Office of the Historian

468. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1

Washington, September 29, 1965, 8 p.m.

Perhaps imminent Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) would present us with certain problems. The UK must react strongly, under pressure from its African Commonwealth members. Firm US support of the UK seems warranted: (a) UDI is both legally and morally wrong, (b) our UK ties argue for helping them in a tough situation, which threatens them economically and politically; and (c) almost all Afro-Asians oppose UDI, and will be watching the US as well as UK response. With the UNGA on, we need African votes. We have told the UK that we’d consider actions they felt appropriate to discourage UDI, and support them when and if Rhodesia declared UDI. The British may ask us to:

A.
Back their request for Security Council support for UK measures against the Rhodesians. Their strategy here would be to pre-empt disruptive Afro-Asian and Soviet Bloc initiatives.
B.
Join in a Commonwealth boycott of Rhodesian tobacco, as well as in other economic measures. This would work little hardship on us, as our trade with Southern Rhodesia is minimal compared to that of the UK.
C.
Join in discouraging intervention by Afro-Asian nations or Rhodesian African nationalists. We might also be asked to help discourage Afro-Asian withdrawals from the Commonwealth over this issue.

Effect of UDI on Zambia. Since Rhodesia shares power and rail transport with neighboring Zambia, the Rhodesians might just cut off these essential services if Zambia reacts violently to UDI. If so, the UK might ask us to help execute a Zambian contingency plan which we are cooperating in developing.2 The most extreme contingency envisaged is an airlift of Zambian copper out and general commodities in. We’ve told the UK that the most we could contribute is personnel for manning the essential flight control centers. The plan is designed to help the UK economy as much as that of Zambia.

Immediate actions. State is considering (a) telling our Consul General to issue a statement of the US position to warn off the Rhodesians; (b) [Page 807] sending a high-level US mission to London and possibly Rhodesia for the same purpose. We may be able to help at least marginally to forestall UDI. This memo is to advise you on current planning.

McGB & RWK 3

Goldberg’s views are attached.4

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret.↩
  2. Telegram 1661 to London, September 29, instructed the Embassy to advise the U.K. Commonwealth Relations Office that it might inform the Zambian Government that the U.S. Government was willing to participate in a joint, on-spot contingency study of airlift requirements in both Tanzania and Zambia. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ZAMBIA)↩
  3. Bundy initialed for himself and Komer above Komer’s typed signature.↩
  4. Not printed.↩