202. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson1
Attached are Soapy Williams’ package proposals for a Strengthened African Program, endorsed by Secretary Rusk.2 You will recall that this is what you “asked” Soapy for last spring. We have held it up briefly, so as not to burden you with what is regrettably rather a mouse.
The chief trouble with his package is that it doesn’t have much focus or go far enough. It would simply beef up slightly our existing aid and info programs, and call for high level visits and a speech by you. But we doubt that such measures, necessarily spread over 36 countries, add up to a bold new program
Neither a little more aid nor more high level massage—desirable as these are—go to the heart of the problem. In our judgment the success of US policy and the extent of US influence will depend primarily on the position we take on those political issues of overriding interest to the Africans themselves.
Over the coming years these issues will inevitably be those of clearing the remaining vestiges of colonialism from the southern third of Africa—Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, and South Africa itself. As is already clear from the ruckus over Rhodesia, these are the issues which Africans themselves will regard as the prime test of who’s with them and who isn’t. Vietnam, South Asia, or Berlin are far away, but these African issues are seen by Africans as an intimate part of their own struggle for independence of colonialism. Moreover, each of them has racial overtones of black vs. white, so arouse great African suspicions.
Without debating all the pros and cons of a positive US policy on these issues (it has many real costs), we can’t escape one basic point—African majority rule is sooner or later inevitable and we ought to be on the winning side. The battle was really lost when two-thirds of Africa became independent; the completion of the process is historically inevitable. It will be painful, but there’s no stopping it (except perhaps in South Africa for a time).
There are other reasons too. As Arthur Goldberg keeps pointing out, we need the 36 African UN votes, and these 36 countries will be looking more at where we stand than at what we give them. They won’t be responsive to the case for gradualism, but will be quick to ask whether US opposition to racism at home is also our policy abroad. Such questions [Page 314] are also likely to be asked increasingly by civil rights groups here at home. Finally, we are in competition with the Soviets and Chinese, who will jump to exploit too much US waffling on these issues. Thus, we’d argue that the best and cheapest way to advance US interests in Africa would be a clear US stance on the southern third of Africa.
Even so, we see merit in the three recommendations outlined in Rusk’s memo (which summarizes Soapy’s longer memorandum—also attached but not necessary to read). These are (1) more high level visits; (2) an African speech by you; and (3) somewhat increased info, exchange, and aid programs. The added cost would be only $1.5 million for USIA in FY 1966; $1. 7 million for State (CU) in FY 1967 and $263 million for AID in FY 1967 (some $40 million more than this year).
If you agree in principle with both Rusk and us, but don’t wish to sign on to specific dollar levels, we suggest the device of the memo to Rusk at Tab 1.3 Charlie Schultze is satisfied with the phrase “subject to usual budget review.” Or if you prefer, we can just give this package the silent treatment.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Secret.↩
- See Document 201.↩
- See Document 203.↩
- Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature.↩
- President Johnson checked the first two options.↩