Office of the Historian

393. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1

Washington, November 27, 1967, p.m.

WWR:

SUBJECT

  • Comments on State’s proposed itinerary for a Vice Presidential trip to Africa

1. I think it is a very close question whether the Vice President should go to Nigeria while the civil war is going on. Joe Palmer thinks he should go, and I am not comfortable arguing against a man who has spent three years as Ambassador to Nigeria. But I think we would have to realize that—however carefully the Vice President’s speeches are drafted—his visit would be a clear and unmistakable political signal that [Page 670] we have moved off the hands-off position in the civil war. At the very least, the rebels would broadcast strong statements to the effect that we have abandoned our peace-making role and lined up with the Russians and the British in support of the “neo-colonialist puppet regime in Lagos.”

Of course there is a case for doing just that. Our hands-off posture rests in large part on a strong suspicion that the feds can’t lick the rebels, and that we will have to deal with the sovereign state of “Biafra” in the years ahead. The first few months of the war seemed to confirm this prediction. The last few months—since the arrival of Soviet weapons in Lagos—suggest that Gowon’s forces will prevail. Thus, there is an argument that now is the time to repair our relations with the winning side by a gratuitous and newsworthy political gesture such as a Vice Presidential visit.

But, on balance, I still think it is more trouble than it is worth:

(i)
It still isn’t at all clear when or if the Ibo rebels will be put out of business. They are in bad trouble, but they could bounce back fast in the event of a number of plausible contingencies ranging from outside military help (probably Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia) to collapse of the Gowon regime (which always suffers some level of internecine strife).
(ii)
If we make this gesture and somehow Gowon does get into trouble, we will be in a more difficult position to refuse him military help. (We will, of course, be in a difficult position anyway if a Biafran revival is based on help from the Portuguese and/or the white supremacists.)
(iii)
Even if the feds win, the Vice President’s visit would make us fair game as negotiators and financiers of the sticky problems of peace—a large group of refugees (perhaps in the millions) fleeing across the border to Cameroon, arrangements for the safety of the conquered Ibos, etc.
(iv)
There is an excellent chance that a Gowon victory would bring bloody violence ranging from tribal massacres of Ibos to summary trial and execution of the rebel leaders. It may not be a pretty thing to be associated with.
(v)
There is the added danger that this violence may occur while the Vice President is in Nigeria, or after his public itinerary had been announced, making it politically difficult for him not to go.

For these reasons—and recognizing that it is a 51–49 bet—I come out against a Vice Presidential visit to Nigeria in January.2

[Here follows discussion of other aspects of the proposed itinerary.]

EH
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Nigeria. Confidential. A note in Rostow’s handwriting on the source text reads: “You sound sensible, as usual. R.”↩
  2. Nigeria was dropped from the Vice President’s proposed itinerary.↩