Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

423. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 71–64

Washington, July 1, 1964.

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE AFRICAN NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

The Problem

To estimate the prospects of the African nationalist movement in Angola and Mozambique over the next year or so.

Conclusions

A. The guerrilla activities of Angolan nationalists have been for the past two years confined by the Portuguese military to sporadic fighting in a restricted northern area. There is little evidence of active dissidence elsewhere in Angola. The Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE), in Leopoldville, is the political backing of the guerrillas. The GRAE is autocratically but inefficiently controlled by Holden Roberto; it is torn by internal dissension and tribal rivalries and disheartened by its lack of progress. Roberto will probably seek help, including arms, from the USSR and Communist China, and we foresee some increase in Communist influence in the next year or so. (Paras. 8, 11, 14, 16–17, 21)

B. Roberto may be forced by others in the GRAE to share control and direction, but probably not for some months at least. The Angolan nationalist movement will be able to keep the rebellion alive at the present level if, as seems likely, it retains access to the Congo sanctuary, but we do not believe it will seriously challenge Portugal’s hold in Angola over the next year of so. (Paras. 18–20, 22–23)

C. The principal nationalist movement in Mozambique is Mondlane’s Frelimo. The movement has not yet progressed to the point of open fighting, though a few raids and excursions in the north, based on Tanganyika, are likely during the next year or so. The Portuguese military and security services appear to have control of the situation and the Mozambique nationalist movement is more important in terms of African politics than as a physical threat. (Paras. 28–29, 35–37)

D. Despite a few steps to liberalize their colonial policy, the Portuguese have not taken, and are not likely to take, any significant steps to meet the pressures brought on them to move towards self-determination or independence for their African territories. Portugal may be able to preserve its present control of Angola and Mozambique for a good many years. But, we believe that the growing political and military costs of maintaining control of the African provinces will almost certainly force Portugal eventually to accommodate to nationalist aspirations for self-determination and independence.² (Paras. 1–5, 41)

[Here follows the body of the paper.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on July 1.
2. The longer term Portuguese position will be discussed in an NIE on Portugal scheduled for August, 1964. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 27.2–64, “Prospects for Portugal,” was issued on August 5, 1964.]