Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

33. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, February 7, 1967, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Three North African Decisions

Secretary Rusk wants to discuss with you at lunch the three attached North African decisions.² The two Moroccan decisions—one food and a $14 million military credit sale—are relatively easy and should be made before King Hassan arrives Thursday. The third is an Algerian PL 480 deal which the Secretary has added to the package because he would like to see us keep a foot in all North African doors.

We have also scheduled an NSC discussion on North Africa tomorrow to give you a picture of all our interests there and the whole complex of problems we face. You may want to give us a preliminary OK on the Moroccan programs and then hold the Algerian decision until after the NSC meeting if you still have reservations after the lunch today.

The attached bulky package boils down to this:

[Here follow summaries of Tabs A and B concerning Morocco; for text, see Document 130.]

Tab C: The Secretary recommends a dollar credit sale of 200,000 tons of wheat to Algeria. Politically, this is the toughest of the three because of Algeria’s posture on Viet Nam. However, on balance, Secretary Rusk feels that our North African policy requires keeping a position in Algeria. The alternative is to let all food aid drift to a halt and maintain only minimal diplomatic representation. Our long-run goal is to knit North Africa into one of Africa’s most prosperous regional units. To do so, we need some influence in Algeria, and it’s hard to expect our oil companies to shoulder the whole load. We will discuss this policy more fully at the NSC tomorrow.

A dollar credit sale of 200,000 tons does not seem out of line on pure self-help grounds. Algeria has already bought for cash in the U.S. more than 350,000 tons this year, and the U.S.S.R. has offered 200,000 tons from its own Canadian purchases.³

If you approve, you would have to sign the finding at the second signature tab. Algeria’s trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic commodities for which you can make an exception.

We have touched base with Budget Bureau. They feel these requests are reasonable, and they confirm that all are within approved budgets and plans.⁴

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/67. Secret.
2. Not attached.
3. A handwritten note in the margin by Rostow reads: “President asked for proposal in which Algerians bought some as well.”
4. Later that day, in response to a question raised by the President during his lunch with Rusk, Rostow sent him a note stating that Algeria had bought 405,000 tons of U.S. wheat for cash so far that fiscal year and that, if the Secretary’s recommendation for selling 200,000 tons was approved, Algeria would have bought about 40 percent of its requirements in the United States during the fiscal year. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21)