Office of the Historian

47. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, March 23, 1964.

McGB:

We may have had a modest break in Libya. King Idris strengthened his hand by threatening abdication and allowing himself to be persuaded to stay on. However, it’s not clear to what extent Idris balked on abrogating base rights. So we’re far from out of the woods.

We’ve sent a strong team out from State and Defense to take a reading before we try drawing up our negotiating position.

UK will begin negotiating 20 April and is willing to pull out troops by September 1965 if it can save transit-staging rights through El Adem to East Africa. Our best tactic may be to let UK run in front so Libyans can show some progress in getting US/UK out. Meanwhile, we can try to spin out our tenure by gradually phasing Libyans into nominal control over Wheelus. We’ll be lucky if we can get three years.

Am following Wheelus closely, and am satisfied we’re playing it smart.2 Naturally DOD people talk of State softness (a la Moroccan bases) and act as if all we need do is beat up Nasser, but this sort of backflap is normal just now.

RWK
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Confidential.↩
  2. A handwritten note in the margin by Bundy reads: “Keep it up—it matters—McGB (and do P a sitrep when you think it ripe).”↩