273. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State1

2174. Vipto 58. Subj: VP Trip to Africa. Ghana: Conversation With Gen. Ankrah, Jan. 3.

1.
The hour long conversation with General Ankrah opened with his giving Vice President his warmest welcome and sending his best regards to President Johnson.2 He read with pleasure President’s personal letter. As part of his introductory remarks, he expressed appreciation [Page 480] for US assistance during past two years and stated his confidence that Ghana would be able see through the economic difficulties left by Nkrumah.
2.
Southern Africa. In very measured way, Ankrah expressed understanding for US position re South Africa and Portuguese Territories. In latter connection he hoped that US, being member of NATO Alliance with Portugal, would be able persuade it change its colonial policy. With respect Southern Rhodesia, he thought sanctions were not biting deeply enough. He had told PriMin Wilson they should have to be more effective or else force would become inevitable. He hoped US would exert strong pressure solve this problem. VP replied with eloquent assurance that US opposed to principles apartheid abroad and at home. US supported self-determination and majority rule in Africa and elsewhere. In fact, trip to Zambia was for express purpose demonstrating our support of President Kuanda in his difficult situation.
3.
Ankrah then turned to problem of cocoa, noting it major problem for his govt, because it represented 60 percent of exports, he said that some measure of price stabilization was absolutely necessary if country were to make intelligent plans for economic development. In very frank but firm manner, he recalled that last Oct he had asked President Johnson’s help in achieving a cocoa agreement. The recent cocoa negotiations, however, went well until end of conf when US Delegation refused to move forward with an accord. He had been shocked by what appeared to be pressures of US manufacturers, and he could not help but feel this action was “real stab in back of Ghana.” He then presented aide-memoire on subject (septel)3 and concluded with very strong plea to VP to seek reconsideration US stand this matter. VP sympathetically endorsed principle and value cocoa agreement. Noting he had helped push through coffee agreement when in the Senate, he also wished state very frankly that approval for cocoa agreement would face serious obstacles and pressures from US interests. Nevertheless, Executive Branch of USG supported idea of cocoa agreement. He promised to inform President of deep disappointment Ghana in this matter.
4.
Ankrah went on to make clear his regret over withdrawal of Abbott Labs but to indicate he and GOG had no ill feeling about matter. He strongly hoped US would tell other American industrialists not be discouraged about Ghana because of this incident. In fact, there might be provision in new constitution encouraging foreign investment. VP expressed understanding of Ghanaian Govt attitude. Knew Abbott Company was responsible firm but not experienced foreign affairs. Perhaps in due course, Parke Davis or Pfizer, for instance, might be interested. [Page 481] VP agreed that it extremely important this matter not cloud prospects for private investment, which should be encouraged by every possible means.
5.
VP then commented on current restrictions in US AID capabilities due Congressional cuts. He personally supported AID levels two to three times those at present. But under circumstances he thought it wise study all possibilities of external assistance, e.g., IBRD, IMF, EX–IM Bank, UNDP, ADB and very importantly PL–480. In times financial stringency, he believed it essential that more ingenuity be displayed in external assistance. Within its limits, however, the US would do everything it could to help Ghana. The more reasonable the request, the easier it was to be of assistance.
6.
In relatively brief discussion concerning Vietnam, Gen. Ankrah expressed his continued understanding for our general objective in Southeast Asia. He expressed strong hope that Hanoi could be persuaded come to the negotiating table during coming year. If this proved impossible he favored stronger mil action. The Vice President expressed appreciation Ankrah’s sympathy to our position and noted that there were varying views within US concerning method prosecuting war in Vietnam.
7.
Meeting closed on note of warm cordiality. Participants then adjourned to nearby room for signature of PL–480 agreement between US and Ghana.4
Williams
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Confidential; Priority.
  2. For Vice President Humphrey’s report to President Johnson on his African trip, see Document 231.
  3. Telegram 2170 from Accra transmitted the text of the aide-memoire. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY)
  4. For text of the agreement, see 19 UST 4645.