Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

600. National Policy Paper¹

Washington, January 18, 1965.

[Here follow the preface and table of contents.]

NATIONAL POLICY PAPER—SOUTH AFRICA PART ONE—US POLICY

I. The Problem

South Africa’s worsening racial situation and increasingly isolated international position pose complicated problems for US foreign policy. The probable long-range effects on US security interests of the Nationalist Government’s repressive apartheid policy in South and South-West Africa require that every reasonable effort be made to improve the situation there and to mitigate its repercussions abroad.

At this moment, Verwoerd’s regime appears to be both strong and secure. It seems impervious to change, despite a wide variety of international pressures for its reform or redirection. It now appears likely that the issue over the mandatory status of South-West Africa may soon bring about the first major confrontation looming between the world community and South Africa. This confrontation also has serious implications for the authority of the UN, the International Court of Justice. It will bring into sharp focus the potential danger for unilateral action by Communist countries which could jeopardize our long-term interests in Africa.

A workable, but not necessarily satisfactory, resolution of the South-West African problem, while extremely difficult to achieve, might produce some political realignment in South Africa during the course of which Western pressures might be brought to bear with some hope of success.

By mid-1965 the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on South Africa’s obligations as Mandatory over South-West Africa is likely to bring into sharp focus the issue of South Africa’s responsibility to the UN for its administration of the Territory and the question whether apartheid (separate development) is compatible with the best interests of South-West Africa’s inhabitants. Whether South Africa complies with the Court judgment, resists it, or gives up the Territory, the issues for the US are important. There will be wide support at home and abroad for the authority of the ICJ in its judgment on a contentious proceeding. Inevitably the United States and other major powers will be faced with a major international issue involving both race relations and the future welfare of peoples of a dependent territory.

Early in 1964, it became apparent that implementation by South Africa of the recommendations of the Governmental Odendaal Commission regarding South-West Africa could lead to a crisis in the US Security Council involving possible collective measures to uphold a restraining order of the ICJ. Under the Odendaal Commission’s recommendations, measures of economic development would have accompanied the creation of racially defined homelands and tightened control of native affairs by the South African Government. The Commission’s premises were frankly those of the apartheid policies of the present SAG and would have intensified apartheid in South-West Africa. Similarly, the Commission rejected the possibility of United Nations supervision, as called for repeatedly by the UN backed by earlier Advisory Opinions of the ICJ.

Viewing such action by the SAG as highly prejudicial to their rights as applicants in a contentious proceeding before the ICJ, Ethiopia and Liberia considered seeking a restraining order from that Court. In this proceeding, applicants, as former League of Nations members, are seeking a judgment establishing that South Africa’s administration of South-West Africa violates its obligations under the Mandate for South-West Africa conferred on it by the League.

The plaintiffs might have succeeded in obtaining a restraining order and could have asked the Security Council for measures to enforce it. (Under Article 94 of the UN Charter, they could have obtained majority support in the Security Council for measures to enforce the Court Order.)

To forestall this development, and permit the case to proceed to a judgment on the merits, probably by mid-1965, without intervening crisis, the United States, in concern with the UK sought to dissuade the SAG from immediate implementation of controversial elements of the Odendaal plan. This effort succeeded, and, at present, the SAG is holding back, so that applicants have not felt constrained to seek a restraining order from the Court.

It is our best estimate that the ICJ will decide the case before it by mid-1965 and that its decision will be unfavorable to South Africa’s contentions respecting its asserted freedom from legal obligations under the Mandate, freedom to apply apartheid in South-West Africa and freedom from UN supervision.

As the gap between South Africa’s actions and world opinion widens, the dilemma of balancing conflicting US interests is becoming more difficult and potentially hazardous. South Africa’s Nationalist Government is increasingly repressive in applying its apartheid doctrine, despite the actuality of economic integration. By constraint and legal restriction it is inhibiting the press, perverting news media and curbing academic freedom. It is arming heavily to defend its way of life. In the process it is employing increasingly repressive measures and eroding personal rights. Both the trend in the UN and the immediate thrust of US domestic policy are running strongly counter to South Africa’s practices of racial segregation and domination. Many countries, particularly Afro-Asian, are increasingly insistent that effective international action be taken respecting South-West Africa and apartheid in the Republic—this in light of the fact that South Africa has completely disregarded over thirty UN resolutions condemning South African policies. With the recent creation of the Organization of African Unity, determination to help resistance movements in Southern Africa and to embarrass countries friendly to South Africa in gathering momentum.

