Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

385. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, May 25, 1967.

WWR:

SUBJECT

• Nigeria

I suspect that events are about to take a nasty turn in Nigeria. I won’t bore you with a blow-by-blow, but, on the whole, I think we have played our own hand well. (We simply don’t hold many high cards.) Nevertheless, the fact is that the dissolution of Nigeria is imminent—barring miracles. The primary operational questions we now face are:

• —Can we salvage the most useful tokens of unity—a common currency, a single representative at the UN, etc? (A common army is clearly out of the question.)
• —Can we avoid civil war?
• —Can we provide reasonable assurance of the safety of the 7,000 Americans in Nigeria, and/or evacuate them efficiently if necessary?

Let me preface my answers with a brief analysis of the present situation.

Where we are

There are four major political actors on the Nigerian scene: (1) Colonel Gowon, chief of the central government; (2) Colonel Ojukwu, military governor of the East; (3) Chief Awolowo, leader of the Yoruba tribe which controls the West; and (4) General Katsina, military governor of the North. As you know, the main lines of conflict are between the North and the East. The North is large, populous, and backward; the East is smaller, relatively rich (oil, etc.), relatively well-educated, and dominated by the Ibo tribe which has a long-standing feud with the northern Hausas. The North wants a strong northern-controlled central government; the East favors the loosest possible confederation of autonomous regions.

After a long, dreary slide, the parties are now at the following positions:

1. Ojukwu has laid all the groundwork for secession, right down to the name of the new country (“Biafra”). He probably could not stop the train now if he wanted to. Our intelligence indicates that he may be planning either to declare independence within the next few days or to propose tomorrow that the regions form a “confederation” which would leave each with “an international personality.” The federal government would be reduced to a secretariat to nurture economic relations between almost totally separate states. Ojukwu has fomented so much independence fever that he probably couldn’t accept a tighter federal arrangement at this point without threatening his political future.

2. Awolowo has paved the way for secession of the West if the East secedes. He would probably still prefer a federation—the West will have a difficult economic time of it alone. But he thinks the West would be better off on its own than in an unequal partnership with the North. He has persuaded the western Military Governor to demand that Gowon remove all northern troops now stationed in the West. Gowon has agreed to do so by the end of May. It remains to be seen whether he has enough control to carry it off. If he doesn’t, there may soon be fighting in the West.

3. The North is run by a loose collection of Moslem emirs, under the rather precarious control of Katsina. (It is never quite clear who controls whom.) We have solid intelligence that the northern segments of the army are preparing to fight the East if Ojukwu secedes. Katsina’s role in this is uncertain. He may not be able to keep the army quiet in the face of secession even if he wants to, and there will certainly be strong forces at work to dissuade him from wanting to. Aside from tribal hatred, the most powerful northern fear is that dissolution of the federation would cost them their route to the sea. (They are already at work on arrangements for trade routes through Dahomey.)

4. Gowon remains the most reconstructed leader of northern origin, but he is rapidly fading as a major influence. The history of his problems is not entirely to his discredit. But, as things now stand, Ojukwu refuses to have anything to do with him; the northerners are extremely unhappy with his “softness” toward the East; he is distrusted in the West; and he has largely shot his bolt in bargaining terms. He may have sealed his own fate last week with an abortive proposal that British troops guarantee the security of a meeting of the regional Military Governors; Ojukwu dismissed the suggestion out of hand and made it clear that the British are finished as mediators as far as the East is concerned. Gowon made a last-ditch effort to save the day over the weekend by rescinding the economic sanctions against the East, but it now seems that Ojukwu will not reciprocate, and that the only effect of Gowon’s announcement was to multiply his problems in the North.

In summary, the probabilities now argue for: (1) an Ojukwu ultimatum calling for a very loose confederation on pain of immediate secession; (2) a wishy-washy answer from Gowon which will not satisfy anybody; (3) a public statement by Awolowo favoring Ojukwu’s proposal, but promising that the West will secede if Gowon drags his feet; (4) serious pressure in the North, probably reflected in the army, for military action against the East—perhaps resulting in violence.

Options

My own considered judgment is that no foreign power can assert anything like decisive influence on the Nigerian situation without commitment of major resources—troops and money. On balance, I don’t think it is worth such a commitment on our part.

Three outside influences are relevant to the Nigerian problem: other African states, particularly Ghana; the British; and the U.S. (All Nigerian factions are opposed to taking this matter up in the U.N. Unless and until there is widespread violence, most Afro-Asians will probably agree.) The Ghanaians have been heavily involved in mediation. General Ankrah has been to see all of the Nigerian leaders several times, and Ghana was the site of the last meeting of Military Governors. Ankrah is not persona non grata with them now; he simply has run out of things to sell—and Ojukwu has built up secession pressure to the point where there is no more time to develop new solutions. Unfortunately, mediation by other African leaders has become a cause celebre, with Ojukwu pushing for a conciliation panel of Nasser, Haile Selassie, etc., and Gowon opposing any non-Nigerian influence. Both sides have made clear that they want nothing to do with the OAU, although Diallo Telli has visited Nigeria several times of late.

The British, always viewed with some suspicion, seem now to have ruined themselves entirely by their tacit support of Gowon’s proposed meeting guaranteed by British arms. Both sides have also rejected the idea of a Commonwealth peace mission.

Our own situation is by far the best of the three. We have been very strong for unity, but have generally managed to keep from being tarred by either side with favoritism for the other—although we are suspected by both. We also have $15 million per year in technical assistance to use as leverage. The truth is, however, that unless we are prepared to risk another Katanga, we don’t have the bilateral tools to affect the outcome. We can marginally influence the method of change—particularly, I hope, limit violence—but the unity question is beyond us. Our real choice is whether to go all out now with some sort of grandstand diplomatic play, or to keep our powder dry so as to have the best possible start with the successor states.

Our best diplomatic play would probably be a Presidential emissary to all the regional capitals—with or without fanfare—carrying a personal Presidential request for a new try at preserving unity. For my own part, I would vote against this, and I am confident Secretary Rusk and Joe Palmer would agree. My principal objection is that it wouldn’t work. We are simply beyond the stage at which anybody with a solely diplomatic mandate could get any of the sides to about-face. We might gain a month; there might even be a new meeting of the Military Governors. But the cost would be much greater U.S. involvement; correspondingly greater subsequent pressure for U.S. intervention when the talks broke down and/or degenerated into violence; and, almost certainly, some feeling in the East that the United States had chosen sides against her.

Thus, painful as it is, my advice is that we sweat it out and prepare to deal with whatever configuration of autonomous states emerges. In the meantime, of course, we should continue to press for whatever tokens of unity are possible. I think there is considerable hope that we can preserve a common currency and common public utilities. But we should take no action which would indelibly identify us with any of the factions.

Violence and Evacuation

We have an elaborate joint evacuation plan with the British. I think it is adequate. We have also worked out detailed contingency plans for all the specific problems which would arise from any of the likely degenerative processes. Of course, any action to evacuate will increase instability and probably enlarge the chances of violence. Thus, the critical question will be when to begin. This should be a Presidential decision.

You should know that the evacuation plan does call for the use of one rifle company to guard the C–130s while they land, load, and take off. The British will make a similar commitment. This is the minimum military involvement (about 200 U.S. soldiers) we will be able to get away with if evacuation is necessary.

I know this is a bleak picture. I paint it in this detail to demonstrate that the fact that we are not pushing for some Presidential action now reflects neither disinterest nor optimism. It flows from the fundamental fact that we are marginal to the deepest problems in Nigeria, and that it would take an enormous—and unwarranted—investment to become an important influence.

You may want to give the President a precis of this situation if opportunity should arise. (You might also remind him that African politics have a way of charging headlong to the very edge of the cliff and then unaccountably drawing back. With luck, we may be treated to another such experience.)

EH

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Secret.