) consider current military plans and effect of defense review thereon.

2. Kitchen for US side accepted British approach to problem and ascertained that UK would not use force on purely internal threat, although British observed it was hard to separate internal from external. Kitchen stressed that US letter to King Idris³ commits US only to consult Libya and other interested govts in case of threat to Libya.

3. Speares circulated draft paper entitled “Libya: The Threat,” conclusions of which were (A) internal situation is likely to remain stable so long as King reigns; (B) prospects of internal stability are improving; (C) threat we are concerned with is an external attack by UAR rather than by internal subversion alone; (D) UAR military intervention is likely only in circumstances in which Libyan revolution already underway and British willingness to assist legitimate govt was in doubt; (E) Egyptians would be anxious to avoid direct confrontation with British troops and any Egyptian decision to intervene would be greatly influenced by presence or otherwise of British troops in Libya and their assessment of reenforcement capability.

4. Root observed that US estimate of threat to Libya was very close to that of British and while UAR threat now seems more hypothetical than real we should remember UAR involvement in Yemen, Congo, and Algerian-Moroccan conflict. Root emphasized that US considers UK treaty with Libya very important as a deterrent because it provides framework within which military action can be taken.

5. Both sides agreed it was difficult to assess internal threat to regime but that continued, full exchanges of information were essential.

6. Speares for UK reviewed capabilities Cyrenaica defense force as being sufficient to deal with internal problems in their area of operations. Less is known about loyalty of army which British do not consider capable of opposing UAR invasion.

7. Arthur said he suspected Nasser was waiting for King’s death before making moves, sequence of which might be attempt to bring off coup and establish new govt which would denounce UK treaty and permit UAR military to move in. He added that we must watch Libyan army and police like a hawk.

8. Root agreed that Nasser might proceed as Arthur had indicated. He added that UAR had been reminded of our interest in Libyan integrity. It was agreed that US would take British paper back to Washington for further comment.

B. Second Session, March 7

9. UK element of US/UK planning group outlined Brit unilateral contingency plan in detail, covering three phases of steps to meet possible UAR threat in Cyrenaica. Notable that post-UK defense review revision of this plan calls for full augmentation previously contemplated, although degraded in time, and with unresolved problems of airlift and naval support. Arthur emphasized all permanent UK naval deployments in Mediterranean will be removed by mid-1968.

10. Subsequent discussion indicated Benghazi area reductions from two armored reconnaissance squadrons and two companies to one of each had been initiated by previous conservative govt by agreement with Libyan Govt, well before defense review, but would not be complete until end 1967. UK plan not operative in absence some element of external aggression, since this rather than internal coup is contingency UK committed to deal with. Moreover, it could only be implemented in response to request by GOL.

11. Kitchen and US element of planning group summarized US deployments in Tripolitania, training and staging roles of Wheelus AFB and arrangements for its protection. Stated no special planning had been undertaken as result of President’s letter to King. However, also noted USG had no formal commitment to Korea or, except under protocol to SEATO, to Vietnam.

12. Arthur observed that apart from defense treaty US and UK interests in Libya essentially similar, politically and militarily, without any strong emotional involvement by either. Said consideration had been given during defense review to Brit withdrawal from treaty. Kitchen pointed out US would view such step with utmost gravity, since treaty of major importance, most fortuitous to defense of West and accepted by other Arab states. Finkelstein noted value of close and continuous US/UK consultation.

13. Arthur said HMG had admitted to Brit press that Dhekelia stockpile being cut, and Egyptians bound realize this to some extent. However, he hoped UAR would notice that a British Canberra bomber force was remaining in Cyprus, since it provided “real deterrent” to any UAR aggression against Libya.

C. Final Session, March 8

14. Arthur reemphasized degradation of UK deterrent in Libya that would result from reduced UK presence in Mediterranean area, particularly removal of Brit Fleet. Since this situation only tolerable because of US Sixth Fleet, he asked whether there were any actions, political or military, which US could take to fill in gaps in UK planning, recognizing they must be without commitment to US side.

15. Kitchen expressed appreciation for continued undertaking by UK to dispose its forces in support of Libyan treaty. Noted US response necessarily limited by heavy Far East operational requirements, demands on our European airlift and other resources which might be further strained by De Gaulle’s initiative against NATO, as well as US unwillingness to commit itself to a joint plan. Nevertheless, the US team was willing look into possibilities for complementary US planning which would enable fulfillment of British plan, such as airlift augmentation or more definitive utilization of presence of Sixth Fleet. Arthur observed that without some US assistance the Brit units in Libya would be very much out on limb, with sea reinforcements from UK five or more sailing days away.

16. In response Root’s question, Arthur stated for record that HMG has no intention try get out of treaty obligations. Although UK plan as such not known to Libyans, may be necessary discuss matters with King if his confidence appears shaken when Brit ships removed from Mediterranean. Agreed to consult with US in normal course, and particularly in that event.

17. Discussions of possible courses of action to enhance deterrent vis-a-vis UAR included US ship visits, training exercises, firepower demonstration off Egypt to which Nasser’s senior officers might be invited, and training of additional US security force personnel in Libya. Kitchen noted need not to overload Wheelus and requirement to work contemplated measures in with other Sixth Fleet requirements.

18. Root noted US less optimistic than UK over lack of trouble during King’s lifetime. Again observed UK threat assessment pointed exclusively eastward, and desirability of consulting on other contingencies, such as those arising from Algeria or even Tunisia. Arthur accepted theses, and also need to consult on Libyan internal situation. Was agreed one method for refining joint threat assessment would be to exchange views on current UK paper (JIC 6615) after it had been circulated through intelligence channels.

19. In light foregoing discussion, US side undertook to raise matter in Washington with view to seeking modification of instructions to US element of US/UK planning group so that coordinated military planning could take into account problems which will arise in Brit plans as result of decisions taken during defense review and which were explained at meeting on March 7.

20. Possibility of contributions by other NATO nations to Libya also considered; although no specifics emerged, was agreed to keep matter under review. Timing of future meetings will be left to pace of developments.

Bruce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 LIBYA. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to DOD, Tripoli, CINCSTRIKE, and EUCOM.
2. Beginning in Spring 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in 6-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time.
3. Document 74.