Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

569. Telegram From the Embassy in Zambia to the Department of State¹

Lusaka, October 19, 1968, 1017Z.

2782. For Katzenbach and Moore (AF) from Palmer. Subj: Concern Should UK-Rhodesian Settlement Be Reached.

1. Following discussions with Kaunda and country team (including O’Neill from Salisbury) wish record concerns I have for US position in event UK-Rhodesian settlement reached on basis Gibraltar proposals.

2. As Kaunda sees it, any settlement which does not include British control during interim period before independence is a “sell-out” (septel).² Although our view of Rhodesia and what would constitute satisfactory settlement do not necessarily coincide with Kaunda’s, our aim of unimpeded progress to majority rule has always been firm. Therefore, before we subscribe to any settlement on Gibraltar terms we should have hard look at details and likelihood Rhodesian good faith in carrying proposals out. In this connection, I do not think we can exclude possibility UK agreeing on something less than Gibraltar. UK HICOM Pumphrey (protect) candidly emphasized to me last night how anxious PriMin Wilson is to be rid of Rhodesian problem.

3. Ultimately, leaving Smith in control depends on question of trust in him and Europeans in general to carry out agreement in good faith. On basis past record and evident British unwillingness use force even if agreement violated, this is slender reed.

4. We also need to find out more specifically what British have in mind on implementation certain details. How would sanctions be dismantled? Supposing resolution withdrawing sanctions was vetoed? Would threat of sanctions reimposition be requested of Security Council by UK? A most important element is how test of acceptability would be carried out. Just when and how quickly would cases restricted or detained nationalists be reviewed? If these nationalists were clearly willing give agreement a try, there would be favorable atmosphere. What happens, however, if Zanu leader Sithole is for and Zapu Leader Nkomo against or vice versa? Suggest London explore these questions with CO.

5. Agreement does not currently seem too likely in light Smith’s attitude. However, in light forgoing factors, I urge USG proceed cautiously, take reserved attitude should agreement materialize quickly and avoid any advanced commitments at least until full analysis can be made of implications for US positions in Africa and elsewhere.

Good

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD–UK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to London, Pretoria, Salisbury, and USUN.
2. Telegram 260164 to Pretoria, October 23, stated that the Department appreciated Kaunda’s concern regarding the lack of provisions in the Fearless proposals for an interim period of British control before independence, but noted that the United Kingdom was insisting on safeguards against possible retrogressive amendments to the proposed constitution. It noted that while the Department was volunteering no public comment on the substance of the talks, the U.S. Government would be under great pressure to go along with any agreement and would probably do so. (Ibid.)