Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

182. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, February 7, 1964.

ADH/B–26

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER DOUGLAS-HOME FEBRUARY 12–13, 1964

Background Paper

East Africa and Zanzibar

1. Recent Developments in East Africa

Despite speculation there is no hard evidence at this time that the trouble in East Africa was part of an interrelated Communist plot to take over the area. There was obvious Communist involvement in Zanzibar. The successful Zanzibar revolution undoubtedly provided inspiration to frustrated dissidents in neighboring East African countries.²

The situation in Zanzibar was basically unstable. African antagonism towards the entrenched Arab minority was deep-rooted. While the coup was essentially an African drive to seize control from the Arabs, the African nationalists were assisted in the planning and execution of the coup by pro-Communist forces.

A chain of mutinies then swept through the armed forces in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya. The revolt in Tanganyika was an alarming eye-opener to the other East African governments. When Ugandan troops threatened to rebel, Obote requested the British for help. After obtaining signed requests for help from the African governments, the British promptly brought the situation under control. Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya also sought and received British assistance.

Julius Nyerere, when convinced that he could no longer cope with his army, fearing trouble in the labor field, and impressed with British action in Uganda and Kenya, readily accepted similar British assistance.

2. Zanzibar

Problem. The crux of the Zanzibar matter is to prevent its takeover by the Communists. The new regime is an uneasy coalition of African nationalist and pro-Communist elements, each struggling for power. We are gravely concerned that the role of the nationalists may be deteriorating.

The elements of preventing a Communist takeover include:

1. Elimination or control of “Field Marshal” Okello and armed thugs, who represent a continuing threat to order and stability.

2. Development of an independent nationalist government probably built around President Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazis.

3. Political containment of any pro-Communist force, including Babu and Hanga, if they are unwilling to work with Karume. Babu and Hanga have had strong ties with Peiping and Moscow. Nevertheless Nyerere believes in the showdown they are African nationalists who can be and must be worked with. This is questionable.

4. Support and strengthening of Nyerere in Tanganyika and Kenyatta in Kenya.

Time Factor. The time factor in any Zanzibar action program is highly important since the vacuum now existing favors Communism.

Discussion. The U.K. has a military capability in the area to disarm Okello and his followers and to maintain order. It would do this on its own initiative if British nationals were endangered. Otherwise, understandably, it would desire a written GOZ request from Karume. Only the British can act militarily with adequate effectiveness.

Alternatively, the U.K. has non-military capabilities which it might use to get rid of Okello or at least to bolster the chances of a successful conclusion of intervention by covert operations, economic aid, educational help, police training, etc.

The U.S. could provide non-military support for either of the above U.K. approaches, through educational and economic assistance, diplomatic support and support at the UN.

There are roughly 300 Tanganyikan police already in Zanzibar. Initially these policemen disarmed a number of the local population, but they have not been able to control Okello and his hard-core gunmen. Recent reports indicate that the Tanganyikan police are not now an effective factor. Nyerere indicated to our Ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam that these police might be helpful if the British also were on the ground.

Duncan Sandys told Ambassador Bruce on February 4 that the British had as yet no grounds for intervention and no action program had been formulated for Zanzibar. In a follow-up to this conversation Ambassador Bruce on February 6 delivered a Presidential message to Prime Minister Home asking what action the British proposed to take to frustrate a Communist takeover in Zanzibar and to strengthen African nationalists.³ The Prime Minister expressed his great concern about Zanzibar and said he had established a study group to deal with the question. Unfortunately he had no faith in the character or motives of any of the Zanzibar leaders. He would discuss the matter further in his talks with the President.

Every effort must be made to induce the British to take effective action. Since any definitive U.S. action would be based on the extent and type of action by the British, alternative measures the U.S. might take diplomatically, covertly or through economic or technical assistance would best be considered in light of the British program.

However, certain minimal actions to prevent the further deterioration of the U.S. position, such as to increase our intelligence capability in the area and to maintain contact with the Zanzibar government must be and are being taken.

Neither the U.K. nor the U.S. has recognized Zanzibar yet. Both countries are under increasing pressure from Zanzibar officials to take such action.

3. Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda

U.K. intercession has served to check the immediate threat of chaos in East Africa. Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote all seem to be aware that they must be more alert against subversive elements of various origins. The Chicoms have been particularly active of late.

President Nyerere plans to explain the seriousness of the situation in East Africa at an emergency meeting of the Organization of African Unity to be held in Dar-es-Salaam on February 12.

Despite the short-term stability which the U.K. military presence probably will insure, basic problems will remain, making British disengagement extremely difficult. Dependable African security forces cannot quickly be developed. At the same time, East Africa’s leaders will be under mounting domestic pressure to seek early U.K. withdrawal. Domestic and general African pressures could lead to a British withdrawal before internal security forces have been adequately strengthened.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, PM Home Visit Briefing Book, 2/12–13/64. Secret. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote.
2. On January 12, African rebels on the island of Zanzibar overthrew the predominantly Arab government and established a republic.
3. A copy of the President’s February 5 message to Prime Minister Home is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Zanzibar, Vol. 2, 2/64–4/64.