22. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
McGB:
It’s still early to tell how the new Algerian government will pan out. It doesn’t look like there’ll be a sharp lurch to the left. In fact, there’s a good chance it will try to be more businesslike in attacking its chronic economic troubles, less concerned with foreign adventures. However, Boumedienne is not popular, and he hasn’t seen the last of the pro-Ben Bella demonstrations. So his first job will be to put together a leadership that will command some popular support. State may skirt the whole recognition problem by saying there’s no need for a formal act since most members of the previous government are still at their posts.
The one thing we’re sure about is that the coup has put both Moroccans and Tunisians on edge. Both have border troubles with Algeria and view Boumedienne as the architect of the 1963 Moroccan-Algerian border spat. Although the well-connected Tunisian ambassador in Algiers [Page 43] thinks the coup could well net out as a gain, Bourguiba, Jr. has already said the US military aid he asked the President for is now “emergency rather than precautionary.”
Tactically, we’re in an excellent position to move either way. After a winter of cutting food stocks to the bare minimum needed to keep food-for-work and feeding programs going, we had just decided to let stocks run out and programs expire over the summer. Rusk and Porter have both told Algerian officials this would happen since current agreements are running out and they haven’t asked us to continue. So we can easily coast for a month or two and still pick up momentum if the situation warrants.
If the new government asks for help, I’d argue for making self-help the chief criterion for whatever we do. The small model rural rehabilitation projects we’re running there now are technically impressive. But because we’ve never fully engaged the political level of the government, our aid hasn’t had the catalytic effect we’d hoped for. What we want this time—if we start up again—is something they’ll put their own resources behind. Our line ought to be that we’re ready to help with their nation-building but we’re not going to waste our time if they’re not interested in their own problems. I wouldn’t argue for a big dollar program (though the new French oil-aid agreement will cut French aid and maybe trigger requests to us) because we can do a lot to tackle unemployment and some reconstruction through food-for-work.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I (2). Secret.↩