Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

226. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

AFRICAN PROBLEMS

We see six decisive problems whose solution will be important to large areas of Africa and to United States policy toward the continent as a whole. At the north there is the complex of issues in Arab Africa arising from the Near East crisis and deep-seated local tensions. At the south there is the complex of issues arising from colonial control and racial discrimination. Without ignoring a number of other issues in Black Africa, there are three areas in the middle belt of the continent which present critical problems: Nigeria, the Congo, and East Africa (including Zambia). Finally, our aid and other economic policies face obstacles here and abroad, and our responses to these questions will affect our interests in the continent.

In dealing with these problems, this paper points to essential conclusions and critical decisions. In view of its rapid preparation, it does not have interagency clearance.

1. The Effect of the Near East Crisis on Africa

The Middle East crisis has sent shock waves throughout Arab Africa from Mauritania to Sudan. All condemned “Israeli aggression,” some offered military support to the UAR, all now demand Israeli withdrawal. Algeria, Mauritania and Sudan have broken diplomatic relations with the United States. Algeria has increasingly become a spearhead of Soviet influence. Arab emotionalism caused riots almost everywhere, even in Tunisia. In Libya the foundations of government were shaken. More than half of the 13,000 Americans in Libya were evacuated, the vital flow of Libyan oil to Western Europe was suspended for a month, normal operations at Wheelus Air Base ceased, and we have been asked to negotiate for the relinquishment of Wheelus. Libya is only now slowly recovering, and the outlook remains precarious. The crisis has set back prospects for Maghrebian economic cooperation; it has caused new problems of internal stability in Morocco and Tunisia and new anxieties about the military strength of radical Algeria; it has opened new opportunities for the extension of UAR, Algerian and Soviet influence. The Sudanese, for instance, are now seeking military assistance from Czechoslovakia and the USSR. As a consequence of these events, we face the following principal policy issues:

a. The impingement of Near East policy. If methods cannot be devised of dealing with the Near East problem which are tolerable to the moderate governments of Arab Africa, we risk the weakening of Tunisia, Morocco and Libya and a strengthening of views of the extremists like Algeria. Conversely, whatever is done to reinforce the moderates will enhance their prospects of contributing constructively to a Near East settlement. Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and perhaps Libya will be more than ever interested in obtaining US arms. We should adhere to present commitments and resume shipments as urgently as our general arms policy allows. We should be prepared to examine means of strengthening the internal security systems of friendly governments.

b. At the same time, we should try to move forward on the President’s proposal of an arms registry. The need of our friends for limited additional military assistance and our interest in arms control need not be in conflict.

c. In the emotional atmosphere of politics in Arab Africa, our political actions in the Mediterranean and the Near East will be of primary importance, but economic support will remain an essential element in restoring political stability and American influence. It is therefore extremely important to keep aid going—to expand it where the situation is propitious, as in Morocco and Tunisia, and not to abandon it entirely where the situation is more difficult, as in Sudan. Initial steps in this direction have been taken, but they are bound to run into difficulty; patience abroad and perseverance in Washington will be essential.

d. We should give particular attention to what we can do to shore up the regime in Libya. A special contingency paper on Libya will be available this week.

2. The Southern Sixth

While the group of problems in southern Africa—Rhodesia, Portuguese Territories, South West and South Africa—are basically different from those of the northern littoral, they have three things in common. They are deep-seated emotional problems on which our influence is limited. They interact on each other, inevitably making our efforts to solve them more difficult. They affect other parts of the continent and adversely affect our interests there. Hence we have an interest in their solution for their own sake and because of their wider effect.

Rhodesia. We are committed to supporting British and UN efforts to end the rebellion through economic sanctions. While the British currently through the Lord Alport Mission to Rhodesia are seeking to determine whether there is any basis for renewed negotiations, the British Government remains publicly committed to the pledge of “no independence before majority African rule.” Settlement on any other basis would produce strong anti-British reaction in Africa with the British unpopularity transferred to the US and the West generally. We thus have an interest in the terms of any settlement of the Rhodesian problem.

Portuguese Territories. As there is little likelihood of any change in the foreseeable future to the respective positions of the Africans or the Portuguese on this problem, the US should continue to: (1) advocate to both parties a peaceful solution based on the principle of self-determination; (2) assure maximum Portuguese concurrence with our policy that arms and equipment supplied or sold to Portugal not be used outside the NATO Defense Area.

