Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

387. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, May 31, 1967, 7 p.m.

WWR:

SUBJECT

• Nigeria situation report

1. After eleven months of slow deterioration—in which we played every card in our limited hand to maintain unity—the Eastern region declared itself the independent Republic of Biafra yesterday morning.

2. Gowon responded with a public statement that the East had committed an “act of rebellion” which “must be crushed.” (He later softened “crushed” to “contained.”) He reimposed the economic blockade of the East, and ordered full mobilization of the Federal army. (In practice, mobilization will add little to the 9,000 troops now under Gowon’s command; there are no reserves to call up. The Eastern army totals about 7,000 men—better trained and positioned than Gowon’s troops.)

3. Gowon called in the U.S. and British Ambassadors yesterday afternoon. He said that he planned to take action against the East, and asked for military help, apparently implying troops. Both Ambassadors immediately replied that this was out of the question. Gowon retreated to a request for tactical aircraft and a naval presence. Again the Ambassadors refused. As a final shot, Gowon asked what the U.S./British would do if “others” intervened on the side of the East. The Ambassadors replied that this was a hypothetical question which they could not answer.²

4. Gowon did indicate in the above conversation that he would cooperate in any evacuation of British and American citizens.

5. Late yesterday afternoon we instructed our Embassies in London and Lagos to approach the British urgently to set in motion our joint evacuation plan for dependents and non-essential personnel. This first stage involves a commercially-operated airlift (PanAm and the British airlines). The instruction reflects our unanimous judgment (Katzenbach included) that we can no longer give reasonable assurance of the safety of more than 7,000 American citizens in Nigeria, and that an evacuation order will not bring on substantially greater instability.

6. HMG (Saville Garner) replied this morning that they can give us no final answer until tomorrow, but that they lean toward the view that the threat is not yet serious enough to justify evacuation. In any event, Garner said, HMG will be heavily influenced by the views of the British Ambassador to Nigeria.

7. The approach to the British in Lagos was even less fruitful. We have the full text of what the UK Ambassador recommended to London. Essentially, he advised against any evacuation of the whole of Nigeria—now or in the future—and against immediate evacuation of the East. His arguments are (1) it isn’t clear whether we face a prolonged conflict or a “foray;” (2) evacuation would seriously disrupt the Nigerian economy, particularly in the East, and would bring the British into disfavor with Biafra; (3) many Brits would refuse to leave; and (4) British citizens might well be safe in a successful attack on the East if they followed instructions and “kept their heads down.” He summarized that he would not recommend evacuation until “British subjects become a target.”

8. At this point, which is about 2:30 this afternoon, the story trails off. We know there are several messages which have been sent from Lagos, but not received. We have received word that our Ambassador has instructed our Consul in the East to advise U.S. dependents to leave that region. We do not know whether he has done the same in the other regions. (This is of great political importance in terms of U.S. even-handedness, which will largely determine the nature of our post-independence relations with Biafra.) Joe Palmer has sent a flash inquiry to find out what is going on. We assume our man is moving forward with a Nigeria-wide evacuation.

9. Whatever the present facts, as I reported to you yesterday we propose to proceed—with or without the British—with commercial evacuation of dependents and non-essential personnel from all regions. We shall probably have to let this be known publicly tomorrow if Lagos has not already announced it. I will furnish George Christian with guidance and stand by to help with the briefing if necessary.

EH

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Aides File, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 29. Secret. The memorandum was passed to President Johnson with a May 31 covering note from Rostow at 7:50 p.m.
2. Telegram 9607 from Lagos, May 30, reported these exchanges and other details of the two Ambassadors’ discussion with Gowon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA)