357. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State1
1723. Personal for President and Secretary of State from Harriman. In long talks with Prime Minister Abubakar and Foreign Minister Wachuku, both expressed great respect for President Johnson and his policies, and manner in which he is giving leadership. They both indicated grave concern over Congo, felt much time had been lost by UN in failing to gain troops and police, and otherwise help Congolese Government. Efforts must now be made to assist Adoula attain stability after UN leaves in June, which will be most difficult. They want to work with us and are ready to consider leaving troops and police if asked by Adoula. Would need, however, burden sharing on formula used in Tanganyika—Nigerians pay salaries but Tanganyikans pay other expenses of troops. They urge we use our influence with Belgian Government as well as Adoula to have Belgians play leading role in every way possible as only country which had needed knowledge and ability. They are ready to work closely with us in all aspects of problem. They fear Soviet and Chinese efforts to undermine as well as Rhodesian, South African and Portuguese support for possible Tshombe military intervention.
Both expressed desire our support in achieving African objectives but showed some understanding when I explained difficulties with Salazar. Prime Minister admitted Home had stated categorically that UK would not support economic sanctions against South Africa. Both indicated however they did not agree with Home and felt it was European and US responsibility to force change.
Both showed a suspicious attitude towards France and French policy in Africa and also resented French failure to assume any responsibility in Congo and other African problems outside former colonies.
They expressed gratitude for our aid and although intend to retain intimacy with UK feel they have much in common with US including growing pains of a federation and post colonial difficulties.
Both minimized concern I expressed for Communist takeover in Zanzibar, assured me that if UK and US gave needed help there was no [Page 611] danger of Communist control. Karume was sensible and Babu was primarily African nationalist and would not permit Communist takeover. When I pressed Wachuku, he firmly insisted he could guarantee Babu whom he had personally known a long time.
They intended to play leading role OAU, and strongly desire Lagos as headquarters.
They have no confidence in Nkrumah and expressed fear, having failed to gain other support, he would fall under Soviet and even more so Chinese Communist domination.
Prime Minister expressed personal hostility to British Labor leaders including Wilson because of their criticism if Nigerian justice on Enahoro extradition case.
My last call was on President Azikiwe who received me most cordially and informally. He then proceeded to read an eloquent statement of Nigerian objectives and friendship for US. (Statement in separate telegram later released to press by President.) In conversation that followed he confirmed his government’s desire to assist Congo. Also expressed appreciation US aid and asked me to convey warm personal message of respect and admiration to President Johnson.
Talks throughout showed a sober determination to take leadership in African affairs and strong desire to obtain our support. They recognized need for moderating influence on impatient African leaders. They are prepared to give help to other countries but recognize their own shortage of trained personnel and resources.
Detailed report follows.2
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Africa, Box 31, Harriman’s Trip, 3/64. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House.↩
- Further documentation on Harriman’s trip to Nigeria and other African countries during the last week of March 1964 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 HARRIMAN and POL NIGERIA–US.↩