South West Africa. Caught in the dilemma of asserting UN responsibility without achieving UN authority over the territory, we have no choice but try to maintain our support of the UN without endorsing action that is totally unrealistic. It is very important that we continue to support through peaceful means the right of the people of South West Africa to self-determination.

South Africa. Facing the problem of opposing tendencies—to associate with South Africa or to disengage from it entirely—the pressures have been strong to take actions which swing between the two extremes. A fully consistent policy is probably impossible at this time, since the policies at each end of the spectrum are contradictory but nevertheless have strong attraction and considerable support. One possible formula would be continued economic association; active political dissociation; and progressive strategic disengagement. The aim would be to influence South Africa to accept necessary accommodation to the realities of Africa.

3. Nigeria

The outbreak of hostilities on July 6 between the Federal Military Government and the East (Biafra) intensifies our various basic polity problems with respect to Nigeria. We have consistently stated that the Nigerian problem is one for the Nigerians themselves to solve. This policy of non-involvement, however, is being complicated by several factors: the FMG is unlikely to defeat Biafra immediately; Biafra, and perhaps the FMG, may be getting arms from Eastern Europe; and Biafra may obtain sympathy or recognition in due course from some other countries.

The policy of urging peaceful solutions has failed for the present. Our refusal to intervene in this internal Nigerian struggle has caused us to limit our active support for the established government, to deny support for the secessionist government, and to refuse to sell arms to either side. It has also led us to cut down on the numbers of Americans in trouble areas and to slow down implementation of our aid programs. This is a conscious policy of limiting commitments and involvement while continuing to recognize the FMG as the government for all of Nigeria.

We see our policy coming under increasing pressure during the coming months. With aggressive agility Biafra will probably get more arms, further involve groups in the United States friendly to its cause, and with considerable skill continue its diplomatic efforts for external support. The FMG, more inhibited by its internal divisions, will increasingly react against our neutral stand. Key policy issues will be:

(a) UK Role. Given our other commitments, we have no other practical course than continuing to assert that among foreign governments the UK has primary responsibility, in view of its large stake and traditional ties with Nigeria.

(b) Arms for the FMG. Provision of arms will destroy our posture of non-involvement, and will progressively open up greater financial and military commitments. We should stay out of this; urge the UK to provide assistance and not try to restrict FMG acquisition of arms elsewhere.

(c) Further political assistance to FMG. We should not connive with secession, either in the Nigerian context or because of precedents elsewhere in Africa, nor should we oppose it.

(d) Future of AID, Peace Corps, etc. We should reaffirm our goal of helping the people of Nigeria in their long run development irrespective of the political configuration of the country. Subject only to safety of individuals, we should offer to continue programs in all of Nigeria, and we should be prepared to bend legal requirements to this objective.

(e) Settlement of the dispute. Given our limited engagement, we have limited influence. Our best course is actively to support Commonwealth, especially African, efforts, with other types of African mediation (e.g. OAU, or an ad hoc group) as an alternative.

4. The Congo

The outbreak sparked by the revolt of the mercenaries on July 7 has obscured the basic problems of the Congo and hindered our efforts to assist the political and economic development of the country.

We have three immediate objectives in connection with the revolt.

(a) To provide emergency assistance, without deeply engaging ourselves on a continuing basis. We have so far done this by providing airplane transportation for Congolese forces on a temporary basis. We expect to draw the line in our own direct involvement at this point.

(b) We should exert such influence as we have in both Brussels and Kinshasa to retain maximum Belgian presence in and assistance to the Congo. Belgium is a principal source of further help in strengthening the security and economic development of the Congo. Congo-Belgian estrangement will cause loss of badly needed personnel and resources with consequent pressure on the United States to replace them.

(c) To associate responsible African nations with the Congo in dealing with the present revolt. The association either in word (e.g. Kaunda) or in deed (e.g. Ghana and Ethiopia) with Mobutu and our efforts to help his government is already our tactical goal. Similarly, we should try to keep the Congo out in front both in obtaining and using any African support. If successful, this tactic will also make it more difficult for communist forces to reinsert themselves into the Congo.

