5. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research1
SUBJECT
- North Africa Eight Weeks After the Arab-Israel Conflict
The spirit of unity that pervaded North Africa during and immediately after the Arab-Israel war has evaporated. Algeria has rejected any compromise with Israel and the West and has called for a resumption of the war. Armed with this militancy, its reputation as the strongest Arab state undefeated in the recent conflict, and a 60,000-man army equipped with the most modern Soviet weapons, it has made a powerful bid to replace the UAR as the leader of the Arab world. Algeria’s moderate neighbors, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya, realizing the futility of further conflict and anxious to preserve political and economic ties with the West, have moved in the opposite direction to temper opinion at home and restrain opposition elements seeking to undercut a more realistic policy. So far, the two camps have avoided a direct confrontation. Both appear to have made gains in their respective strategies. Yet the long-term success of either depends as much on how domestic affairs are handled as on the future course of the Arab-Israel struggle in the Middle East.
Algeria’s Inadequacies. Boumediene’s motives in pushing for an uncompromising policy on the Middle East appear to derive heavily from domestic political considerations. Over the past year Algerian politics has reverted increasingly to the Ben Bellist pattern. The regime has subordinated earlier post-coup plans for domestic reconstruction to the imperatives of “revolutionary” politicking, as demagogic politicians vie with each other in pressing for more stridently anti-Western policies abroad and more rapid socialization at home. Boumediene, lacking a secure political base, has come to depend increasingly on short-term political tactics designed to keep his adversaries off balance and prevent them from outflanking him on the left. Seizing on war hysteria, he has turned away from decision-making to an increasingly personal form of leadership. The economy continues to deteriorate as the government’s socialist-oriented policies and anti-US and UK measures discourage new investment and dry up even existing markets for Algerian goods. In the process of turning from domestic reconstruction to “revolutionary” politics, Algeria has become increasingly dependent on the USSR. Even normally excellent French-Algerian relations have been damaged during [Page 13] the recent crisis by the prevalence in France of pro-Israel sentiment and the anti-European backlash in Algeria. Signs are growing that these developments have resulted in considerable dissatisfaction both among elite groups and in the population as a whole.
Hobbled by its domestic inadequacies, the Boumediene regime is nonetheless buoyed up by its new-found prestige in the Arab world. Yet this prestige stems more from the stridency of Algerian pronouncements on renewing hostilities with Israel, Algeria’s entente with Syria, and the diminished stature of UAR President Nasser than from the exercise of any real leadership by Algeria in the present crisis. The Arab moderates in both halves of the Arab world have rejected Algeria’s bellicose anti-Western panaceas. Even the UAR appears reluctant to be pushed into a new conflict before it recovers from the wounds of the last one. Still more significant is the apparent reluctance of the Soviets to endorse the Algerian hard line for fear of being drawn into an eventual confrontation with the US and out of concern for what would happen to their Arab proteges should full-scale hostilities break out again in the near future. Given the natural reluctance of the eastern Arabs to submit to the leadership of a geographical remote Maghrebian state, secure from attack by Israel, there is little likelihood that Algeria over the long run can make good its present claims to Arab leadership.2 If it does not succeed in doing so, however, this, together with its domestic failures, will inevitably threaten Boumediene’s position at home.
Moderates Batten Down the Hatches: Morocco Seeking Arms. For the moderates the essential problem has been to gain control of public opinion, disarm unruly opposition elements, and improve the effectiveness of security forces. To keep his domestic opposition in line, King Hassan of Morocco has strengthened the authority of his tough Interior Minister Mohammed Oufkir, thereby guaranteeing—because of French President De Gaulle’s opposition to Oufkir as the result of the Ben Barka affair—a continued freeze in relations with France. He has also cracked down on the country’s two strongest political groups, labor and the Istiqlal Party, thus reducing the prospects for ending emergency rule and for broadening the political base of his regime. With the help of efficient security forces and traditional rivalries among opposition groups, he has had reasonable success in these efforts. But while he has made some headway towards popular acceptance of a more realistic accommodation to power realities in the Middle East, Moroccan opinion remains volatile and unpredictable. As in the case of Algeria, Hassan’s main headaches are economic ones growing out of stagnation in the industrial sector and the continuing inadequacy of Moroccan agriculture; these, in turn, contribute to rising social tensions.
