Office of the Historian

619. Special National Intelligence Estimate1

SNIE 70–66
Washington, June 2, 1966.

PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA ISSUE

Conclusions

A.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) will soon render its decision on the case brought against South Africa concerning its mandate over South-West Africa (SWA). Irrespective of the terms of the decision, we expect the black Africans and their sympathizers to take the occasion to press the UN to end apartheid in SWA and eventually in South Africa itself. They will put particular pressure on the US and UK who, they believe, could bring South Africa to terms if they really tried. (Paras. 1, 8–9, 20)
B.
South Africa, in order to improve its legal and political position, might comply with provisions of the judgment which did not dilute its control over SWA. South Africa is highly unlikely to give in to pressure for further steps and its opponents will probably seek strong UN action. Although the UK could ill afford to join full economic sanctions, it may not veto Security Council action and no other permanent member may do so. If, as is likely, economic sanctions were ineffective, the matter of military sanctions would arise, though sufficient support in the UN for such sanctions is highly unlikely. We do not believe that the South Africans would capitulate in the face of economic sanctions or the threat of military sanctions.2 (Paras. 15–19)
C.
The African states will portray firm US action against South Africa as the touchstone of US relations and influence in Africa. If the UN does not force South Africa to retreat, the Africans and their sympathizers will keep the issue alive, in the UN and out, and it will trouble Africa’s relations with the West. (Paras. 20–22)

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  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on June 2.↩
  2. Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, dissents from the estimates in the last two sentences of this paragraph, because he believes that they depend significantly on future US policy decisions. Cf. his footnotes to paragraphs 18 and 19. [Footnote in the source text.]↩