Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

499. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State¹

Salisbury, November 29, 1965.

448. With UDI nearly three weeks old, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn:

A. Although sanctions are bound to have effect on local economy in long run, there are no signs of major repercussions in immediate future; some businesses, particularly in luxury trades, are being affected and there may be some shifts in employment, but these should not produce critical problem for several months.

B. Despite some acts of intimidation, partially successful strikes in both Salisbury and Bulawayo areas, and incidents of stoning and petrol bombing, security forces remain firmly in control of country.

C. Smith regime has made no moves against Zambia and continues to affirm its determination to live harmoniously with its neighbors.

D. Perhaps single most important conclusion to be drawn is that white Rhodesian community appears united and solidly behind Smith regime. Because of press censorship, fact that Parliament is in recess until Feb 22, and general feeling among whites of “all hanging together or each hanging separately,” it would be extremely unwise to base hopes of any immediate change in this situation on divisive elements.

2. There is widely-held intense animosity among Rhodesian whites against person of UK PriMin Wilson, but continuing conviction that HMG will not follow through with measures to cripple Rhodesia. Among those who aware, retention sizable UK HICOM staff strengthens belief. [If] the British measures do in fact prove to be less stringent than originally expected, brunt of Rhodesian anger will concentrate on USG which already commands little affection.

3. Distasteful though prospect is, ConGen hopes USG contingency planning will include possibility of relatively long tenure Smith regime.

If Smith survives for more than year, without any outside encouragement except from South Africans and Portuguese, chances will have increased geometrically that Rhodesia will fall completely into South African clutches. At that time it may well be too late to do anything to change situation short of all out military efforts.

4. If UK makes attempts aimed at finding modus operandi for renewed dialogue, this would appear from here to be all to good. The larger mentality will do more to keep regime and its followers united than anything else. It is only by introduction of fresh breaths of air that we can hope to have any constructive influence with moderate elements that might change course of events.

Gebelt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the source text but the telegram was received at 11:20 a.m. Repeated to London, Lusaka, and Pretoria. Passed to the White House DOD, CIA, CINCLANT, CINCSTRIKE, and USIA at 11:58 a.m.