354. Intelligence Note1

No. 705

SUBJECT

  • Somali-Ethiopian Relations Turn a Corner

Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Egal’s September 1–4 visit to Ethiopia has broken the deadlock between the two countries. The Ethiopians, who had hinted that concessions were in the offing, have agreed to suspend emergency measures in the Somali-inhabited Ogaden, long a stumbling block to improved relations. Ingrained distrust and technical details remain to be overcome but for the first time in many months the detente first offered by Egal in July 1967 has begun to gain momentum.

The Ante. According to the communique signed September 4 by Egal and Ethiopian Prime Minister Aklilou Abte Wold, emergency measures will be relaxed on September 16. Ethiopia will return confiscated Somali vehicles with compensation for damages. It has given permission for flights between Mogadiscio and Hargeisa to overfly the Ogaden area of Ethiopia (see map).2 The two governments agreed to negotiate cultural, [Page 605] telecommunications, and trade agreements. A joint ministerial consultative committee was set up for the periodic discussion of problems between the two countries.

Earlier Omens. The break-through ended a summer of deteriorating relations, marked by raids, counter-raids, and mutual recrimination. Egal—faced with doubters in Parliament, threatened by the coming March 1969 elections, and under pressure from his army—badly needed proof of Ethiopia’s good will. In Somali eyes Ethiopia’s posture was unyielding and signified an attempt to exploit Egal’s move toward detente to build up Ethiopian military might. It led Egal to consider purchasing additional Soviet arms. There were mutterings within the Somali Army of a possible need for the military to take over the government. In these circumstances Ethiopia, aware that Egal is its best hope for stabilizing relations with Somalia, at last moved to help Egal with much-needed concessions.

Why the Change? Ethiopian action on the detente has often bogged down in acrid dispute between moderates and hardliners. Emperor Haile Selassie, preoccupied by the war in Nigeria, had evidently given little consideration to meeting Egal halfway. Detailed proposals for concessions were, however, submitted to him by Chief of Staff Gen. Iyassu Mengesha on August 14. The US weighed in strongly in favor of a forthcoming response. Shortly afterwards, the Emperor invited Egal to visit Addis Ababa.

Changing Signals. Hawkish Ethiopian civil servants and army officers, long conditioned to a philosophy of external threat, have already reacted to the talks by grumbling about a “sellout to the Somalis.” A few higher officials are apparently even assuring them that the measures can be rescinded, blaming the US for pressing Ethiopia to make the concessions. While the Ethiopian negotiators did not insist on a quid pro quo, they will be scrutinizing Egal’s handling of anti-Ethiopian organizations in his country. His actions, and his countrymen’s reactions, will determine how fast Ethiopia moves in following through on its commitments—in particular, in tackling the thorny problems of how it polices the border areas. The Emperor can be expected to throw his weight behind the peacemakers headed by Prime Minister Aklilou, but the actions of lower officials and army officers anxious to throw a monkey wrench into the peace machinery could still create difficulties.

Next Steps. The success of the Egal mission, well covered in Ethiopian news media, has given rise to heady optimism in Addis Ababa. Enthusiastic Somalis predict a meeting between the Emperor and Somali President Abdirascid Ali Shermarche, perhaps at the September 13–16 Algiers Summit. Ethiopian officials are allegedly considering secretly financing Egal’s campaign expenses. Prime Minister Aklilou has said that, once the problems of border controls are settled, he is ready to [Page 606] negotiate the elimination of customs duties, and to enter into the joint development of the water resources of the Juba and Webi Shibeli rivers. Egal arrived in Addis Ababa with reservations about Ethiopian sincerity; he left convinced the Emperor supports the detente. The question is now whether the euphoria will be succeeded by concrete accomplishment.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–SOMALI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted as a memorandum from Director of INR Thomas L. Hughes to Rusk.
  2. Not printed.