With a population of 3 million Whites as opposed to 11 million Blacks, 1.5 million Coloureds (mulattoes) and .5 million Asians (mainly Indians), the ratio of Whites to non-Whites in South Africa is 1 to 4 as compared with a ratio of 9 Whites to 1 Black in the US. Thus, the problem of integration in South Africa is far more knotty than in the US. Until now the White populace has been divided by the hostile feelings of the Boer War with 55% Afrikaner and 45% of British and foreign extraction. The English-speaking Whites have become increasingly receptive to Afrikaner racist theories in the face of internal and external pressures. Although liberal elements in South Africa and the world at large have made efforts to soften South Africa’s hard line on racial attitudes, no real softening has yet been achieved.

In its main effort to placate world opinion and to curtail, artificially, the ratio of Blacks to Whites, the South African Government has recently introduced the concept of “Bantustan.” This idea embodies the eventual creation of a series of scattered Black African tribal states in a confederal or “Commonwealth” system, but with South Africa retaining central direction for several decades to come. Thus far, the idea envisions assignment of 13% of South Africa’s land (470,000 square miles) to 70% of its population. The plan lacks administrative infra-structure, essential development capital, and clear-cut promises of eventual autonomy or independence. It fails to resolve the problem of the urban African. It is even criticized by right-wing Nationalists as “giving too much to the Kaffirs.” Thus far, in the Transkei, the South African Government has shown little evidence of good faith in giving the territory adequate economic backing or progressive movement toward actual autonomy. Yet, by its very vagueness, the Transkei (or other Bantustans yet to be created) may be awakening new political and social desires among South Africa’s Blacks, could unleash forces South Africa may not be able to control. Given the gravity of the South African problem, it will be important to watch the development of the Bantustan concept in the possibility that, over the long term, it or a variant thereof could help to provide a solution.

South Africa has a growing, effective military establishment and a highly efficient police-security system. The Republic possesses a modern air force, an expanding army and an organization of home guard volunteers referred to as “Commandos”, and a small, efficient navy. South Africa could field a force of 200,000 men within ninety days. She possesses armed might superior to any existing military combination of nations of the African Continent today, She is swiftly increasing her production of armaments and is seeking complete economic and military self-sufficiency.

South Africa’s economic base is broad and her trading position strong. Her only basic shortages are petroleum products, some automotive and airplane parts, wheat, cotton and rubber. She is heavily depend-ent on foreign flag shipping. She is seeking to overcome her deficiencies by producing motor fuel from coal, by expanding storage and refinery facilities, by establishment of an elaborate new petrochemical complex, and by expanding domestic wheat and cotton production. She is also expanding production of essential strategic mechanical components and armaments.

Producing over 50% of the world’s gold, marketing 80% of its diamonds, and selling large amounts of uranium to US and UK under long-term contracts, South Africa has forty-five commercially exploited minerals. Her export trade in livestock, sugar, wool and fruits is also large.

UK investment in South Africa exceeds $3 billion while the US investments surpass $600 million. Businessmen are receiving high returns on their South African investments, which net from 12% to 30% annually. Both US and UK business interests are contributing to South Africa’s current drive for self-sufficiency and are being propelled into strengthening its strategic capabilities in partial contradiction to official US and UK policies of arms embargo. In the same vein, our trade policy becomes embarrassing in terms of our relations with the rest of Africa.

While economic sanctions and trade boycotts have been imposed on South Africa by various nations, results thus far have been limited. South Africa’s economy appears to have many strengths and few weaknesses. The whole complicated problem of what measures might be effective against South Africa should the occasion arise is under study within the US Government and, following a resolution of June 18, 1964, by the Security Council. Difficulties of enforcement, adverse effects on the people of South Africa as well as the race relations situation, and consequences for other countries, such as the UK, all need the more searching analysis that is currently being undertaken in the Department of State. Much more realism needs to be injected into UN consideration of possible enforcement measures. Toward this end USUN will strive for a thorough and truly expert study of the problem in the Security Council over the next several months.

The strategic importance of South Africa to the US is based on requirements of an alternate to the Suez Canal as a sea route between the Indian and Atlantic Oceans; availability of air and naval facilities in South Africa for US forces and limited South African military capability to contribute to the security of Southern Africa in event of hostilities inimical to over-all Western or US interest. In addition, the Republic of South Africa is geographically located so as to provide excellent facilities for our DOD and NASA missile and space tracking requirements. While our present South African tracking and space facilities are preferable to alternative facilities, acceptable alternative sites in the general area can be found.

