Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

25. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 27, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Algeria

PARTICIPANTS

• The President”
• Ambassador Guellal, Algeria”
• Mr. Komer”
• G. Mennen Williams

The President asked Guellal how he liked 4040 referring to the number of his old house. They exchanged a few pleasantries.

Guellal then responded to the President’s question as to the effect of the change in government in Algeria. Guellal said it was for the good, and in the national interest, of Algeria. He said it was not a result of a military coup for power alone. Rather it was the product of political and economic forces, particularly the concentration of power in the administration.

Guellal said there was speculation as to the origins of the coup. Some said it was China because of the earlier messages sent. Some said it was the Soviet Union seeking postponement of the Bandung II Conference. Notably the CIA was never mentioned.

At this point, the President interjected that the role of the CIA was tremendously overstated. If it did even half the things it was credited with doing, it would be quite an outfit.

Guellal continued that the fact of the matter was that the coup was internal against the concentration of power. Ben Bella, he said, had sought all offices: Secretary-General of the party, Minister of Planning, Interior, etc., etc. He indicated that the second problem was the systematic elimination of political opposition.

The President then asked what was the effect of this on the United States. Guellal said it was for the better. The President then turned to me and asked if it had been better. I replied that there were some improvements, and we were hoping for more but that just recently, as the Ambassador knew, the press had brutally attacked the United States on Vietnam. The President then spoke with great vigor on Vietnam. He asked rhetorically why people who didn’t understand the situation talked so much about it. He said it is a pure question of defending the South Vietnamese. He said that he wants actually to help the North Vietnamese and has provided for a regional over-all AID program. But he was not going to let North Vietnam gobble up South Vietnam. He wasn’t going to let them do it even if China and Russia intervened.

Then the President said if they quit attacking us, we’ll quit tomorrow.

On the other hand, the President said if they bomb us we have to continue. What’s more, as far as foreign public opinion goes it seems that if the opposition bomb us as they are doing all around in Saigon, that’s all right, but if we bomb them, we are criticized. The President then said that we are all for peace, that we would go to Cambodia, to Geneva, to the United Nations; we would talk to anybody anywhere; that we are ready for unconditional talks.

The President then referred to the fact that this had been the policy of President Eisenhower, of Kennedy, and of himself.

The President then changed his tone and manner completely and said in an earnest and kindly voice: we do hope for better understanding. If we have better understanding, there is much that we could do.

Guellal then took up the conversation by saying that Algeria wished for an improvement in relations with the United States. Guellal, before continuing with what Boumedienne had authorized, said that in the past our relations had never been very very good but neither had they been very very bad. He said that he had met with Boumedienne and that Boumedienne had authorized him to convey the message to the President that he wanted to see relations between the two countries improve. Guellal then said that, as a matter of fact, certain measures had already been taken to clear up misunderstandings of US policy where there were differences. However, he said, one must realize that Algeria can’t do it completely all at once. But the indications were there that they were going to do something. Actually, actions had been taken to put relationships that had been extreme before into regular form, namely measures had been taken to normalize relationships with the UAR, Cuba, the USSR, and even small Bulgaria.

Guellal said that there were important developments which would effect a reorientation of policy.

Guellal then expressed the appreciation of Boumedienne for the July 5 message from the President.² He also thanked us for the continuation of assistance and said that they would like to see assistance increased even as it had been increased by France.

Guellal then said that Boumedienne wanted the President to know that if there were any problems, he would be happy to have an exchange of direct messages between heads of state, and that President Johnson’s views would always be carefully taken into consideration.

Guellal continued that Algeria had good relations with most of the Afro-Asian countries. If we felt that there was anything that we wished to convey to them, Algeria would be ready to develop a procedure to do so.

At this point, the President broke in to say that if people can’t get along with Komer and Williams they can’t get along with anybody. But if the Ambassador had problems he couldn’t work out with us, he would be happy to see the Ambassador.

The President then said that he would follow up on Boumedienne’s invitation to communicate. He realized that everyone couldn’t agree on everything but that we weren’t going around trying to sell everybody on our idea of things. He then made reference to the fact that Chou En-lai had been three times in Africa to exercise his influence.

The President then said that it was his ambition to work with the countries of the world to raise their standards of living, to provide more education, and to fight against the ancient enemies of mankind, poverty, ignorance and disease.

The President said international relations should not be conducted by international name-calling. If Algeria has any problems with us, don’t talk to others about it but come directly to us. He hoped that Algeria would not from time to time say ugly things about the United States. He had never said a critical thing about any country since he had been President—not even about Russia or China. He said the place to handle diplomatic matters was in the office.

The President terminated the meeting by saying he was happy to see Ambassador Guellal but that he was already fifteen minutes overdue for a Cabinet meeting.

Note: After leaving the President, I pointed out to Ambassador Guellal that he had asked the President for aid but that we had never received an official request from his Government and that we wouldn’t respond until they had done so. He said never worry they were working on it.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation, 1965, July-December. Confidential. Drafted by Williams and approved by Komer in the White House on July 30.
2. President Johnson’s message of congratulations on the anniversary of Algerian independence was transmitted in telegram 47 to Algiers, July 5. (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, CO 13 Algeria)