43. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1
There seems little alternative but to agree now to renegotiate our Libyan base agreement, in hopes this will defuse the issue. Our best friends in the Libyan Government (the King and PM) plead that we do so. They’ve panicked in the face of an outburst of Libyan nationalism, and face an aroused Parliament demanding prompt abrogation of the US/UK treaties. Nasser started off the parade by criticizing the bases, but clearly both his action and Libyan popular hysteria were stimulated by the Arab-Israeli issue.
Our ability to resist is undermined by UK agreement to renegotiate its base rights. Actually, the UK treaty had a renegotiation clause, while ours is legally good till 1971. Yet if we stall now, we’ll almost certainly face a Libyan parliamentary motion for abrogation which the regime will be unwilling to block. We want to save this regime (the best we could have), and also protect our oil investment, now $670 million. So State, our Embassy, and our Libyan friends recommend we be forthcoming now to sidetrack demands for abrogation. We would then hope to spin out negotiations, and finally agree to a reduced tenure which will buy us three-five more years. Much will depend on whether external factors affecting US-Arab relations set the Libyans off again. But it’s worth the try.
- McG. Bundy
- R.W. Komer
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I, 11/63–6/64. Secret.↩