At the same time, we wish to prevent the current situation from ruining the prospects for longer term development in the Congo. The recent devaluation will fail in its purpose if economic development falters. An emergency examination of what is required to keep the Congo going during the coming months may be necessary. Economic development will also be stifled if there is a mass exodus of Europeans from Katanga, and special measures to assure their security may be required. The severance of Belgian efforts in production, transportation and training would also set back development badly. Here we may have to employ a mixture of pressure and economic help to restabilize the situation.

5. East Africa and Zambia

The situation in East Africa and Zambia lacks the dramatic impact of the crises in Nigeria and the Congo, but it nevertheless has several important aspects.

Several developments during the past months have been encouraging. Each of the East African governments have gradually consolidated its position. Kenyatta and his supporters have clipped Odinga’s power; Obote has so far been successful in his centralizing policy; Nyerere is slowly strengthening his authority over Zanzibar. At the same time, these governments have agreed to expand their cooperative efforts by establishing an East African community. Zambia has made substantial progress in developing alternative transport routes for its imports and exports following the illegal seizure of independence in Rhodesia.

This progress could be affected, however, if the offer of the Chinese Communists to build the Tanzanian-Zambian railroad is accepted. Appealing to a deep-seated desire of Nyerere and Kaunda for this link, and exploiting their frustration at failing to get the assistance from the West, the Chinese may be able to consolidate their influence and compensate for their various losses elsewhere in Africa.

Our own position in these two countries is also affected by the problems of Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. Frustrated and disillusioned, Zambia and Tanzania have whittled down their relations with and confidence in the United Kingdom. This estrangement has also affected us, since we are Britain’s major partner. This has tended to limit somewhat the initiatives open to us in East Africa and Zambia. In view of the Chinese initiative in the single most important regional project in the area, we may have to challenge this competition by helping to provide valid alternatives to it. We may in this way succeed in convincing the Tanzanian and Zambian governments that we continue to support their aspirations. By such a demonstration of our commitment to their economic development we can also hope to offset somewhat the negative effects of our policies in southern Africa.

6. Aid and Economic Programs

Our AID and other economic programs for Africa are running into heavy weather both in Congress and in Africa.

Congressional criticism is an amalgam of several views. The fear of involvement which stimulated the country limitations of last year is even stronger. Because the prospects of Africa, were exaggerated and the effects of external aid were overestimated, Congress tends to be disillusioned. The internal difficulties in Nigeria and the Congo contribute to the disenchantment. They have become an excuse for cutting funds, and even our modest aid request ($195 million) is threatened.

A number of African leaders (and some Congressmen), on the other hand, are dismayed by our phasing out of bilateral assistance from some twenty-five countries. The Africans see this as a denial of much needed help and a sign that the United States has lost interest in the continent. Certain Congressmen also see it as foregoing much needed US influence. This group seeks, first more flexibility in our policy and progressively moderate increases in the totals.

The regional approach—whether through the IBRD, the African Development Bank, formal African groupings, or ad hoc national combinations—is slow in developing. The principal gesture available to us in the immediate future is a contribution to the ADB, which so far has been postponed because of the Near East crisis and other priorities.

Commodity prices affect some African nations far more than external assistance. Cocoa is a chief issue. We have worked out acceptable principles for an agreement on price and buffer stocks with Ghana, but the proposals face hurdles: other producers have got to agree, and the concerted and stubborn opposition by US companies must be overcome.

Among the key decisions facing us in the coming months are the following:

a. Level of Aid. We have got to mobilize support for reasonable assistance levels, or suffer a serious psychological blow in Africa as to the validity of our interest in the continent, to say nothing of the loss of influence.

b. Flexibility. Since our inflexibility is due partly to the African situation, to Congressional restrictions and to Executive Branch decisions, we cannot do much right away. We could start first with the “Self-Help Fund” to make it a “Politico-Economic Fund.” We should be sure to make every effort to search out regional possibilities, including selective bilateral help to develop regional capabilities

c. Regional Development. As soon as appropriate, we should make known our intention to seek Congressional authorization to contribute $60 million over three years to the ADB special fund, with a minimum of conditions attached.

d. Cocoa. We should enlist full Executive Branch support to negotiate the proposed cocoa agreement and to assure its domestic and international acceptance.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, 7/13/67, African Problems. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The paper was discussed at the July 13 NSC meeting; see Document 225.