Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

636. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, April 15, 1967, 1:39 a.m.

176137. Subj: South West Africa.

1. This message contains guidelines for use of USUN and Embassies in consultations preceding Special UNGA opening April 21.

2. Our overall objectives re SWA continue to be those set out in Goldberg UNGA statement of October 12, 1966,² Nabrit UNGA statement of October 27,³ and Rogers statement in Ad Hoc Committee on January 26, 1967. All three make it clear that US considers South Africa has forfeited its right to continue to administer South West Africa; that consequently UN must discharge responsibilities re SWA; and that these responsibilities include the determination of practical means of administering SWA in interest of inhabitants and above all to enable them to exercise their right of self-determination. UNGA Resolution 2145 (XXI)⁴ conforms quite closely to these objectives. We, together with 113 other UN members, supported it as most comprehensive formula on which overwhelming majority of UNGA could agree. We would like if possible to maintain this broad consensus in Special GA.

3. Impasse in SWA Committee resulting in Committee’s failure to adopt any substantive proposal indicates that it will be very difficult to reach consensus acceptable to us in Special UNGA. Fundamental problem is that Afro-Asian majority tends to regard Resolution 2145 as a decision that UN should assume direct control over SWA and should bring it to independence within short, and definite, period, using enforcement measures in Security Council as required for this purpose. US has not accepted and does not accept this interpretation. In all three U.S. statements, U.S. has repeatedly insisted that approach to problem must be “practical,” and SWA Committee was enjoined in GA Res to recommend practical means by which SWA should be administered. In Nabrit statement, we specifically declared that US had undertaken no commitment as to SC action, and stressed our desire for peaceful action for benefit of SWA population. Peaceful implementation must continue to be our objective.

4. Unpopular though it may be in UNGA atmosphere, we must continue to take line that we do not regard Resolution 2145 as in any way committing US or UN to enforcement action. From US standpoint, we could not in present circumstances envisage use of forceful means or mandatory economic sanctions to carry out resolution. Hence, from UN standpoint, a GA resolution which threw SWA problem into SC in hope of Chapter 7 action, particularly while Rhodesian problem hangs in balance, would gravely engage UN prestige and pave way for most serious setback for UN as an instrumentality for dealing with race relations problems in Southern Africa. Accordingly, we shall have to resist extremist proposals which could not be carried out. We shall also have to avoid to extent possible ambiguous compromise proposals which could later be construed as committing UN or US to unrealistic course in SWA.

5. Task for US will be to persuade Afro-Asians that there is a distinction between the pronouncement of objectives and the determination of the pace and means with which these objectives will be pursued. We remain unshaken in our opposition to the practice of apartheid in SWA and in our espousal of the principle of self-determination for its people. But we are convinced that these objectives can best be attained gradually through various types of pressure and dialogue with South Africa, maintained over a period of time. This will be unpalatable doctrine among extremists. Its force would be demonstrated, however, if Afro-Asians persisted in pressing for drastic resolution along lines of African proposal in SWA Committee, at cost of large number of abstentions or negative votes, particularly by those states whose cooperation is most necessary if South Africa is to be brought around. We imagine that this choice between moderation and consensus on the one hand, and divisive extremism on the other, will be the basic issue at Special GA.

6. One relevant consideration is question of relations with South Africa in next phase of SWA problem. Afro-Asians are likely to contend either that any effort toward dialogue with South Africans is fruitless or else that dialogue should be conducted only on ways and means of carrying out Resolution 2145. Though prospects for a successful dialogue are clearly slight, we believe every effort must be made to carry through with it before we contemplate further substantive UNGA recommendations. We do not believe South Africans can realistically be expected at this stage to discuss implementation of GA Resolution 2145, but we do believe that UN and South Africa may conceivably have certain common concerns with respect to advancement of people of SWA and that in search for common ground, new insights may be gained for dealing with problem which will help us to avoid ultimate costly confrontation.

7. More time would be useful in working through the possibilities of a dialogue. Time might also help in exploring limits to which UN should go in seeking truly effective action in SWA situation. Optimum outcome of Special GA, from our standpoint would therefore be procedural resolution which, while permitting further study, in effect puts matter over to 22nd GA.

8. We recognize this result likely be attained, if at all, only after consideration of substantive texts. In this regard, US should make clear from outset where it stands on ground covered in resolutions considered by SWA Committee. We were unable to accept either African resolution or Latin American resolution in that Committee; indeed, we felt that in reaching agreement with Italians and Canadians on our own proposal, we went about as far as we could go in direction of Committee majority. We would not wish to be jockeyed much further toward African position by pressures at Special Session. Without excluding minor changes, we should resist further compromising our existing position solely for the sake of broad agreement. We should also be wary of signing on to subtle, implied commitments like those in Latin American proposal which edge us toward immediate establishment of administrative machinery in SWA and a UN commitment to immediate implementation. Accordingly, we should use the leverage we have—ability to maintain through our agreement the broadest consensus—to prevent erosion of points covered in Italian-Canadian-US Resolution.

9. Specifically, we would hope to avoid adoption of following points likely to figure in any African-Asia proposal.

(a) Request for Security Council action

(b) Proposals to establish in SWA, over South African opposition, a system of UN administration

(c) A take-it-or-leave-it proposal to South Africa to negotiate for implementation of Resolution 2145

(d) A directive to a UN Council to promulgate laws and regulations for SWA, or to establish a constituent assembly in SWA

(e) A decision or recommendation that a UN police force be established for SWA

10. We can accept the following points in a resolution

(a) General reiteration of Resolution 2145 as continuing objective of UN for South Africa

(b) Appointment of a UN Special Representative or High Commissioner, and/or a UN Council or Committee, to exercise UN functions re SWA (Question of representation of US on Council should be left open for time being.)

(c) Planning, study and liaison functions for Special Representative or Council

(d) Language permitting contact by UN agents or UN members with South Africa for purposes indicated in preceding paragraphs

(e) Recommendations to Specialized Agencies and member states re appropriate measures of assistance by them

(f) Provision for further substantive discussion at 22nd GA

(g) Reference to disapproval of action described in South African statement on Ovamboland which appears to contradict para. 7 Res 2145.

11. Discuss soonest with friendly delegations and report reaction.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Popper on April 13; cleared by Deputy Legal Adviser Carl F. Salans, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen, Palmer, and Clark; and approved by Sisco. Sent to USUN, Ottawa, Rome, Tokyo, and London, and repeated to all African posts.
2. For text of Ambassador Goldberg’s October 12 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 583–585.
3. For text of Representative Nabrit’s October 27 statement, see ibid., p. 587.
4. For text of Resolution 2145 (XXI), see ibid., pp. 585–586.