Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

511. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM–882–65

Washington, December 16, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Measures Against Rhodesia (C)

1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–27, 885/65, dated 6 December 1965,² which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze Rhodesian defense capabilities, estimate the nature and size of military force required to accomplish specified objectives, and point up any particular military problems in mounting the operation.

2. (S) From the standpoint of plausible national involvements in Rhodesia, including a United Nations force, there are almost unlimited combinations of military force that could be examined. Since Rhodesia is an area of recognized UK primacy, it appears that military intervention in Rhodesia, if any, will most likely be accomplished primarily by UK forces.

3. (S) The detailed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the information requested are contained in the Appendix.³ A summary of these views is set forth below:

a. The small Rhodesian active Army (3,000), Air Force (69 assorted aircraft), and Police Force (5,100) are well led and in a high state of readiness. The Rhodesian Government can mobilize an additional 6,000 reservists on extremely short notice. This force is capable of successfully meeting any likely threat posed by African states, but it could not repulse a major UK military effort. The major Rhodesian strength is her ability to make deliberate preparations for defense behind the formidable Zambezi River obstacles and the ability to destroy the critical Kariba Dam power facilities and the Wankie coal mines. The major military weaknesses of the Rhodesians are the limited size of their forces and difficulty in replenishing ammunition, spare parts, and POL supplies if confronted by a major UK military force.

b. The estimated nature and size of the UK force required to take and hold the Kariba Dam area and the Wankie coal field are: one airborne/infantry division force, three tactical fighter squadrons, combatand logistic support forces, and necessary airlift. Two brigades would be employed to secure the Wankie coal mines and maintain a rail line of communications to the Zambian border, and one brigade would be employed on the south bank of the Zambezi River to seize and hold the Kariba Dam.

c. An estimate of the UK military force required to overcome Rhodesian resistance and restore lawful government is: two airborne/infantry division forces, five tactical fighter squadrons, combat and logistic support forces, and necessary airlift. One airborne division would be employed to seize and hold the Kariba Dam and the Wankie coal mining areas; and, subsequently, one reinforced infantry division would be used to seize and hold the capital city of Salisbury.

d. Major problems which bear on a UK military operation in Rhodesia are as follows:

(1) The loyalties of the 225,000 white Rhodesians are difficult to determine; but, initially, the majority would probably be loyal to the Smith government. Over an extended period, the white urban population would be inclined to accept the authority of Her Majesty’s Government. The rural white Rhodesians, however, would probably resist and harass a UK force.

(2) South Africa and Portugal would probably furnish major economic support to Rhodesia. South Africa might furnish some military supplies and volunteers to Rhodesia, but it is doubtful that either South Africa or Portugal would overtly deploy forces to Rhodesia to fight against the United Kingdom.

(3) There is a shortage of UK troop transport to meet this and other commitments.

(4) The United Kingdom would have difficulty in mustering adequate combat forces, both ground and air, because of current commitments.

(5) It is probable that military action in Rhodesia would result in destruction of the Kariba Dam facilities and certain Wankie coal fields.

4. (S) If the United Kingdom should request US military assistance, it would most likely be for military airlift for deployment of UK forces to the area and their continued logistical support. There are three AFSTRIKE troop carrier squadrons which could be committed if implementation were directed. Their employment would, however, result in the cancellation of other commitments such as deployment of one troop carrier squadron to Southeast Asia, support for GEMINI recovery, programmed USAFSTRIKE support of MATS, and airlift support for deployment of one tactical fighter squadron to Southeast Asia.

5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that any US military commitment in Rhodesia is militarily unsound because of the resultant degradation of the US strategic military posture. Present major military commitments in NATO, Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Dominican Republic do not permit an additional significant military commitment wherein the depth of involvement is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that no US military forces be committed to operations in the Rhodesian crisis.

6. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is downgraded to Secret.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

David L. McDonald
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Rhodesia 091. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the source reads: “Sec Def has seen.”
2. Not printed. A copy is ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 092 Rhodesia.
3. Not found.