Office of the Historian

53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1

Washington, April 23, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Reply to NSAM 291 on Wheelus Air Base2

I enclose a proposed action program prepared in response to NSAM 291, dated March 19. The paper has the concurrence of the Department of Defense and AID.3

There follows a summary of the important points covered in the action program.

The United States has agreed to a Libyan request to discuss in Libya on or about April 29 the agreement of 1954 on Wheelus Air Base, an installation considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be of primary importance to the security interests of the United States. The United States objective in the discussion is to preserve facilities at Wheelus for as long as possible, consistent with the preservation of the independence, stability, and friendship of Libya. The British are opening similar discussions to preserve the future of their Libyan base arrangements and treaty on April 20. We are coordinating closely with them.

Pressures for the withdrawal of the United States from the Wheelus Air Base result from a feeling of greater nationalism in Libya, crystallized by a February 22 speech of President Nasser of the UAR. Since then the Government of Libya and the King have assumed greater control of the situation and have helped create a better climate for reasonable discussions with both the United States and Britain.

Current United States actions described in the enclosed paper are designed to: (1) create a suitable climate in Libya for reasonable discussions; (2) win support in Libya for a continued United States presence; (3) enlist the interest of friendly governments; (4) prepare in detail for actual discussions with the Libyans; and (5) insure that the United States and the United Kingdom are in harmony.

Despite the current pressures in Libya, it is considered possible to work out arrangements in the discussions which will enable the United States to continue using facilities in Libya for a considerable period, perhaps until, and on a limited basis even beyond 1971. This prognosis [Page 84] could be upset, however, by renewed attacks from Nasser, further unrest in Libya, British policies against Yemen, or Arab reactions to United States policy toward Israel.

Dean Rusk
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 291, Libya Base Rights. Secret.↩
  2. Document 45.↩
  3. Attached but not printed.↩