18. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff1
RWK:
It turns out that Porter and Lennon on their own hook are doing what we’ve been recommending right along but what AID has been saying is too hard. Part of the stimulus was need to prepare phase-down in case we invoked 620(e), but part is Porter’s political sense.
They’ve knocked off further January-February food shipments to Algeria (fortuitously but secretly we’re diverting them to Morocco to tide us over a crisis there). This will reduce stocks so we’ll be in a realistic position in April to manipulate the program instead of continuing to pile up a backlog.
Just another example of the problems of getting things done in USG. You thought Bell was all for slowing shipments and cutting stocks. I found AID/State working levels not even thinking about it. Today I asked them about attached cables,2 and they sheepishly admitted the embassy started this all by itself.3
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966. Confidential.↩
- Telegram Toaid 177 from Algiers, December 31, 1964, and telegram Toaid 180 from Algiers, January 4, 1965, are attached but not printed.↩
- Komer’s handwritten note in the margin reads: “Good—keep an eye on it.”↩