476. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson1
CAP 65594. To: Prime Minister Wilson. From: The President.
We agree that the Southern Rhodesia affair could quickly become a calamity, with potentially serious damage to Western interests. We also agree that deterring Smith from any fateful step is by all odds the best course open to us.
If you see fit, we would be glad if you would tell Smith when you see him that we as well as you would take a very poor view of UDI, and that we would necessarily have to oppose it vigorously.
We would also be prepared, as you suggest, to approach Smith directly along the above lines, either through our Charge in London or by calling in the Rhodesian Minister attached to your Embassy here. And if deterrence is our prime objective, it may be better for us to convey our views before your decisive meeting with Smith, rather than after. We will do this promptly if you wish. Should negotiations fail, we would certainly be prepared to make our views public in an appropriate way.
I am glad that our two governments are in close touch, since it is important to coordinate our efforts with yours in dealing with this unhappy problem.2
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret; Via Private Wire to London. No drafting information appears on the source text.↩
- On October 6, Prime Minister Wilson thanked the President for his support and agreed that deterrence was the main U.K. objective. Wilson told Johnson that it would be very helpful if Johnson were able to make his administration’s views known to Smith before the decisive meeting. He would leave it to the President to judge the best way of doing this, but suggested the possibility of using both techniques. (Ibid.)↩