Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

539. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Discussion of Rhodesia with Prime Minister Wilson²

Recommendations:

1. If Prime Minister Wilson requests US support for a settlement of the Rhodesian problem negotiated with the white minority Smith regime, I recommend that you avoid a commitment pending study of the terms of the agreement.³

2. If Prime Minister Wilson does not raise the Rhodesian problem, I recommend that you ask him to inform you of the kind of settlement the British Government is prepared to accept.

Background:

From what we know of the present British position on Rhodesia, it seems likely that (1) the UK is prepared to grant Rhodesia independence under a regime headed by Ian Smith, hence before majority rule is achieved and (2) the grant of independence will not be accompanied by enforceable lasting assurances on a transition to majority rule. We have always been skeptical that the economic sanctions program would succeed in “bringing the rebel regime to an end” as the Prime Minister last November publicly expressed the hope that it would, but we have suggested no alternative lines of action for accomplishing this objective.

Now we are faced with the possibility of serious damage to our relations with African governments if we are closely associated with such a Rhodesian settlement, which would be clearly unpalatable to them. US support for such a settlement would clearly be at variance with the spirit if not the letter of your May 26 remarks to the African ambassadors, which included the statement that we were supporting UK and UN efforts “to restore legitimate government in Rhodesia” because “only when this is accomplished can steps be taken to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia—not just six percent of them.”

Without regard to the disadvantages for us, there is some question as to whether such a “settlement” would in fact settle the problem. The white minority is probably too small a part of the population to hold out indefinitely if the African majority organizes itself for militant action. There is a considerable risk that, after independence, the white minority would use repressive measures to maintain its position, the Africans would respond with violence, and there would be a breakdown of law and order.

The British would doubtless try to build into any settlement some sort of “guarantees” of progress to ultimate majority rule, but really effective guarantees would be very difficult to achieve. “Inviolate” constitutional provisions can be violated by a determined minority and reliance on international guarantees protecting a constitution would be unrealistic. However, if effective assurances could be devised that are credible to the international community, this should affect our attitude positively.

Suggested Questions To Be Raised:

1. The Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on July 5 that “there would be no purpose in reaching agreement on the constitutional future of Rhodesia if that agreement did not at the same time win for Rhodesia acceptance in international society.” How does the British Government intend to ascertain this international acceptability?⁴

2. Is the British Government prepared to grant Rhodesia independence before majority rule? If so, with what guarantees of progress to majority rule? Will these guarantees be credible and enforceable if the Rhodesian Front is in control of Rhodesia?

3. What does the Prime Minister believe the African reaction will be to a grant of independence to a white minority regime? If adverse, what implication does the UK think this may have for its position in Black Africa?

Dean Rusk ⁵

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Secret.
2. Prime Minister Wilson visited Washington July 28–29 and met with the President on July 29.
3. There is no record of any discussion of Rhodesia by the President and Prime Minister Wilson. Memoranda of their conversations on July 29 are in Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. A memorandum of remarks by the President concerning his private talks with Wilson, which also excluded Rhodesia, is ibid., POL 15–1 US/Johnson.
4. The Prime Minister also announced on July 5 that the British-Rhodesian talks in Salisbury were being suspended and that the British participants were returning to London for consultations.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.