Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

638. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 73–67

Washington, May 4, 1967.

SOUTH AFRICA

The Problem

To estimate developments in South African domestic and foreign policy over the next five years.

Conclusions

A. South Africa’s economy is strong and growing. The white population is united in its support for white dominance. The government is competent and the security forces exceptionally effective. Non-whites are denied political and other rights, though they have some share in the economic prosperity. Most of the Bantus accept such economic benefits and modern amenities as are available, resigning themselves to the government’s repressive policies.² (Paras. 6–8)

B. The present South African Government, under Prime Minister Vorster, has made some effort to promote good relations with neighboring black African states. Its hopes of improving relations with tropical black African states are unlikely to be realized. It is likely to maintain its current support of the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia. (Paras. 30, 32–33)

C. We believe it highly unlikely that South Africa will voluntarily give up South-West Africa or accept UN supervision of the territory. We further believe that any attempt forcibly to dislodge South Africa’s hold on the territory would require a major military effort, probably including significant participation by the US. (Paras. 28–29)

D. South Africa especially wants to improve relations with the US and, if possible, to obtain some expression of US approval for its attempts to appear more flexible. It will probably permit the US to use present space and tracking installations at least during the period of this estimate, provided the US does not participate in significant sanctions against South Africa. We believe, however, that the whites will hold steadfastly to their policy of white dominance and that significant changes in South Africa’s policies either in response to domestic developments or external pressures are highly unlikely in the next five years. (Paras. 37–38)³

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1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the source text, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 4.
2. Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that “resigning themselves” is not sufficiently descriptive of African reaction and prefers “cowed and politically inactive as the result of the government’s repressive policies.” [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Rear Adm. Eugene B. Fluckey, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believes the economic, labor, and domestic conditions are overly drawn in the estimate, and that South Africa’s foreign policy is more influenced by its relationship with other African states, and its desire to maintain buffer states in their present status quo, than is indicated in the estimate. He also believes the current situation, and the prospects for South Africa’s future—in particular with regard to distribution of the products of the economy, political stability, and easement of domestic difficulties—to be better than stated in the estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]