Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

331. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, March 1, 1967, 1425Z.

3133. Response to Emperor’s Requests.

1. Following are the answers I would wish to give Emperor shortly after his return:

A. Spell out the special efforts on MAP including the four helicopters, 17 tanks and accelerated delivery of trucks, APCs and F–5s. State we also seeking acceleration of delivery other items whereon we will have answers later in spring. On helicopters, because of my belief that Iyassu has been discussing terms for more French helicopters and because I am persuaded French will offer what for Paris will be generous credit terms for choppers and other aircraft, I intend to let MOD know that if they wish other equipment in place of helicopters from US for equivalent value, we would be willing to consider it. Rationale is that since air force probably will get more Alouettes from French and since choppers would be new item in US inventory here, it could be advantageous over long run to have French totally responsible for that item.

B. Offer arms for police per my memo to AID Administrator Gaud, detailing how delivery would be linked to formation of units with 5,100 initial force goal.

C. Indicate that DOD prepared to consider sales for certain items such as equipment for ammo factory here to turn out bigger caliber items and possibly modified C–119s. Rationale is that increased domestic capacity for in-country ammo production would be highly beneficial to our long-term MAP relationship and relieve part of burden of our supplying ammo. Would also be psychologically beneficial to indicate our desire to have IEG self-sufficient in more items. Therefore would urge DOD authorize good terms for this equipment. Any other items DOD would feel justifiable for sales program should be transmitted in response to this msg.

D. Indicate in off-hand manner that if we did not have burden of almost US $1,000,000 annually for navy this money could have been diverted to army and air force. Follow up this idea more specifically with MOD as a personal preference while offering the suggestion that the French and the Israelis might wish to assume this commitment. I continue to believe that this approach might conceivably be successful, particularly if the Israelis who are more concerned about the Red Sea than they are about the land or air forces of Ethiopia, push hard with French in event of a French victory in CFS referendum. It would have extra appeal when I tell Emperor that we can do nothing about the navy now and that the replacement of HMS Ethiopia could not be envisaged before fall of 1968 at earliest and then only with a minesweeper carrying crew of 94.

E. Detail efforts of AID to meet stated IEG desire for private agricultural investment, for follow-on to Blue Nile survey, for continued support of the university. Give firmly negative response on budgetary assistance.

2. All foregoing will be packaged in the underlying philosophies and restraints well known to the Dept, and more importantly, on stated assumption of continued good rels between our two govts.

3. It would be helpful to know in advance what transpired in Moscow but I doubt we will have benefit of reliable info since IEG will probably seek to influence our responses to HIM by floating scare stories.

4. For the record, I wish repeat that the soured atmosphere created by limited magnitude of our responses could well, although not inevitably, lead to such diverse reactions as recognition of Red China, withdrawal of IEGF representation from Korea, demand for changes in Kagnew SOFA and other harassment of Kagnew as well as personal abuse, the last being promptest and most inevitable consequence. If we remain cool we should be able absorb heat without too much damage to our fundamental interests in the short run. When and if we arrive at a policy for Red Sea Basin, we can review our position.

5. For the record too, foregoing is in keeping with strategy adopted at Chiefs of Mission Conference in Addis and with successful handling of Emperor’s visit. However wish to note that Dept has thus far evaded equally important commitment it made at same conference to keep heat on Somalia, particularly in field of aid. In contrast to diminution of aid, Dept has in fact been seeking to increase aid projects which not only contrary to Addis CM Conference adopted strategy, and it has been permitting technical difficulties (Reynolds, lack of local funds) to obfuscate real point of our tactics. Indeed it is wining and dining a Somalia parliamentary delegation which has just passed in the face of US warnings a resolution totally opposed to US policies in Africa. Net effect of such tactics is to continue by our actions to encourage the most extreme elements in GYT into believing their policies can be followed with impunity and into putting more pressure on supposedly more moderate segments of society. Nothing could better demonstrate lack of any influence on GSR by USG than the total failure of this tactic over past four years if anyone would bother to read the cables of that period and measure promise against delivery.²

Korry

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asmara.
2. Telegram 150563 to Addis Ababa, March 7, approved the course of action proposed by Ambassador Korry. In telegram 3258 from Addis Ababa, March 12, Korry reported that on March 10 he delivered the U.S. replies to the Emperor, who had been “unruffled and non-committal” in his responses. (Ibid.)