Confusion of American attitudes and interests is reflected in conflicting activities of US private citizens and organizations as well as US government agencies. Both in Washington and in Pretoria, South Africans have reasons to regard US policy toward them as ambivalent. They frequently find it contradictory and occasionally unsupported or even undercut by our own representatives, official and private.

The present course of events, which we may be able to influence only in minor ways, and only over the short term, promises to be detrimental to all if the trend continues. Ultimately, the US would wish to avoid choice between South Africa and the other African countries; instead, it finds itself in an awkward position at home and abroad in attempting to maintain friendly relations with two hostile factions and at the same time maintaining a basic domestic principle of racial equality.

The probabilities of new dilemmas over the South-West Africa issue, of sporadic racial outbreaks in the Republic, increasing campaigns of sabotage and terrorism, and the eventual possibility of widespread disorder, make necessary a reappraisal of our policies toward South Africa. This reappraisal must include a full assessment of US interests and activities in the Republic; the inter-action of international pressures and forces at work within South Africa; the kind of resolution of the international treaty issue concerning South-West Africa for which we should strive, and the significance of South Africa vis-a-vis race relations on the US political scene.

In this reappraisal, certain questions are paramount:

Should the US avoid intervention in South Africa because the short-term situation is relatively stable and might be worsened by interference? Should the US join in treatment of South Africa as a pariah nation and back up this condemnation with pressures going beyond the arms embargo? Is apartheid so dangerous to international order in Africa and so susceptible to Communist exploitation that the US must seek ways to resolve the issue? Should our own racial problems lend strength to our stand against apartheid, or should they only heighten our awareness of the complexity of race relations and Nationalism? Are there constructive ways in which the US and its allies can show South Africa a path toward racial harmony? Are there ways in which the few liberal elements remaining in South Africa can be rallied and coalesced? Can we help to establish a forum for negotiation and eventual compromise between the races in South Africa? Can we help to avert an open, dangerous confrontation between South Africa and the rest of the world over the problem of South-West Africa? Failing these, should we progressively dissociate the US from South Africa with respect to arms, space, investment, trade and cultural relations?

[Here follow Sections II and III on U.S. Objectives and Interests.]

IV. A New Strategic Approach

National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964, states, inter alia:

“The State Department will develop a program for actions during the months ahead, pending final ICJ decision in the South-West Africa case, aiming to persuade the South Africa Government to acceptance of the Court’s decision. In addition to use of available pressures, particular attention will be given to exploring possible basis for accommodation and understanding with more moderate members of the South African white community along the lines proposed by the State Department’s Memorandum of March 10th.”

A. Background

The probable harmful effects on US interests in Africa resulting from the South African Government’s continued repressive apartheid policies in South and South-West Africa require that every reasonable effort be made to improve the situation there and to mitigate its repercussions abroad. The South African problem can also test the viability of the UN; in the long run over the issue of racial oppression and peace in Southern Africa; in the short run over the issue of South-West Africa. For the US, with its significant ties to various sectors of Africa and with its own domestic racial situation in an acute stage of resolution, the situation in South and South-West Africa, as elaborated elsewhere in this paper, poses grave policy problems.

The usual arguments for the status quo policy are that South Africa needs a long time to modify significantly its racist policies, the problem is intractable, outside pressures will only worsen the situation, and the alternative is chaos. These are counsels of caution but hardly justifications for a policy of inaction. The weakness of the status quo approach is that the world and Africa are moving fast in one direction while the South African Government since 1948 has been moving as fast in the opposite direction. Thus, the ground is being rapidly eroded from under the policy of precariously balancing what are at times contradictory US interests.

An alternative to the status quo policy is needed. An examination of alternatives indicates that a combination of pressures—national and international, internal and external—offers the best hope for the future. As a maximum, a program is necessary to deal constructively with the South African situation by promoting a non-violent approach, if possible; as a minimum, the program should limit the adverse international effects of the situation on US interests.

