Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

213. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 60–1–66

Washington, July 7, 1966.

THE RADICAL WEST AFRICAN STATES

The Problem

To assess the nature of West African radicalism as exemplified in Guinea, Mali, and Congo (Brazzaville) and the prospects over the next few years.

Conclusions

A. The radical or moderate character of a West African state depends essentially on the inclinations of the man or group of men at the top. West African radicalism, though influenced by Communist policies and practices, is vague in doctrine. It is characterized by strong distrust of the West, and a tendency to follow extreme means to reduce dependence on former metropoles. (Paras. 1–5, 10)

B. The radical cause in West Africa is now at a low ebb. Ghana’s virtual bankruptcy has been revealed after Nkrumah’s overthrow. Sekou Toure of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali in particular have severely strained their economies by mismanagement, are unable to sustain revolutionary zeal among the populace, and do not fully trust their armies. Nevertheless, though they require Western aid, their devotion to militant radicalism and their affinity for the Communists remain unshaken. (Paras. 6–9, 13, 23)

C. The political future of the present radical regimes is no more secure than that of their moderate neighbors. Each is vulnerable to sudden military coups or popular turmoil, or some combination thereof. But, even the downfall of all present radical regimes in West Africa would not mean the disappearance of radicalism. All West African states are so fragile and face such formidable problems that the lure of radical solutions will continue to have great appeal. In time the failures of today’s radicals (and Nkrumah) will be forgotten, and some others who rise to power in West Africa will follow a similar path. Indeed, African states now considered to be moderate could quickly become radical by a change of the small governing elite. (Paras. 14–16)

D. Probably the most worrisome aspect for the US and the West will be the extent to which the radical Africans will be willing to collaborate with the Communists in subversive activity against moderate states, and in aid to certain of the “liberation” groups which are already susceptible to Communist blandishments. (Paras. 11–12, 22, 27)

E. Though Moscow and Peking do not work in tandem, they consider the current crop of West African radical leaders as useful, if uncertain, collaborators. Despite occasional setbacks, the Communist states have acquired an influential position in these countries. The heavy influx of Communist arms and advisors, particularly to Congo (Brazzaville), gives the Communists a base from which to exploit political turmoil elsewhere in Africa. (Paras. 17–22, 27)

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1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on July 7.