Office of the Historian

329. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1

Washington, February 14, 1967.

SUBJECT

  • McNamara-Katzenbach Meeting with HIM

WWR:

McNamara and Katzenbach had a 1–1/2 hour, friendly meeting with the Emperor this afternoon.2 HIM opened with an abbreviated version of his speech to the President. Again, his specific requests were for a doubling of our MAP and a new program of budget support—amount unspecified. McNamara replied:

1.
The Ethiopian army is well-trained, well-equipped, and three times the Somali forces.
2.
The long Ethiopian-Somali frontier is difficult to defend, but the Emperor’s army seems well up to it.
3.
In our view, a larger force would be an impossible burden for the Ethiopian economy to carry if it were to improve the standard of living at the same time.
4.
There may be some problems of maintenance and utilization of present equipment. We may be able to help some in these areas. (McNamara did not spell this out; he apparently means a speed-up in deliveries of current commitments.)
5.
It is a fact of life that the Congress looks upon increased military aid with great displeasure.

Katzenbach added that we are already supporting the Emperor’s budget through revenues from PL–480 shipments of cotton. He urged the Emperor to seek political solutions to his problems with the Somalis. HIM replied that his hand is always out to Somalia, but that they always refuse it.

In summary, it was agreed that:

1.
The Emperor would submit their requests and rationale in writing.
2.
McNamara, Katzenbach and Korry would undertake a careful personal review of this whole range of issues, and
3.
Korry would then give them our replies in detail when the Emperor had returned to Addis Ababa. (The Emperor goes to Sudan and Turkey after leaving here; he won’t be home for a month.)

I would suggest the President take the following line in any conversations tonight:

1.
He understands HIM’s talks with McNamara and Katzenbach were most useful to both sides—each of us better understands the other’s problems.
2.
Assure the Emperor that the promised review of his requests will be thorough and as sympathetic as our restraints allow.
3.
Emphasize that we believe there are real possibilities of softening the Ethiopian-Somalian problem through joint development of shared resources—particularly river basins.
4.
Repeat that our conception of the Ethiopian security problem stresses internal security and that we will do our best to be as forthcoming as possible.

EH
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie, 2/14–15/67. No classification marking.↩
  2. Another record of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH.↩