Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

651. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)¹

Washington, December 20, 1967.

SUBJECT

• South African Arms Sales

I held a meeting of all the interested parties.

The basic problem is that we adhere to a more restrictive interpretation of the Security Council Resolution than most other countries, while France openly ignores it. At the same time, any change in policy on this sensitive subject—perhaps even a change to bring our interpretation closer to that of the U.K., which Foy’s new guidelines² propose—might stir up another swarm of hornets, and editorials.

The immediate source of poison in the situation is the unresolved conflict over Southwest Africa, from which spring the terrorist trials, and the resultant outcry.

I remain of the view that we should try (and try urgently) to work out an understanding with South Africa about these territories, based (a) on de facto recognition on their part of a U.N. interest in the territories, (b) asserted through a carefully chosen U.N. Committee that would allow South African administration, subject to reporting and advice.

Only such an agreement could change the political atmosphere, and permit a rational disposition of issues like those before us.

At the meeting, AF and IO argued (1) that any change in our present policy would have disastrous political repercussions in Africa and at home; (2) that any change would also be the wrong signal to the South Africans. At the moment, the South Africans are firmer than ever in enforcing apartheid, and are under severe criticism from us and others for their terrorist trials, their toughening position on Southwest Africa, etc. IO is also concerned about the adverse effect any change would have on our ability to obtain African votes on other issues before the UN.

The other bureaus concerned (E, EUR and G/PM) feel that some minor adjustments in the policy guidelines are needed to reduce conflicts with third countries who wish to sell South Africa some items with American components. Those items are not military, but might be used for some military purposes. Communications equipment is a case in point. In each instance the conflict arises because our construction of the Security Council Resolution is more severe than that of the third country concerned.

The changes recommended by Foy would not call into question our fidelity to the Resolution, or to interpretations given in the past by Adlai or Arthur. They would bring our interpretation nearer to that of the United Kingdom, and should help minimize the kind of conflict represented by the file. Even if the new guidelines are adopted, our policy under the Security Council Resolution would continue to be more stringent than that of any other country.

I conclude that while there might be some fall out if we adopt these guidelines, they are sensible, and the fall out would be more than balanced by advantages.

I also recommend that we attempt to block the sale of the Italian Piaggio aircraft and the French (Mystere) aircraft to the South African Government. This position, I think, is indicated even under the Kohler guidelines, although such transactions would be permissible under the British regulations. I am impressed by the difference between an executive jet aircraft like the Mystere and slower planes which might be used for military purposes along South Africa’s borders. However, if we allowed the French plane with U.S. engines to be sold we would have trouble with our own manufacturers and with the British as well. I believe it would be impossible to make a convincing case for the Mystere sale based on distinctions between different types of unarmed civilian aircraft. It would be a paradox, to say the least, to approve the French transaction now, after we had said “No” to our own manufacturers and to the British.

This recommendation illustrates why I think we should go beyond the Kohler guidelines if the political climate can be changed enough to let us examine the problem rationally. Disparate standards, especially between us and the British, are causing increasing difficulty with our own domestic manufacturers and with European governments. The British feel that within the terms of the embargo, they can supply civilian aircraft such as the Beagle 206 for use in air/sea rescue, maritime reconnaissance and communications. Thus far, they have been prohibited from doing so because the planes had U.S. motors. The South African Government has now gone to the Italian Piaggio firm for similar planes. Although the Piaggio plane has U.S. components, it is not clear that we can block the sale legally, although we may (or may not) be able to persuade them to go along on political grounds. The South Africans may well make the plane themselves, or buy it from the French.

The net result is that the U.S. balance of payments suffers, the British balance of payments suffers, we create friction with our European allies and give De Gaulle another chance to say that you cannot do business with the United States without ending up having the United States dominating your foreign policies.

The result is the normal consequence of boycott and embargo plans—frustration all around, and a failure of sanctions.

I think we must begin to move towards a more realistic application of the arms embargo and to attempt over time to bring our practice more in line with the present British one.

I agree with Arthur that we should not change our basic policy in the present political climate, and not give the South Africans a political “victory”, at least until the Southwest Africa problem can be moved. But standing pat is not in our interest either. The present policy is not working. The South Africans are getting the equipment they need. And their policies are hardening, not softening. The trial of the Southwest African terrorists is an important signal in this respect.

Before the Middle East war intervened, it had been agreed that Arthur or someone make a trip to South Africa and attempt to work out a modus vivendi with them on the status of Southwest Africa. Some discussion of the arms embargo policy would be useful in this context and a proposal to loosen our guidelines further—that is beyond the Kohler formula which I recommend we adopt now—might well help them take a more forthcoming attitude. I propose that we consider permitting civilian-type U.S. aircraft or engines to be shipped to the South African Air Force when we are assured that they are destined for such use as VIP transport or unarmed marine patrol if we can get some positive movement from the South Africans or Southwest Africa. I think we should do this before the South African position becomes more fixed than it is now.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Secret.
2. Kohler’s proposed modifications dealt mainly with the question of the extent to which the very restrictive U.S. policy on direct shipments from the United States to South Africa was also applied to U.S.-origin components in equipment shipped by third countries whose policy was less restrictive. He recommended that the United States not apply the embargo in cases where the U.S. components were non-weapons in nature and were included in third-country equipment. His views were set forth in a draft memorandum to Rusk, filed with a December 14 covering memorandum from Katzenbach to Under Secretary Rostow asking for the latter’s views. (Ibid.)