Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

609. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, July 31, 1965.

STATUS REPORT ON NSAM NO. 295 OF APRIL 24, 1964—SOUTH AFRICA²

Key Factors in Current Relations with South Africa

Apartheid and Tracking Stations

The South African Government has informed our Ambassador that it does not wish or intend that past public statements relating apartheid to tracking stations should lead to official confrontation. The Prime Minister’s extemporaneous speech at De Aar on June 25 was for internal political consumption according to Foreign Minister Muller. No South African official has commented in public on the issue since that date. It appears that the South African Government in the face of sharp attacks from its political opposition and some growing concern among business leaders is prepared pro tem to abandon the subject, except for lingering echoes in the Nationalist press.

Alternate Sites

As the result of actions begun over a year ago, NASA and DOD would be prepared, if necessary, to move all space tracking operations from South Africa to alternate sites (principally Malagasy, Spain, Ascension) by June 1966 without serious degradation to scheduled programs. (See details below in action on paragraph 4 of NSAM 295.)

Timing of ICJ Judgment on South West Africa

The best current prediction is that the ICJ, now in summer recess, will not make its decision on the pending South West Africa cases until March or April 1966. This is based on recent estimates by the Court Secretariat and by Ernest Gross, Counsel for the Applicants. The South African Government has called up numerous witnesses and will continue this process when the Court resumes session this fall.

Future Action

Lines of action set forth in NSAM 295 and the National Policy Paper on South Africa continue to comprise adequate policy framework. NASA and DOD are proceeding as rapidly as possible to complete and equip alternate tracking stations. Other issues will continue to complicate our relations with South Africa, and Prime Minister Verwoerd may well move to create new incidents. We are currently involved in a serious situation involving a South African Government initiative against personnel of our Embassy. This was unpredictable. A further deterioration in increasingly strained relations may come with a possible showdown between South Africa and the United Nations over South West Africa in late 1966. Between now and then the perennial problem of apartheid resolutions in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly may complicate relations with Afro-Asian powers. Pressures may increase in Security Council and General Assembly sessions this coming fall for more concerned UN action against apartheid in South Africa.

Consideration is being given to US–UK strategy during the period still ahead before the ICJ decision. Diplomatic discussion designed to persuade South Africa that its best long-range interests would be served by complying with the ICJ decision will be resumed later this year. Informally this point is being made whenever the opportunity arises in talks with both official and non-official South Africans here and at our posts in South Africa. Consideration of additional measures such as higher level approaches will be reserved until the date of the ICJ judgment approaches.

NSAM Decisions—Implications and Prospects

Following numbered paragraphs correspond to the seven numbered paragraphs of NSAM 295:

1. Defer Implementation of Odendaal Report

The South African Government has continued to postpone action on controversial political recommendations of the Odendaal report. However, the Government has continued to lay the groundwork for dividing South West Africa into little Bantustans largely responsible to departments of the Republic. Such actions include buying land to facilitate redistributing the population, a propaganda ploy about Ovambo chiefs petitioning for an Ovambostan, a Government-sponsored visit by South West African chiefs and headmen to the Transkei “State”, and planning by a South African Government committee for administrative reorganization of the relationships between South African and South West African units of government. The South African Government also has rushed economic and social development such as roads, airfields, schools and hospitals in an obvious attempt to influence favorably the International Court of Justice and world and South African opinion. To ensure that this outpouring of funds is fully appreciated, the South African Government has invited the Court to visit South Africa and South West Africa as well as other parts of the continent.

2. Policy Regarding Military Sales

The arms ban policy continues to be carefully observed. Consistent with the posture adopted by the President in the case of the proposed sale to South Africa of Lockheed Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft, United States representatives in the appropriate NATO committee have been successful in deferring action on the sale to South Africa of a NATO consortium-sponsored aircraft, the Brequet Atlantique. So called “Gray Area” items continue to arise either in Commerce or in the Department of State, and they are treated on an ad hoc basis. These are items suitable for either military or civilian end use but not on the controlled Munitions list; or on the Munitions List, but covered by exceptional treatment accorded in the case of some follow-on spare parts.