[Page 14]Hassan cannot afford to turn his full attention to domestic concerns, however, because of Algeria’s growing military might and increasing radicalism. Because of the prominent role the Moroccan army plays in his regime, Hassan must respond to military demands for heavy armaments to match those of Algeria, even at the expense of high-priority economic projects. Hassan’s principal concern, therefore, has been to obtain more arms quickly. Despairing of obtaining quick delivery from the US of the types of military equipment he is seeking under our $14 million commitment of last February, he has turned to Czechoslovakia for T–54 tanks and other heavy equipment. The burden of any attempt to match the Soviet arms build-up in Algeria on the already stagnant Moroccan economy would be crushing, making unrealistic any major expansion of programs to reduce unemployment and relieve social tensions. The extent of the additional strain will depend on the size of foreign aid inputs: Hassan is clearly looking to the US for additional economic and military assistance.
Tunisia Reorganizing Security Forces. Domestically, Bourguiba’s regime in Tunisia is stronger than the monarchies in either Libya or Morocco. Bourguiba’s skill as an effective modernizer and the success of his development efforts have won him the loyalty of much of the population, particularly the older generation. Nonetheless, the restlessness of Tunisian youth, the strong pro-Arab sentiments aroused during the recent crisis, and the economic strains of an ambitious development program have had an unsettling effect on the regime. Tunisian leaders have been unable to control public opinion, inflamed by Algiers and Cairo radios. While the government has made progress in restoring its authority by dealing severely with rioters and in moderating opinion by using government media to instill greater realism, it is aware that a new outbreak of hostilities could produce a fresh wave of hysteria and new threats to public order.
Bourguiba’s principal concerns spring from the inadequacies, both quantitative and qualitative, of his army and security services. The June 5 riots demonstrated that Tunisia’s security services were neither alert to the dangers of rioting nor able to control the rioting once it began. To remedy its defects the security apparatus is being reorganized under a new chief. The army is also undergoing a reorganization to improve its efficiency and morale. There’s no real prospect, however, that Tunisia’s forces could be adequate to withstand a direct military challenge from Algeria. Moreover, Tunisia’s ability to withstand a determined effort to subvert it by Algeria and the UAR is unknown—particularly in the event that the present Libyan regime should be replaced by one favorable to the UAR. Even more than Morocco, Tunisia looks to the US for its ultimate security.
Libya—Putting The Lid Back On. New Premier Abd-al-Qadir al-Badri, pressed into service and prodded into action by King Idris, seems [Page 15] to have mastered a previously chaotic internal situation. Badri broke the crippling oil and dock strikes, jailed free-wheeling political and labor agitators, muzzled a rampaging press, and has Libyan oil flowing again. But Libya may never be the same as it was before the Arab-Israel war. The deep humiliation of the Arabs—which the Libyan people share—will keep the Palestine issue alive. The identification of the US as the principal enemy will die hard—if it dies at all. The internal opposition forces unleashed in June 1967 will prepare to try again, convinced—correctly, we believe—that only the timely intercession of a 78-year old monarch prevented the foundering of the regime. Their opportunity may come as the result of the reopening of negotiations, scheduled to begin in August, for the withdrawal of US and UK bases—if the Libyan Government cannot demonstrate concrete results within a reasonable period of time. Barring a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East, Idris and Badri (or a successor) may be able to clamp the lid on once more. But the long-term prospects for Libyan stability, and for the resumption of Libya’s special ties with the US and UK, are as cloudy as ever.
Radicals vs. Moderates: Which Side Will Crack First? The prospects for the survival of the moderate regimes have thus considerably improved over the past eight weeks. Their internal security is stronger, and anti-Western sentiments destructive of public order have cooled. The very fact that Libya has survived strong radical pressures has improved the moderate position throughout the area. The moderates have also profited indirectly from the failings of radical leaders: their infighting, their inability to settle on a viable diplomatic or military strategy to compel the withdrawal of Israel from Arab territory, and Soviet reluctance to endorse any early resumption of hostilities.
Nonetheless the prospects over the longer term are less clear. Should the impasse between Israel and the Arab states be prolonged indefinitely and the UAR, Algeria, and other radicals build up sufficient military strength, the logic of a military solution could once again become compelling, and pressure could once more build up on the moderates. In such an atmosphere the radicals might be able to work off Arab frustrations by fastening the onus of stalemate on the moderates for maintaining ties with the West. In the meantime, domestic considerations will probably largely determine the relative advantages of radicals and moderates. Both camps have significant internal weakness. Libya will remain vulnerable to nationalist agitation as long as foreign bases remain. The competitive efforts of both Morocco and Algeria to build up military and security forces will aggravate their internal economic strains—perhaps leading, ironically enough, to a net decline in real security. In this game the side with the most generous foreign donors will hold an important advantage.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted in a memorandum from Hughes to Rusk.↩
- See Intelligence Note RAF-481, “Prospects for Algeria as a Replacement for the UAR as Leader of the Arab World,” June 15, 1967 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem). [Footnote in the source text.]↩