335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia1

184357. Ref: Addis 3835 and 3776.2

For Addis.

1.
Very much appreciate your efforts discourage IEG obsession with jet bomber purchases, despite difficulties encountered.
2.
In your continuing campaign, assume you will point out: (a) if IEG wants provoke Somalis into asking Soviets for bombers, MIG-21’s or SAM’s, this is surest way of doing it; (b) we see absolutely no reason or need for “strategic deterrent,” as we indicated to General Iyassu during HIM visit; (c) in view MinFin Yilma’s request for budgetary aid during HIM visit, and 1966 decline in foreign exchange reserves, not to mention emphasis on economic self-help as basis for US aid, Ethiopian purchase bombers will create most adverse reaction here.
3.
For London: Request you clarify apparent discrepancy between assurances from Ambassador Bromley and HMG that normal commercial credit terms being offered and BAC statement that they offering 15-year terms. Leave your discretion whether higher level approach necessary. Depending on information you provide, we considering new approach to UK Embassy here, possibly at higher level.3
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Walker on April 27; cleared by Officer in Charge of United Kingdom Affairs Thomas M. Judd, Wolf, and Bader in DOD/ISA; and approved by Looram. Also sent to London, and repeated to Asmara, Paris, CINCMEAFSA, and Moscow.
  2. In telegram 3776 from Addis Ababa, April 22, Ambassador Korry reported that a British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) salesman was in Addis Ababa to discuss a possible sale of Canberra jet bombers to Ethiopia. The British Ambassador had told him the British Government was offering no subsidies and was staying clear of the discussions, but Korry argued that the United States should try to persuade the British Government to stop the sale. In telegram 3835 from Addis Ababa, April 26, Korry reported that the Ethiopian Chief of Staff had told him his government was now committed to procuring bombers, but that Korry had been trying to stir up “maximum opposition” to the bomber purchases among Ethiopian Ministers interested in development. (Ibid.)
  3. Telegram 189411 to London, May 6, reported that the British Embassy had officially informed the Department that the British Government had decided to allow the BAC to continue its discussions with the Ethiopians, but that the Export Credit Guarantee Department would not guarantee more than the normal 5-year commercial credit terms for such a sale—terms that were “stiff” and might stop the purchase. (Ibid.)