3. Suspension of Action on Applications for United States Government Loans and Investment Guarantees

In June 1965, the Department interposed no objection to an application to the Eximbank for a guarantee to cover diesel engines manufactured in the United States to be supplied to South Africa for assembling in 25 locomotives for the Mozambique Department of Port, Railroad and Transportation Service. We looked upon this transaction as mainly concerning the United States and Mozambique. Only one other rather special case has arisen in connection with this policy. A New York firm had applied to FCIA for Short Term Political Risks Insurance coverage, including $30,000 in military equipment to be exported to South Africa in the next twelve months. The Department requested the Eximbank to advise the exporter that, because of our strict arms embargo policy, the Eximbank would not be prepared to cover any proposed military shipments to South Africa.

4. Alternative Space Tracking Facilities

By June 1966 NASA and DOD space stations in South Africa, if necessary or desirable, could be closed down without damage to programs other than relatively minor degradation.

NASA and DOD have been planning and arranging for facilities alternate to those in South Africa. NASA’s needs can be met elsewhere by mid-1966 through: (1) the completion of alternate facilities at Ascension Island by April 1966, and in Spain and Malagasy by June 1966; (2) the continued use in South Africa by DOD on NASA’s behalf of DOD’s GLOTRAC system near Pretoria through the second quarter of 1966 to support NASA’s testing of the Centaur launch vehicle (to be used by Surveyor); and (3) the assumption by NASA on Madagascar of certain DOD tracking and telemetry tasks being performed now at the DOD station in South Africa. These latter tasks include support of NASA launches. The NASA facilities in Malagasy are being planned to handle these DOD tasks, if DOD were to withdraw from South Africa. DOD’s needs can be met on six-months notice by equipment installed, or removed, to available sites elsewhere. Thus, after the completion of the Centaur tests in the second quarter of 1966, the DOD facilities will not be critical for either DOD or NASA projects, provided NASA can assume certain tracking and telemetry tasks on Madagascar.

Negotiations for additional land in Malagasy and Spain were initiated in May and June 1965, respectively. Completion of negotiations in Spain is expected by mid-October. In Malagasy, oral agreement has been obtained; however, these negotiations relate only to NASA facilities. It is now believed that the Malagasy Government’s approval should be obtained for NASA to cover certain DOD requirements. No difficulty is expected, but a delay in obtaining the necessary approval may occur. Such delays in negotiations need not slow up the contingency program, however.

5. Program to Persuade South Africa to Comply with International Court of Justice Decision and to Encourage Moderate Whites in South Africa

US–UK Talks with Foreign Minister Muller. Due primarily to the number of witnesses South Africa is using, the judgment of the International Court of Justice on South Africa’s obligations as Mandatory of South West Africa is now not expected until March-April 1996. The British and American Ambassador separately commenced in April 1965 a dialogue with the South African Foreign Minister about the South West Africa issue. They sought to influence the South African Government in the direction of contingency planning for prompt compliance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice, whatever its substance might turn out to be. Ambassador Satterthwaite stressed United States support for the rule of law and for the authority of the Court, and the advisability of contingency planning by the South African Government for the possibility of an ICJ decision adverse to South Africa. The Independence and tracking station incidents in May-July 1965 delayed resumption of the United States talks; but the British Ambassador on May 24, in an interview with Foreign Minister Muller before going on long leave, brought up the subject a second time. He used a possible Security Council debate on the report of the Security Council Committee on Measures as the occasion for mentioning the desirability of avoiding a confrontation. The British Embassy in Pretoria, like our own, intends to raise the South West Africa issue with the Foreign Affairs Department as occasions arise. United States contingency planning for the prospective Security Council session on apartheid and the next General Assembly could provide such occasions for resumed talks with Muller.

