Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, October 15, 1964, 5:35 p.m.

236. Ref: Tripoli’s 253.² Audience with King October 6 most helpful in providing further elaboration King’s view on base issue.

We naturally take most seriously what King has said as indication his probable feelings this matter and will take views into account in our planning.

Against background King’s statement and with objective of retaining Wheelus for longest time possible consistent with US objectives we believe following should be broad strategy:

1. Complete study and obtain early approval of CINCUSAFE Action Plan. Implement those portions which are acceptable and can be implemented within current resources and capabilities, all in coordination with general strategy.

2. Seek through sub-committee to impress Libyans with complexity costs and technical requirements to maintain and operate base and offer closer association on base with Libyans.

3. Be prepared for Libyan pressures to make statement to new Parliament; hopefully, only new element any such statement if required would be based on subcommittee progress.

4. Plan for opening negotiations during first half 1965 which will offer increasing Libyan involvement at base and to extent possible and necessary reduce less important US activities while preserving basic US training activities against possible ultimate reversal pressures for complete withdrawal. These negotiations should seek basis for phased arrangements acceptable to King and GOL while preserving US presence and avoiding specific commitment on withdrawal dates.

5. Keep King informed directly of approaches and results of meetings.

6. Avoid mention in any manner to Libyan officials King’s intentions as expressed to us.

Such strategy takes note of fact King does not intend reveal his thoughts to GOL. As Ambassador has noted, matter remains in hands Libyan Government and pressures continue for early agreement on withdrawal, as evidenced by statement Libyan Crown Prince October 8 at Non-Aligned Conference that negotiations are now in progress in order to fix a final date for withdrawal. Comments thus do not alter significantly practical negotiating problem US will have to face in sub-committee meetings and in 1965 negotiations based on acceptance of principle of withdrawal. Although King does not intend disclose his views, we can expect enlist his support at critical moments to moderate Libyan position even though we find little basis for expectation he will take any action now reverse present pressures.

Re King’s suggestion of Mutual Defense Pact: We have serious doubts any GOL government in present situation would be prepared seek parliamentary approval and sign such pact in face recent demands for abrogation existing agreements. From US viewpoint, while we are prepared reiterate our interest in independence Libya, formal pact raises numerous problems regarding post requests for similar guarantees from other Mediterranean powers as well as Congressional considerations.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Lee of USIA, Hilbert of Air Force, Chapin in M, Warren, and Bronez; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, CINCUSAFE for General Disoway, and to CINCEUR.
2. In telegram 253 from Tripoli, October 7, Ambassador Lightner described a meeting with King Idris on October 6, during which the King said that the United States should not take the Libyan Government’s demands for evacuation of Wheelus or early agreement on dates of withdrawal seriously. Such demands were necessary because of pressure from the Arab League states. The King noted that the negotiations in 1965 could lead to agreement to defer discussions for 2 years. If there were no agreement in 1971, he might ask for an extension, especially if there were a mutual defense pact between the two countries. (Ibid.)