64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya1
39. Refs: Deptels 37 and 38 to Baida.2 Acceptance principle withdrawal from Wheelus and agreement report on timing in 1965 represents [Page 98] U.S. decision designed maintain satisfactory relations with Libya and create best possible atmosphere for reasonable discussions on modalities of withdrawal. Department does not exclude possibility, however, that, despite previous assurances, Prime Minister Muntassir or Foreign Minister Maaziq may now find U.S. position has not gone far enough and that, either independently or under GOL stimulation, parliament may still order abrogation of 1954 agreement and establishment early date for evacuation Wheelus.
We believe, therefore, it most important make greatest possible effort, as appropriate, assure key figures that: (1) this had been difficult decision for U.S. but we intend carry out our part in good faith and in manner designed maintain best possible relations with Libya; (2) given this step on part U.S., we would regard any unilateral action by Libyans as most serious matter, reflecting not only on good faith Libyan Government, but casting doubt, as well, on Libyan good faith in other matters involving international agreements; (3) additional pressure on U.S. at this time will not make early resolution this matter any more likely and could seriously complicate it.
For Baida: Accordingly, we suggest, after presentation note to Muntassir:
- 1.
- Informing King in most suitable manner, transmitting, if possible, copy of letter to Prime Minister to King through Khoja.
- 2.
- To extent we can do so without antagonizing GOL, informing friends of U.S. who may have influence on government or in parliament.
- 3.
- Coordinating closely with CAS which being separately alerted this problem.
For Cairo: (Reftels being repeated separately) Once you receive word GOL has been informed of substance Reftels, desire you inform GUAR in manner best designed reach Nasser of U.S. decision accept principle withdrawal and discuss details in good faith in 1965, expressing at same time hope nothing will be done by GUAR disturb atmosphere for reasonable resolution this matter.
For London: Desire you inform HMG of U.S. decision this matter and request such assistance as UK feels it may appropriately give through its influence in Libya to insure smooth acceptance U.S. step. We know UK appreciates this step on our part more difficult in many ways than their own recent decision.
When GOL has been informed Baida, we intend call in Libyan Ambassador Washington and stress our desire this decision be accepted in manner consistent with friendship two countries.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Bronez, Strong in NEA, and with BNA and CIA; and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Tripoli, Cairo, and London, and repeated to Benghazi, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE.↩
- Telegram 37 to Baida, August 7, transmitted the text of a letter from Lightner to Prime Minister Muntasir stating that the United States accepted the principle of withdrawal from Wheelus. (Ibid.) Telegram 38 to Baida, August 7, instructed the Ambassador to tell Muntasir that the United States was reiterating in writing its acceptance of the principle of withdrawal, provided that he would confirm that the Libyan Government would not press for further discussion of this matter until 1965 when the U.S. study of the problem was completed, that it would make every effort to maintain a satisfactory climate for discussions, and that it would be reasonable in discussing terms for withdrawal. (Ibid.)↩