Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

433. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal¹

CA-2167

Washington, August 23, 1965, 6:37 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Instructions to Lisbon to: (1) Reply to Foreign Minister’s Complaints of U.S. Policy; (2) Reaffirm U.S. Interest in Azores Base and Loran-C Negotiations; (3) Introduce New U.S. Proposal for a Peaceful Resolution of the Portuguese African Question

With timing at your discretion, the Department would appreciate your seeking an early occasion to continue the discussion with Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira in the light of his meeting with the Secretary and the Under Secretary, June 18, 1965, and of your earlier conversations with him in Lisbon, January 11 and March 5, 1965. We see some advantage to your conveying our oral responses to his catalogue of complaints at the same time as you broach your plan for a peaceful resolution of the Portuguese African problem. Additionally, because the Foreign Minister presented his complaints in the context of a request for a clarification of U.S. policy and of our pending requests for a renewal of the Azores bases agreement and the location of Loran-C sites in Portugal, we would suggest you make reaffirmations of basic U.S. policy objectives of maintaining friendly and constructive relations with Portugal and of our interest in both the Azores bases and Loran-C.

We recognize this presents you with a formidable agenda for one meeting but the placing of your plan for Africa in the context of a continuation of earlier meetings might provide a favorable context to introduce your new initiative. However, if in your judgment it would be preferable to separate the response to the complaints and the reaffirmation of our interests in the Azores and Loran-C from your African proposal, you are authorized to request separate meetings. Also, if you believe it desirable, in order to assure that the Prime Minister has an accurate account of our responses to the complaints presented by the Foreign Minister and of your proposal, you may make a similar oral presentation to him—tailoring it for the occasion.

There follows an outline of the points we would like you to make in your presentation.

[Here follow Sections I–III.]

IV. Anderson Plan for Resolving the Portuguese African Question.

A. In introducing your proposal for a peaceful solution of the Portuguese African question, you may wish to set the stage by informing the Foreign Minister that you have been instructed to pick up his conversation with the Secretary at the point where the Secretary asked why Portugal did not hoist a flag around which its friends could rally. You should reiterate the remarks of the Under Secretary, June 18, that the U.S. has a good impression of what Portugal is doing in Angola and Mozambique and that we do not believe the Portuguese have as much to be afraid of as the Minister suggested in his reluctance to endorse a public acceptance by Portugal of a fixed date for self-determination. You should also state, that before discussing the proposal, which the U.S. would like Portugal to consider, the Foreign Minister should recall Secretary’s June 18 reaffirmation that the U.S. would accept the results of a genuine plebiscite, notwithstanding a possible rejection by certain other states, and that we noted with great interest the Foreign Minister’s reply to the Secretary that the Portuguese agreed to the U.S. concept of self-determination. Moreover, we would like to reaffirm the Under Secretary’s observation that if there is a possibility of the Portuguese and the Africans working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement, the communists could be out and the security of the Portuguese African territories protected. Finally, it is the U.S. hope, as stated by the Secretary June 18, that Portugal would help itself in seeking a peaceful solution and a U.S. fear that if Portugal hews to the status quo, its position in Africa will steadily weaken. With these thoughts conveyed to the Foreign Minister, you are authorized to orally introduce your proposal as outlined in Embassy telegrams 652, April 13; 799, June 18; 38, July 23,² and Department telegrams 671, June 9,³ and 19, July 19.⁴

B. Summary of Anderson Plan—In interest of clarity, there is summarized below your plan as modified by above referenced telegrams.

1. Introduction

It is proposed that the U.S. attempt to persuade the Portuguese Government to publicly accept the principle of self-determination for its African territories on the basis of a definite timetable. This action would be combined with a suspension of African nationalist anti-Portuguese activities during that period and carefully tailored political assurances and specified economic inducements being offered to the Portuguese Government in order to forestall the inevitable argument that any deadline would be bound to be telescoped drastically. The proposal is based on the estimate that, at the present juncture when the Portuguese are in a relatively strong position in both Angola and Mozambique, there is an opportunity for Portugal and the Africans to reach agreement for a peaceful resolution of their differences. Key elements of the solution would have to be a transition period leading to self-determination and a cessation of nationalist-inspired violence and subversion, as well as inspiration and support for such actions by the African governments concerned. A full range of choice would be left to the people, and would include maintenance of the present relationship with Portugal, autonomy within a Portuguese commonwealth, or full independence. Aim of the U.S. proposal would be a peaceful transition and creation of stable societies in the Portuguese African territories no matter what political decisions are made by the people.