A pressure program to be effective should aim to achieve (1) compliance with the judgment of the ICJ next year regarding South Africa’s obligations as Mandatory of South-West Africa, (2) realistic contingency planning by the South African Government, well in advance of the judgment, regarding the broad economic, social and political implications of compliance, (3) moderation in South Africa’s domestic policies in order to facilitate a workable accommodation on the South-West Africa issue, and (4) in the long run (possibly as an indirect consequence of a UN-South African accommodation on South-West Africa) promotion of an eventual dialogue among leaders of all groups in South Africa itself about race relations and government by consent.

The ICJ decision could have a major impact on internal political alignments in South Africa. However, it would not necessarily weaken the general commitment to apartheid or some form of separate development. In the event of SAG relinquishment of responsibility, probably the most effective immediate way to influence favorably the situation in South Africa would be to ensure an efficient, enlightened administration of South-West Africa which would aim at rapid progress toward well-distributed prosperity and self-rule. South-West Africa’s resources and favorable foreign trade balance would facilitate this objective.

Since the South African problem and the South-West African issue are closely linked, any program of action for one must include at the same time attention to the other. Similarly, an accommodation in South-West Africa or on the other hand an intensified application of apartheid policy regarding South-West Africa would profoundly affect the South African situation. If the Verwoerd Government successfully defied the Court on the South-West Africa issue, the possibility of any flexibility within the Republic itself would virtually vanish. Conversely, the establishment of UN authority over the Territory, by persuasion or force, would be a severe blow to the prestige of the Verwoerd Government. Whether the circumstances attending assertion of UN authority tended in the short run to divide or coalesce the white community in South Africa, undoubtedly the defeat would intensify the pressures on apartheid.

Our first objective then should be to make a maximum effort to encourage the South African Government to change course in South-West Africa and prepare the way for accommodation to the findings of the Court. There have been a number of indications that the South African Government anticipates an adverse Court judgment and realizes that its continuance as Mandatory is in jeopardy. At the same time, the SAG has consistently rejected efforts on the part of the UN to exercise any supervisory authority. However, it is worth noting that in 1951 South Africa proposed an agreement with the three remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers of World War I (US, UK and France) for her continued administration of South-West Africa. This was rejected by the three countries because it constituted an effort to sidestep the authority of the UN. Nonetheless it indicated that South Africa might be more willing to discuss the future of South-West Africa with the US, UK and France than with the U.N. as a whole. In any event the results of US/UK demarches earlier this year on the Odendaal Plan suggest that (1) some useful progress may be made through such diplomatic approaches and (2) it would appear that the South African Government was anxious to avoid a major confrontation over South-West Africa at that time. The South African Government was clearly anxious to buy time to strengthen its security situation during the year remaining before the Court decision. However, it might, through sufficiently credible and forceful approaches, be persuaded to avoid a full-scale confrontation following upon the ICJ judgment of mid-1965.

B. Proposed Plan

We therefore set down in general terms the outlines of a two-phase operational approach to the South African Government. The essence of the plan is to reveal our concern, in the first phase, with securing South African compliance with the judgment of the ICJ. The second phase of the plan would be concerned with events following the ICJ decision and would depend on the nature of the decision and South Africa’s reaction thereto. Both these phases would constitute the principal thrust of the US response to the increasingly disturbing situation in South Africa with its implications for US national interests in Africa. It is recognized that the following program, if invalidated by unforeseen events, could require new contingency plans and new objectives. Problems such as the effect of South African withdrawal from the UN; the future of the port of Walvis Bay; the future prospects for confederation or further more satisfactory, development of Bantustans; and development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons capabilities, etc., may well be considered as subjects for Working Group study under new contingency situations.

1. Diplomatic Approach to South Africa on South-West Africa (Phase One)

During the months remaining before the judgment in the South-West Africa case, a basic, high-level diplomatic approach to South Africa would appear to have some utility for inducing the SAG to prepare for an accommodation in South-West Africa. To underline the need for South African action this approach should be made together with the UK (and possibly France) as soon as feasible. If the UK should prove reluctant to join with us in carrying out this plan, we should be prepared to make some concessions in planning and timing because of the value of joint US–UK participation.

Actions to Institute the Diplomatic Approach:

As soon as possible we should consult with the UK (and France) to determine whether it (they) would be prepared to proceed now to work out a common diplomatic strategy for persuading South Africa to accept and adjust to a probable adverse ICJ decision on South-West Africa. We should be prepared to proceed with a US–UK effort if France is unwilling to join and the US should “go it alone” should the UK refuse.

