Office of the Historian

271. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Washington, October 9, 1967.

SUBJECT

  • Your meeting with Chairman Ankrah (Ank-ra) of Ghana
  • Tuesday, October 10—12:15 PM2

Schedule

  • 12:15—Informal arrival at diplomatic entrance (no remarks)
  • 12:20–1:00—Alone, with advisers standing by in Cabinet Room
  • 1:00—White House Lunch

Papers

  • At Tab A is Under Secretary Katzenbach’s memo.3
  • At Tab B are State’s Talking Points.
  • At Tab C is biographic information.

Setting

This is primarily a courtesy call after Ankrah’s visit to Expo. He is fiercely pro-American and wants to have a close personal relation with you. His National Liberation Council has made real progress cleaning up the mess left by Nkrumah. They have introduced an (unpopular) austerity program to try to make the country solvent. They have turned Ghana [Page 476] away from a mischievous and blustering foreign policy, and become good neighbors toward the rest of Africa as well as the West. Ghana is now a voice for reason and moderation in the UN and the Organization of African Unity. (Ankrah is a prominent and respected member of the OAU mediation team on Nigeria.) The General’s only problem with our policy on Vietnam is that it is too soft to suit him—he may well ask you why we are not using nuclear weapons.

Most important, Ankrah and his colleagues haven’t behaved like the usual military dictatorship. They’ve restored some political rights; they’ve convened a citizen’s committee to draft a new constitution, looking toward free elections and a civilian regime. Ankrah doubtless aspires to be the first president of a successor government—and meeting you will surely boost his prestige. It is not at all clear whether he will emerge as the long-term political leader in this new Ghana. Others on the Council have looked stronger in recent months. But he is pretty firmly in the saddle now and a reasonable bet to survive.

Substance

1.
Economic Assistance—Ankrah will be telling you the job of reconstruction is only started, and that he needs more economic assistance in the years ahead. He says he will not present you with a shopping list. But he will give you some indication of what he will need. This year a group of donors (led by IMF) underwrote Ghana’s foreign exchange with nearly $100 million. Our share was one-third. The World Bank estimates that Ghana will need $100–$125 million in aid each year for at least the next five years if Nkrumah’s damage is to be undone. You might say:
  • —We are pleased by Ankrah’s belt-tightening economic policy. We are certainly aware of the political costs and risks of such policies.
  • —We’ll try to hold up our end of the aid effort, though the current atmosphere on the Hill makes it impossible to make any guarantees. We’ll also keep after the other donors.
  • —We’ve just released the second half of our $20 million program loan (authorized by the President in May). This accurately reflects our confidence in Ankrah and in Ghana.
2.

Military Aid—Ankrah might say he needs military aid: (i) to insure against an Nkrumah comeback; (ii) to defend against the “threat” of Soviet MIGs now in Guinea, Mali and Nigeria; and (iii) to raise the low morale of his army.

You might say that we understand Ankrah’s security concerns. But the whole range of arms aid is now a terribly tough business on the Hill. We’re not even sure we’ll have any authority to make credit sales.

3.
Cocoa—Ghana is the largest cocoa producer in the world. We are the largest consumer. We’ve been working for several years to get a cocoa agreement which will stabilize Ghana’s foreign exchange earnings and [Page 477] head off the tendency to grow more cocoa than the world market will support. We had word last week that terms have finally been worked out in Geneva so that an agreement can be submitted for final negotiation next month. You might say:
  • —We’re delighted that the groundwork has at long last been laid for the agreement.
  • —There will probably be some opposition from our domestic industry, but we’ll do our best to get a reasonable agreement ratified.
  • —We very much appreciate the constructive role Ankrah and Ghana have played in working out the agreement.
4.
Intelligence gift from Ghana— Ankrah might mention his personal gift to you of a Soviet ZU–23 anti-aircraft weapon, a sizeable sample of Soviet ammunition, and other intelligence finds. These have been extremely valuable to us, particularly in Vietnam. Even if he doesn’t mention it, you’ll want to thank him for this extraordinary gift.
5.
Nigeria—Ankrah is one of six African heads of State on the OAU Consultative Mission to mediate the Nigerian conflict. It doesn’t look as if the Mission will get to Nigeria before the last of this month. By then the fighting may well be over, with nothing left to mediate. You might say (if asked):
  • —We were delighted the OAU took this initiative. We are hopeful the conflict will be settled soon with no more bloodshed.
  • —It was entirely appropriate that Ankrah was chosen for a prominent role in the OAU effort, since he has been a major force for peace throughout the unhappy history of this conflict.
  • —In whatever job is left for the Mission, we certainly want it to succeed. We hope it can get on with its work—the sooner, the better.
Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Visit of General Joseph A. Ankrah, 10/10/67. Secret.↩
  2. No record of this meeting has been found. Other briefing material for Ankrah’s visit is ibid. and in Department of State, Visit Files: Lot 68 D 475, V–44.↩
  3. The attached tabs are not printed.↩