462. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)1
SUBJECT
- US Contingency Planning for Southern Rhodesian UDI
You have requested Mr. Fredericks to provide you with information concerning our planning for contingencies arising from a possible unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in Southern Rhodesia. The following information summarizes our preparations to the present time.
The basic US Contingency Paper for Southern Rhodesia of July 2, 19642 is still valid. The Contingency Paper (copy attached) is based on the assumption of a severance of constitutional relations with HMG by the Southern Rhodesian Government. This could occur by a UDI of the SRG or by usurpation of Crown authority through “enacting” independence by a two-thirds majority in the SR Parliament.
The Legal Adviser’s Office has prepared an addendum to the SR Contingency Paper which has now completed Department clearance (copy attached).3 The addendum discusses the legal status of the American Consulate General in Salisbury in the event of a UDI. It is based on our policies of supporting the UK in our relationships with a post-UDI Southern Rhodesia and of retaining an official US presence in SR for as long a time as feasible.
Our Emergency and Evacuation Plan is current and no major problems are foreseen in evacuating the 1825 American citizens and their fireside aliens resident in SR at the end of March 1965. The country is divided into seven areas; each area is the responsibility of a “key man.” Seven telephone calls could alert the key men who in turn would alert US citizens in their areas. In addition, most missionary groups maintain radio contact with their outposts.
The US position in case of a severance of constitutional relations between HMG and SRG would be largely dependent on the extent to which HMG and the Commonwealth would go in imposing punitive action on Southern Rhodesia. US resources available for use in case of UDI are limited, but our national interest dictates support for HMG and the Commonwealth [Page 798] action. We are now engaged in informal consultation with HMG and the Government of Zambia on a possible contingency operation to save Zambia, which is dependent on its copper exports, from economic collapse in case normal transportation, electricity and coal from SR are cut off for any reason following a UDI.
The current US planning position in case of a UDI is based on support for HMG and Commonwealth punitive actions which were most recently threatened by UK Prime Minister Wilson on April 29. These would be of an economic and financial nature primarily. Punitive military action by HMG has been eliminated from HMG planning, at least for the present. Recognition of any minority SRG by the US soon after a UDI would be politically impossible but we would attempt to maintain a skeleton staff at our Consulate General as a symbol to SR Africans of US concern for them. We would cooperate with Commonwealth and African nations working toward a solution of the SR problem. While our traditional policy does not favor recognition of Governments-in-Exile, we would maintain friendly contact with major SR exile organizations. We would support the UK in its appeal to the UN Security Council immediately upon the severance of constitutional relations between HMG and SRG and would support UK endeavors to mobilize UN and world support for economic and financial action against the rebel colony. HMG has hinted guardedly that it might not oppose the entry into SR of an international military force under certain conditions and guarantees.