2. Significant Points to Which the Portuguese would have to agree:

a. Acceptance of a fixed date, for a broadly based plebiscite or referendum in Portugal’s African territories. A full range of choice would be given to all of the inhabitants, and would include maintenance of the present relationship with Portugal, autonomy within a Portuguese commonwealth, or full independence. Plebiscite would have to be free and open and observed by U.N. and O.A.U. representatives. In this initial approach, the U.S. would not propose a specific number of years when the plebiscite should take place but would state that an integral part of the plan would be a Portuguese announcement of a specific time period. In the last analysis, the U.S. would expect and prefer that this question be worked out between the Portuguese and the Africans.

FYI. Reftels reflect Department’s views on the time period which the Africans would seek and what might be a possible compromise. End FYI.

b. Accelerated interim Portuguese effort to improve the social, economic and political status of all of the people of the provinces.

(See paragraph 4g, below, for possible assistance to Portugal by NATO allies.)

c. Granting of increasingly free political activity in the territories in order to assure a meaningful plebiscite, as well as granting full amnesty and repatriation of all refugees. FYI: Problem of amnesty for nationalist leaders would probably be qualified as Portuguese may adamantly refuse to accept certain such individuals whom they regard as “terrorists.” While we recognize this qualification could be a major stumbling block, we would not want the exclusion of a few individuals to impede the over-all progress on this grave and important problem, affecting the millions of inhabitants of these provinces. End FYI.

3. Significant Points to Which Neighboring African States would have to agree:

a. Refusal to permit the use of their national territory as a training or operating base for any anti-Portuguese forces during the interim period preceding the plebiscite.

b. Active support by African governments concerned for a cessation of all nationalist-inspired violence and subversion.

4. Significant Points to which other Selected Nations, most especially the U.S. and other NATO partners would have to agree:

a. U.S. and other NATO allies would encourage Africans to accept and would urge fulfillment of terms of such an agreement.

b. Publicly come out in full support of the agreement once it is adopted.

c. Publicly condemn any violation of terms should such occur subsequently from any quarter. We would make all parties concerned aware of our position on this point from the outset.

d. U.S. would sympathetically consider Portuguese requests for support for any Portuguese complaint at the U.N. if we were satisfied that deliberate and organized violations had taken place.

e. U.S. would be responsive to Portuguese requests for arms purchases if we were satisfied that deliberate and organized violations had taken place. FYI: Likewise, if Portugal violated terms of agreement, the U.S. would consider sympathetically African requests for support. End FYI.

f. FYI: U.S. would guarantee to maintain maximum political pressure on Portugal so that rights of all concerned would be protected within the Portuguese multi-racial communities, without distinction or race, creed or color. End FYI.

g. During transition period, the U.S. would itself provide and would encourage other NATO allies to provide, if Portugal so requests, economic and technical support for Portuguese efforts to develop its African territories. FYI: Question of participation and observation by U.N. and its specialized agencies in development programs and of possible invitation to OAU member states to provide economic and technical assistance are considered to be second-echelon problems to be worked out with Portugal only after broad agreement in principle had proven to be possible. End FYI.

h. At such time as Portugal agrees to U.S. proposal, we would propose to make an initial approach to selected African leaders before Portugal would undertake such discussions. We would hope that Portuguese talks with African leaders would initiate a dialogue which might result in meaningful negotiations.

Please confirm by telegram when you have met with the Foreign Minister as it is the Department’s intention to convey the substance of the foregoing to the Portuguese Ambassador following your meeting in Lisbon.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL PORT–US. Secret. Drafted by Funseth and Robert H. Edwards of IO/UNP; cleared by George B. High of AFC, Fredericks, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Joseph J. Sisco, George L. Warren of G/PM, Harry A. Quinn of ARA/BR, AID Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Herman Kleine, Thomas Pape of E/ITED, and Col. Smyser, Lloyd, and Colonel Lardner of OASD/ISA; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Luanda and Lourenco Marques.
2. None printed. (Ibid., AID PORT)
3. Telegram 671 to Lisbon, June 9, stated that the present juncture offered an opportunity for Portugal and the Africans to reach agreement on a peaceful resolution of their differences, and noted that the key elements of such a solution would have to be a transition period leading to self-determination and cessation of nationalist-inspired violence and subversion. (Ibid., POL 10 PORT)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., AID PORT)
5. In telegram 93 from Lisbon, September 3, Anderson reported that he had conveyed the U.S. proposal to Foreign Minister Nogueira on September 2. The Foreign Minister responded that he could not comment immediately and officially upon a proposal of such scope, which would require personal consideration by Salazar and other members of the government. (Ibid., PORT–US)