South Africa has three main choices re the ICJ decision on South-West Africa: (1) non-compliance; (2) relinquishment of the mandate; or (3) compliance. Any of these courses might also involve South African procrastination and legalistic delay before a choice were eventually made. Any one would have far-reaching consequences for South Africa and the UN.

Non-compliance with the judgment would bring into being, with even greater force, the perils the US and UK impressed on the South African Government during the Odendaal crisis. These perils have been spelled out elsewhere in this document. The very existence of the Security Council study committee on sanctions should help impress on South Africa the serious problems which might confront it should it fail to comply with the Court’s decisions.

Relinquishment of the mandate would create an administrative problem for the UN, but it would be manageable for such a sparsely populated and relatively prosperous territory. Such a solution would be a blow to South Africa’s pride. However, apartheid within South Africa might even further be strengthened. Yet it would bring to an end one major problem in South African-UN relations. This is a decision South Africa might make when fully cognizant of the difficulties the other choices entail.

Compliance would raise many serious problems for South Africa, the US and other states. Assuming the Court’s judgment parallels the 1950 advisory ruling, it would necessitate the utilization of UN supervisory machinery. Presumably South Africa would be required by the Court to be accountable to the UN General Assembly only to the extent that it was to the League of Nations. However, it is likely that the Court also will decide that apartheid is not reconcilable with the obligations of the mandate system. Ethiopia and Liberia allege this, and South Africa’s response is that apartheid is necessary and desirable. Prime Minister Verwoerd publicly recognized this on May 5, 1964, in telling Parliament that the adjudication “concerns the policy of the Government of South Africa, namely the policy of separate development.” Loss of this aspect of the case for South Africa would mean that compliance would entail administration of a non-racial policy by a racist-minded Mandatory. Many South Africans as well as others believe Prime Minister Verwoerd would find giving up the mandate less schizoid. There will be strong pressures in the UN for South Africa to give up the Territory.

South Africa might also attempt a legalistic sort of compliance, probably involving procrastination and delay. Verwoerd said on May 5 that “the Government of South Africa is a stickler for doing what is juridically correct.” Under the Class C mandate agreement, South Africa is not specifically obligated to advance the indigenous population politically. However, Prime Minister Verwoerd and other South African spokesmen repeatedly have proclaimed that they aim at self-determination of peoples. On June 5, 1964, Verwoerd said that the prospective British grant of independence to Basutoland amounted to the fulfillment of one of the purposes of the separate development policy. The Republic was prepared to help the High Commission Territories along the road to independence, he said, in the same way it was assisting the Transkei.

Although the mandate agreement does not require political development of the indigenous population, the South African Government would be inconsistent in attempting to deny to South-West Africa the self-rule that it claims to project for territories within South Africa itself, such as the Transkei, and to welcome in the Basutoland enclave. Assuming that the Court judgment prescribes a non-apartheid policy and the General Assembly insists that the Territory be treated as a whole rather than as a collection of Bantustans, South Africa’s declared intention to carry out the Odendaal proposals would prove untenable, both legally and politically. There would be nothing to preclude South Africa from engaging in a new series of legal maneuvers to blunt the Court action. This would frustrate the Black African States and would pose new difficulties in the UN and for the US.

Substance of a Proposed Oral and Informal Approach to the South African Government:

(a) The US, UK (and France) would explain that our purpose was to forewarn, not to threaten, and that we have a special interest (stemming from our position as the remaining principal and allied powers of World War I) in the finding of a solution for South-West Africa which is acceptable, if not entirely satisfactory to the parties concerned (the South African Government, the inhabitants of South-West Africa and the UN).

(b) We would suggest extensive informal and secret discussions in advance by experts of the four (three or two) countries to consider various possibilities for a solution in South-West Africa acceptable to the UN, the inhabitants of the Territory, and South Africa.

(c) We would state our conviction that to have a reasonable prospect for success, an essential step must be South Africa’s acceptance of UN supervisory authority (already ruled upon by the ICJ), and the South African Government must be prepared for unreserved acceptance and compliance now with the final ICJ judgment or, alternatively, for relinquishment of the Mandate.

(d) We would explain, as there is a strong possibility at least that the Court may find in favor of the applicants on some of the issues, very possibly including that of the practice of apartheid in the Territory, we are convinced that apartheid must be eliminated in South-West Africa, we are convinced of the wisdom of frank exploration with the Government of South Africa and other key governments of what can be done in this direction before it is too late.

