466. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
McGB
SUBJECT
- Possible Speeding up of Southern Rhodesian UDI
European sentiment in Southern Rhodesia is heating up to press Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front (RF) government to make an immediate unilateral declaration of independence. Lack of progress during the past six months dialogue between Salisbury and London has driven both Rhodesians and British to the point of mutual exasperation. With the principals in this state, anything can happen.
Indeed, there are indications that the Rhodesians are preparing an imminent UDI: (a) appointment (opposed by the UK) of an autonomous Rhodesian “diplomatic representative” to Portugal; (b) the impatience [Page 802] for UDI shown by right-wingers at the late August RF Party Congress against which most observers agree Smith cannot hold out beyond the end of the year; (c) recent Rhodesian proposals to Zambia that they negotiate a mutually agreeable formula for the division of the unified Zambia-Rhodesian Railroad system; [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (e) PM Smith’s desire to meet with PM Wilson in London.
On a recent African tour, Bottomley was disturbed to find deep concern among all African Commonwealth members over the UK’s failure to solve the Rhodesian crisis. So great was the concern that UK officials fear the Commonwealth itself could be threatened if the UK backed off from its position of independence for Rhodesia only under a Constitution granting majority rule with strict guarantees of minority rights.
The situation is further complicated by the split of Rhodesia’s African nationalists into two equally ineffective groups: the Zimbabwe African Political Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Event he OAU’s African Liberation Committee has thrown up its hands in disgust over ZAPU and ZANU refusal to unite and evolve an action program. In short, neither group offers the material out of which a majority African government could be fashioned.
The US has little leverage in this situation, but there are great risks to us that a sudden deterioration in the Rhodesian situation could trigger similar deterioration in other potential trouble spots in Southern Africa: i.e., Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, South West Africa, Zambia and Malawi. The US has already (June 1964) suspended its modest AID proj-ects in Southern Rhodesia. Soapy Williams has publicly announced (June 1965) that we have ceased supplying any arms. In the UN we have consistently supported the British position of (a) no independence without majority rule; (b) economic sanctions in the event of UDI; and (c) continued UK-Rhodesian negotiations.
We had hoped to deter UDI and preserve the admittedly shaky status quo in order to buy time to work out an accommodation agreeable to both parties. So far we have not succeeded. However, with Rhodesia now on the brink of UDI, Komer and I feel that a more aggressive deterrent effort is called for. Therefore, we plan to suggest that the US:
- 1.
- Touch base again with the UK as to current seriousness of the situation in Southern Rhodesia;
- 2.
- Decide whether the US should make a unilateral approach to the Rhodesians telling them that in the event of UDI we will fully support the UK and that we suspect the UN will do the same;
- 3.
- Perhaps send Harriman on a trouble-shooting trip to Salisbury to deliver the above message if we decide to approach the Rhodesians unilaterally.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret.↩