Other Talks and Briefing. In the Department at all levels opportunities are used to implant among South African as well as foreign diplomats of countries such as Canada, Australia, Japan, Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Belgium the importance of the International Court of Justice judgment and the serious problems, if the South African Government were to fail to comply. Non-official Americans on the way to Africa and South Africa, such as jurists and historians, and South Africans also are briefed thoroughly on this subject, particularly those likely to discuss this matter with influential South Africans.

After further talks with Foreign Minister Muller, it will, at an appropriate stage, be desirable to make more systematic our conversations about the issue with governments other than the British. These could be carried on in Washington, various capitals and New York in conjunction with talks about the prospective Security Council session on apartheid and sanctions, and before and during the upcoming United Nations General Assembly session.

The Department repeatedly has endeavored to encourage writers—scholars as well as journalists—to treat adequately in their publications the potential significance of the International Court of Justice case to South Africa’s future prospects, in a manner to bring maximum realization to South Africa of the possible consequences of failure to comply without delay. The Department discreetly has encouraged public ventilation of the issue in ways likely to impress South Africans.

Encouragement of Moderate Whites. In diverse ways efforts have been made to help moderate whites in South Africa. On the initiative of the Department of State, an AFL–CIO officer has been working with the multiracial South African Trade Union Council for several months training labor organizers. The United Automobile Workers are arranging to send a fraternal delegation to South Africa. A special effort is being made by the Embassy and Consulates to reach South African youth. Religious and educational groups in the United States have been encouraged to support the moderate Christian Institute in South Africa and to maintain closer contact with their sister churches in South Africa. American businessmen and scientists have been urged to encourage their moderate South African contacts, the businessmen by their example as well as in discussions. Most such briefings have been with individuals, but Ambassador Satterthwaite in South Africa and Governor Williams in Washington have talked to groups of American businessmen along these lines.

United States officials have carefully avoided actions which would further strengthen extremists in South Africa—actions such as public espousal of “one-man, one-vote” for South Africa or a United States Government contribution to private funds for legal and welfare aid to persons on trial in South Africa. At the same time, the United States positions during the Independence and tracking station incidents were in part encouragement to moderate whites critical of the South African Government’s racialism.

6. Program to Explain United States Objectives to Interested African Countries

In addition to supplying copies of the National Policy Paper on South Africa to all our embassies in Africa, background and instructions about our objectives regarding South West Africa are provided on a continuing basis to USUN and to all United States diplomatic missions in Africa. A special effort is made to brief our Ambassadors going out to Africa, the many visitors here from Africa, including students, and Americans likely to discuss the subject with influential Africans. American leader grantees from the legal and judicial fields have been briefed on the South West Africa case and sent to the Hague during the ICJ proceedings prior to their visiting African countries (including South Africa), where they have discussed the issue with influential persons and groups. Departmental officers on African trips also have emphasized the issue in discussions with Africans as well as our own missions.

Because the judgment of the Court is not expected until Spring 1966, the United States and the United Kingdom will be increasingly exposed to African pressure for action now regarding apartheid in South Africa itself. To relieve such pressure in the Security Council and General Assembly, instructions to the field have included emphasis on the comprehensiveness of the United States arms embargo and have suggested the desirability of making the embargo effective on the part of other countries. Before the United Nations is asked to consider additional pressures on South Africa, co-operative action should be instituted to close existing gaps in the arms embargo.

7. Analysis of Sanctions

The respective bureau heads of the Department concerned with the comprehensive study of possible sanctions against South Africa have been asked for final clearance of the study by August 2, 1965. United States and United Kingdom United Nations delegations in the near future will conduct a series of joint discussions in tactics and strategy in the United Nations after the Court decides the current case on South West Africa. The Department is developing proposals, for discussion with the British, of possible limited measures which could, as appropriate, be used in case of non-compliance by South Africa with the Court’s decision. This is still in the preliminary stage.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. Sent under cover of a July 31 memorandum from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to McGeorge Bundy at the White House. No drafting information appears on the source text.
2. NSAM No. 295 is Document 586.