Office of the Historian

356. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze)1

Washington, December 16, 1968.

Dear Paul:

I want to thank you for your letter of September 6 on Kagnew Station.2 A great deal of work has evidently gone into this study. I am sincerely grateful.

We have weighed the various factors—first and foremost our security interests and also the volatility of the political situation in Ethiopia and the Horn—in trying to work out the most prudent course of action. Our objective is to find ways of dealing with the heart of the problem: Ethiopia is too uncertain a location for an installation as important as Kagnew.

We could decide to accept the risks of being expelled, either by political pressures or by deterioration of the security situation, and try to hold on until that time, or at least almost until the point where we would have to provide troops to protect our people.

Alternatively, we can begin a progressive phase-down of our activities at Kagnew, stopping any additions and sorting out those already there as you have suggested, and plan for various contingencies in the future. An early phasing-down of some Kagnew activities would lessen the apparent value of the Station to the U.S., and could thus increase the chances of retaining its most important functions over a longer period; both the IEG and the dissidents would be less inclined to believe the Station provides them with strong leverage over the U.S.

Consequently, I propose the following:

1.
We confirm our present policy of adding no more functions to Kagnew, undertaking no new construction, and acquiring no additional land.
2.

We pursue vigorously a sorting-out of present activities in order to reduce or eliminate marginal ones; select out and reallocate those that could be performed by other systems now or in the next few years; and identify those remaining ones which must either continue to be performed at Kagnew or be relocated, probably with overlap to assure continuity.

I recognize that the last category listed above is the most difficult. Therefore, I propose singling out activities which should be continued [Page 609] elsewhere to avoid interruption and those which could be handled temporarily without new construction now at other sites in the event of forced withdrawal.

3.
Meanwhile, we should continue to refine our planning for an eventual withdrawal so that we can soon have in hand a scenario that will permit us to carry out an orderly phase-down, if necessary, well before our present agreement expires in 1978. The preparation of such a plan should put us in a better position to anticipate the problems should such a contingency arise.

If you concur, I propose that our staffs continue their work and prepare an annual report on progress made toward the objective.

Sincerely,

Nicholas deB Katzenbach 3
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 ETH–US. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but a typed note indicates the letter was redrafted in U.↩
  2. Document 355.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that indicates Katzenbach signed the original.↩