Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

430. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)¹

Washington, January 8, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Luncheon with Roswell Gilpatric, January 9—Summary of his Report and of Recent Developments in Portugal and its Territories

For background use in your luncheon meeting with Mr. Gilpatric, I have summarized below: I. his report on his trip to Lisbon, Angola and Mozambique, August 26–September 15, 1964, and, II. recent developments in Portugal and its territories subsequent to his trip.

I. Summary of Gilpatric Report.

A. Mr. Gilpatric’s Over-all Impressions

1. Evidence of economic growth and social advancement in provinces. Remaining problems: economic imbalance (particularly in Mozambique), need for capital and job opportunities.

2. Improved status of natives—education, public health, housing, employment and mobility—under admittedly paternalistic system.

3. Recognition that some political change, i.e., more autonomy for provinces, is inevitable; no consensus on timing and no public acknowledgement for fear of generating pressure for deadline.

4. Determination for the present to maintain Portuguese presence—in some form—in provinces and sufficiency of Portuguese forces to insure same under foreseeable conditions.

5. Unlikelihood that Portugal will be swerved from present objectives, given support throughout all sectors of Portuguese society and with prospects of capital investment from South Africa, Germany and Belgium; also recent developments in Congo, Malawi, Southern Rhodesia, etc.

B. Gilpatric’s Conclusions and Recommendations.

1. Continued Portuguese administration of overseas provinces is preferable to other immediate alternatives; economic and social progress is now being made consistent with steps needed to prepare for ultimate self-government, institutional forms for which now in formation; without Portugal’s presence there would be a dangerous vacuum inviting major conflict among neighboring powers, particularly over Mozambique.

2. U.S. interim acceptance of status quo south of Congo—Northern Rhodesia, Malawi, Tanzania—would not be inconsistent with support of nationalism in middle Africa.

3. U.S. should not underestimate capacity of Communists—Soviet and Chinese—for mischief in middle Africa through penetration and infiltration on both east and west.

4. Since U.S. cannot change present Portuguese policies, it should avoid, both in bilateral relationships and before U.N., exacerbating differences. Granting that neither side is likely to make major shift in near term—i.e., Portugal will not publicly recognize inevitability of more autonomy and ultimate self-government for provinces or any target dates for those eventualities, and U.S.-U.K. cannot retreat from declared positions supporting principle of self-determination—U.S. and Portugal should make interim accommodations by “mutual example” or reciprocation rather than by agreement: such as

a. in case of Portugal, allowing U.S. to establish Loran-C sites and continued occupation of Azores bases, and

b. in case of U.S., removing restrictions on purchase by Portugal of spare parts in U.S. and perhaps more U.S. military equipment (with stipulation against use in Africa), and abstaining from U.S. actions inimical to Portugal (assuming latter continues efforts to parley with African neighbors).

II. Recent Developments in Portugal and its Territories.

A. Non-MAP Aircraft Spare Parts: The United States presently sends Portugal no spare parts for aircraft operating in Portuguese Africa under our policy which prohibits sales of all Munitions List items intended for Portugal’s African territories. A change in the policy would be heavily attacked in the U.N. Mr. Gilpatric’s suggestion that the U.S. remove restrictions on purchase by Portugal of spare parts in U.S. has been under careful consideration, but the Department has not reached agreement on the desirability (or feasibility) of making a basic change in U.S. arms policy towards Portugal at this time. Meanwhile, pending such a decision, we have suspended action on the most recent request by a private U.S. supplier to sell some obsolescent F–84 aircraft engines to the Portuguese Air Force, i.e., we have not rejected the export license application. (The aircraft in question are approximately 22 F–84G jet fighter-bombers which the Portuguese originally received under MAP and which they purchased from us in 1961 for the token price of $6,000 each when the aircraft were declared excess to Portuguese NATO needs and for which the U.S. had no further need.)

B. MAP F–86 Aircraft and Loran-C Negotiations: The Portuguese have informed our Embassy that the last of the eight F–86 aircraft of MAP origin were repatriated from Portuguese Guinea to Metropolitan Portugal December 24, 1964. With return evident, Ambassador Anderson had remarked to Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira on December 21 that, with the F–86 problem resolved, he hoped we could now begin negotiations for the location of Loran-C transmitter sites on Portuguese territory. The Foreign Minister said there were still other problems between the United States and Portugal, citing the Azores and “tantalite.” The Ambassador reminded the Foreign Minister that they had already agreed to separate the question of the Azores base question from the Loran-C negotiations. The question of suspected diversion of the strategic ore, tantalite to the Soviet Union, by Portuguese producers in Mozambique, in violation of COCOM rules, is one the Portuguese Government could resolve by imposing the necessary restrictions. Thus far, they have not been willing to take the necessary steps, although we have brought ample information to their attention.

C. Portuguese Purchase of German F–86: The most serious problem affecting U.S.-Portuguese relations at present is the Portuguese attempt to purchase 65 F–86 aircraft from Germany which the Germans bought from Canadair, a Canadian firm, in 1956. These aircraft had been produced in Canada under the provisions of a 1949 licensing agreement between the U.S. and Canadian Air Force which prohibited their transfer without the concurrence of the U.S. Government. Our Embassy in Lisbon has reported that the Portuguese Air Force intends to use some of these aircraft in Portuguese Africa, notwithstanding the assurances they reportedly gave to the Germans that the aircraft would be used only for NATO purposes and on the European continent. The Canadians have requested that we join them in an attempt to dissuade the Germans from selling the aircraft. We declined, recommending to Canada that they, having sold the aircraft to Germany, might consider making a formal attempt to persuade the Germans from making the sale. Subsequently, we agreed that the Canadians could inform the Germans that the United States shared Canada’s concern and that, if asked the United States position, they could suggest that the German ask the U.S. government.

Ambassador Anderson has stated that if the sale is blocked, the U.S. will almost certainly be blamed, Loran-C negotiations will probably be negated, and there is a chance that the Portuguese will give us an eviction notice from the Azores.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 60, NSAM File. Secret. The source text indicates that Ball saw this memorandum.