427. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central African Affairs (O’Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)1
SUBJECT
- Deterioration of the Angolan Liberation Movement
Considerable thought has gone into Leopoldville tel 1491 (attached)2 which gives the Country Team’s assessment of the mounting difficulties inside the Angolan liberation movement.
The Country Team reports the GRAE complex as a whole seems to be slowly running down and Roberto himself is desperately short of funds. The Congo (Leo) Government has refused to cooperate with GRAE in permitting the importation of arms. The ALNA (the GRAE army) is increasingly ineffective, and has been racked by mutinies and deserted by many of the southerners. It is chronically short of food and ammunition, and largely cut off from its own forces inside Angola where nationalist activity has virtually ceased.
The political groupings within the GRAE are at odds with one another, and dissension within each of these groups further undermines [Page 746] the political structure. While a number of the students who left the GRAE with Jonas Savimbi have become disillusioned with him and are turning back to the GRAE, the Embassy questions how significant this support will be over the short term. Savimbi’s new party is still a negligible fact except for weakening GRAE’s claim to represent all of Angola.
Embassy Assessment. The Embassy believes it would be a mistake to hold Tshombe responsible for this decline since much of it predated his appointment as Premier. However, Tshombe’s accession has intensified GRAE problems. The Embassy believes most Congolese, including Tshombe, see no Angolan leaders strong enough to lead the country to early independence, and, in contrast, they believe the Portuguese are so strong and determined to hold on that they (the Congolese) are not willing to take many risks.
The Embassy ascribes the present declining fortunes of GRAE to:
- 1.
- Fragmentation of the nationalist movement.
- 2.
- The paucity of materiel and ineffectiveness of political assistance—the reluctance or inability of African powers to contribute needed funds and equipment.
- 3.
- The lack of a “nation”-wide uprising in Angola, and the continuing tribal friction in Angola and within GRAE.
In the face of this, the Country Team believes it is unlikely that Roberto will long be saved from the consequences of his failure to achieve any marked successes against the Portuguese or in organizing the GRAE. While the Embassy believes Roberto cannot be written off at this point, it reports that some of the most experienced observers in Leopoldville do not believe Roberto is the man to organize the GRAE to enable it to effectively carry on the liberation struggle. It believes the consequences of this decline in the GRAE could be very unhappy for the West. It foresees the most likely alternative leadership to Roberto as being the pro-Chinese Viriato da Cruz or others who can swing the support of the Chicoms or the Russians. With the Western role necessarily circumscribed by relations with Portugal, there will be increasing opportunities for the Communists to extend their influence over the Angolan nationalists, especially as the frustrations of the Angolan leaders grow owing to lack of military and political progress in their campaign. The Embassy comments that if in the meantime Portugal fails to train Angolans to run their own affairs, when independence comes the United States may wake up to find the only effective leadership at the very least is beholden to the Communist bloc.
AFC Comment. The Country Team’s views and analysis are very close to our own. John Marcum, the closest American to Roberto, now questions Roberto’s leadership ability and potential.