(e) Finally, we would point out the necessity for South Africa to prepare contingency plans for the future of the Territory of South-West Africa which would move away from the present practice of apartheid in the Territory and establish a practicable basis for the eventual according of self-determination to the inhabitants.

Follow-Up Approach: If the first “oral” diplomatic approach fails to elicit any constructive responses, a second more specific and written demarche should be made. Its primary and immediate purpose, like the first approach, would be to maximize within the South African Government realistic thinking either about how to comply with the Court judgment or about the alternative of withdrawal from South-West Africa before involving South Africa itself in an escalating confrontation with the UN and its key member states (including the US). In order to achieve a constructive engagement of South Africa, this approach would be worded in a way as not to negate its primary purpose by provoking the Nationalist Government into an intransigent attitude during the South-West Africa crisis.

These demarches have the merit of beginning a dialogue well in advance of the ICJ decision. An important secondary purpose of the written demarche would be to buttress our propaganda position in the event the Verwoerd Government refuses to comply with the judgment or chooses to withdraw from the Territory. At that point in time it is proposed that the demarche would be released to the public. To be a useful element in US propaganda the demarche should be designed to have maximum appeal to moderates of all parties and groups. It would be intended to throw on the Nationalist Government the onus of either loss of the Mandate or the hardships resulting from increasing pressures against South Africa. Its purpose would be to strengthen the moderates and encourage their coalescence into a more effective opposition to the Verwoerd regime. It would also be aimed at weakening the resolution and unity of the extremists.

Supporting Actions on South-West Africa: As an important supplement to diplomatic efforts, the Department of State, with appropriate assistance from other agencies, should provide full briefing on the South-West Africa issue to prominent American business and professional people who in the course of their normal activities have access to influential South Africans. Aside from that regularly provided to USIA, special guidance for US diplomatic and other personnel who engage in frequent conversations with South Africans should also be prepared on this issue. In short, a total US effort, official and non-official, public and private, should be devised with the end of persuading influential South Africans in and out of Government that accommodation to the ICJ judgment is essential to their best interests, and that the major nations including the US have no alternative to supporting respect for the authority of the ICJ and the rule of law.

2. An Alternative to Apartheid in South Africa (Phase Two)

Under present conditions a major diplomatic approach to the South African Government proposing alternatives to apartheid in the Republic would probably be rejected. It might diminish our prospects of influencing the South African Government beneficially on the more immediate South-West Africa issue. At a later stage, however, after the judgment of the International Court on South-West Africa has been made, it might be opportune to make such an approach.

A South African Government cooperating with the UN in South-West Africa and discovering that a reasonable alternative to apartheid can be made to work there, might be more amenable to suggestions for constructive change at home. On the other hand, if the South African Government should resist the Court’s judgment and UN measures supporting the Court, the publication by the US and others of a minimum, positive program for re-orientation of South African society by South Africans might serve as a rallying point for moderates and perhaps a way of dividing extremists and reducing their resistance to the UN. This could be useful if the South-West Africa issue shakes South African racial politics into flux.

Because either the opportunity or the necessity may thus arise in the next two-year period for a major diplomatic approach on apartheid in South Africa, it is considered useful to have prepared within the context of this paper the general lines which such an approach should follow.

The immediate aim of a comprehensive and practical proposal for moving toward a modus vivendi acceptable to all races in South Africa would be the beginning of informal discussions about South African race relations by spokesmen of all groups. The governments making representations would stress:

(a) The best solution would be one worked out by the South Africans themselves. The associated states do not desire to impose a settlement.

(b) The South African Government should create the proper atmosphere for discussions by relaxing oppressive laws and discrimination.

(c) The associated governments would support agreed proposals covering all groups’ and individuals’ minimal rights and opportunities, under the protection of the law as means of achieving full equality.

(d) Rejection of the combined approach would necessitate a reassessment of the participants’ relations with South Africa.

Should the South African Government reject the combined approach, the details would be released at the most opportune time and exploited to the full.

[Here follow sections on Courses of Action and Perspectives and Conclusions, and Part II, the Supporting Analysis.]

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, South Africa. Secret; Noforn. The preface states that Part One of this paper is a comprehensive, authoritative, and approved statement of U.S. policy toward South Africa, and that all agencies and bureaus with major responsibilities affecting U.S. relations with South Africa participated in drafting it and concurred in the strategy and courses of action it sets forth. Secretary Rusk approved and signed the paper on January 18.