513. Memorandum of Conversations1
VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF PRIME MINISTER WILSON December 16–18, 1965
[Here follows a record of a private meeting between the President and Prime Minister Wilson, December 16, 5:15–6:10 p.m.]
Cabinet Room Meeting, December 16, 1965, 6:10–7:20 p.m.
(From notes dated December 17 prepared by Francis Bator)
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Acting Secretary George Ball
- Ambassador Bruce
- Ambassador Hand (Part of time)
- McGeorge Bundy
- William Moyers
- Francis Bator
- Jack Valenti (Part of time)
- Prime Minister Wilson
- Ambassador Dean
- Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet
- Derek Mitchell, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]
Rhodesia
President: Asked Mr. Ball to summarize our position on providing support for the oil embargo of Rhodesia.
Mr. Ball: Very tough problem. We can manage to help you in ameliorating a crisis—but if copper supply dries up completely and serious sterling troubles, there will be real difficulty.
We can help you with an oil embargo if you will go ahead with an Order in Council, thereby providing protection for our oil companies against any damage claims.
We can supplement your airlift to supply oil to Zambia in case Smith retaliates by cutting off the flow of oil to Zambia. It is our judgment that such an oil embargo would put real pressure on Rhodesia even if it is not airtight.
We would have to get the Germans, Italians, and French to go along. We think they would probably cooperate.
There might be problems with the South Africans.
Prime Minister: We must expect Smith to retaliate by cutting off oil to Zambia—we could manage to offset this.
More serious, they could cut the electricity. We have warned Smith that we would retaliate by cutting off his electric supply.
If they take the third step and cut off coal, this would pose “a phenomenal problem”. The best we could probably do would be to provide Zambia enough oil to keep the mines pumping. But there would be no output of copper.
There are three questions:
- (i)
- Will the large oil companies cooperate—what if they do not play? What about a free booter? Any such leakage would lead to very great pressure for a blockage in the UN.
- (ii)
- Angola—two frigates could probably stop that.
- (iii)
- South Africa—we are not overly pessimistic about this; though they do some very evil things, they are very law-abiding; it’s possible that they would not, in fact, try to break down an embargo.
We will go forward with an Order in Council—a bit worried about it with our thin parliamentary situation, and will qualify it (“as long as Smith’s government lasts”); but we will do it.
Zambia is the key to the entire situation; hope they remain reasonable. It is important to keep things in the UN as quiet as possible, and to have the right answers for the Zambian missions to Moscow, Washington and London.
We are quite clear about what to do if and when Smith does fall; UK will have to resume effective government of Rhodesia; UK will have to [Page 873] take parliamentary control on all matters of human and civil rights; troops will have to go back under British control. It will put us back 40 years, but it can’t be helped.
Hope President will agree to George Ball’s proposals, and that Arthur Goldberg will help in the UN to keep things quiet.
Mr. Ball: I have talked to Arthur and he is fairly optimistic. UK must keep the initiative and responsibility on this; the principle we must follow is that these are UK measures, which the U.S. is reinforcing—not joint measures.
President: We will reinforce and supplement what you do.
Prime Minister: Should like to work out the language on the airlift as soon as possible so as to indicate that we are “not alone.” We have a specific question that I will have to decide this evening. Do we divert a ship on its way to Rhodesia? It carries a two-week supply of oil. A tough problem; it is probably safer to let it go through despite the two-week supply.
Mr. Ball: We do not want to inhibit your decision either way. The President has approved the program we outlined to you so that our position is clear.
Prime Minister: “Quite right. We have got your mind on the general situation and will make our own decision on the immediate problem.”
Meeting at British Embassy, Morning of December 17
PARTICIPANTS
- Prime Minister Wilson
- Ambassador Dean
- Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to Cabinet
- Derek Mitchell, Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister
- Under Secretary Ball
- Secretary McNamara
- Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Rhodesia was the principal subject of discussion and agreement was reached on the announcements to be made of an oil embargo and U.S. participation in an airlift for Zambia. No detailed record of the discussion is available.
White House Lunch for Prime Minister and Subsequent Conversation December 17, 1–3 p.m.
(Based on Comments of Assistant Secretary Leddy and Ambassador Bruce)
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Secretary Rusk
- Under Secretary Ball
- Ambassador Bruce
- Ambassador Hand
- McGeorge Bundy
- Assistant Secretary John Leddy
- William Moyers
- Jack Valenti
- Francis Bator
- Prime Minister Wilson
- Ambassador Dean
- Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet
- Michael Stewart, Minister
- Derek Mitchell, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
- Oliver Wright, Assistant Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
- Lloyd Hughes, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister
- John Killick, Counselor
Rhodesia
The Prime Minister concentrated during lunch on the subject of Rhodesia. He expressed appreciation for United States backing, particularly on the oil sanctions and the airlift for Zambia. The Prime Minister took an optimistic view of the prospects of bringing down the Smith regime in a short time through economic action. While the Prime Minister did not give a specific time estimate, Oliver Wright, Assistant Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, subsequently told Ambassador Bruce that it was hoped to achieve this result in a matter of weeks.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2567, Visit of Prime Minister Wilson, December 15–19, 1965, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Prepared in the Department of State.↩