Office of the Historian

76. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 27, 1966, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • UK Defense Review: Reduction of British Forces in Libya and
  • US Commitments there
[Page 113]

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
    • Secretary Rusk
    • Under Secretary Ball
    • Ambassador Bruce
    • Asst. Secretary Leddy
  • UK
    • Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
    • Sir Bernard Burrows, Dep. Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
    • Ambassador Dean
    • Mr. Maclehose, Priv. Secy. to Mr. Stewart

The Secretary asked whether the British had in mind that the US should assume a commitment in Libya going beyond the President’s letter of September 1, 1965. The Foreign Secretary explained that British adjustments resulting from the UK defense review would eliminate the British stockpile in Cyprus, which meant that they could no longer draw reinforcements from this source for Libya. (The UK would stay in Cyrenaica.) They could if necessary transfer men from the UK, but not equipment. He asked whether the UK might understand the US letter to mean that the US would be prepared to provide reinforcements for Libya with equipment in the first instance and also with some men. He felt it was important to have a US card to play if the whole arrangement were to be considered credible. The Secretary stated that the US could not undertake any commitment going beyond the President’s letter and he was reluctant to interpret the application of the letter to future circumstances. He pointed out that the letter had been written at a time when the UK position was entirely different from that now envisaged in the UK defense review. In any event, the US commitment must be regarded as junior to that of the UK.2

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965–March 1966. Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary for European Affairs John M. Leddy and approved in S on February 18. The source text is labeled “Part II of IV.” The conversation was held during a luncheon in the Madison Room at the Department of State.↩
  2. Telegram 3888 to London, January 7, noted that the U.S. Government had reservations about assuming primary responsibility for the defense of Libya as the British had recently requested, and asked the Embassy to express these reservations to the British Foreign Office. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 LIBYA) Telegram 3261 from London, January 13, reported that Embassy officials had made U.S. reservations clear to the British Foreign Office, but noted that the British had indicated they felt that the United Kingdom lacked adequate forces in the area for a meaningful intervention and that the United States was better equipped. (Ibid.)↩