Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

175. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, May 14, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Your Meetings with President Bourguiba

You will recall that you yourself proposed inviting Bourguiba in 1966 at a time when you were particularly impressed by one of his statements supporting our policy in Vietnam. His heart attack and the Arab-Israeli war delayed his visit. However, our purpose is still as it was then—to show our approval of this rational and like-minded statesman.

Although there are some questions about the level of our economic and military assistance we do not expect Bourguiba to dwell on these bilateral programs. He will probably talk on a high plane about his need to assure Tunisians progress and security and his view of our role in securing world peace. The main points we expect to come up are:

1. Tunisian security. The buildup of Soviet weapons in Algeria on one side and Nasser’s power across Libya to the other have made the Tunisians feel highly vulnerable. Bourguiba and his son, now the Foreign Minister, have for several years been talking with us about the possibility of a US security guarantee. We are providing limited military aid. But the plain fact is that, without a military establishment it couldn’t possibly afford, Tunisia will have to rely on outside help if it is attacked. To gain some assurance of such help, Bourguiba has gone so far as to offer us secretly the use of his naval base at Bizerte in return for such an assurance.

We believe the Bourguibas are too well informed not to realize that a formal US guarantee is impossible in today’s Washington. However, he may discuss with you this problem at some length. Your best response is that we have given Tunisia as much military aid as Congress has made possible. We regret it can’t be more, but we just don’t have the appropriations. We are doing what we can with advisors to help Tunisia adopt the most modern techniques to get the maximum defense capability out of its limited expenditures. If he presses hard for a security commitment, you will have to explain honestly the limits imposed by Congress on your ability to make any such commitment.

2. Arab-Israel. Although Bourguiba has always taken a moderate position on Israel’s right to exist, he feels very deeply about the injustice the Palestinians have suffered. He has even recently made veiled statements favoring Arab terrorism as the only way to force Israel to withdraw. Some of this stems from his own revolutionary experience against France. In general, he has no time for radical Arab solutions, and he has said publicly he thought Nasser ought to resign.

Because of his moderation and his antipathy for Nasser, Bourguiba carries little weight with the more powerful Arabs. However, it would be well for you to make unmistakably clear to him that our position has not changed since your speech last June 19. The problem is that we can not make peace for Jordan and the UAR if they—especially Nasser—can’t find a way to engage in peace talks of some sort.

3. Economic development. Since Tunisian independence, we have provided over $500 million in aid. Our three year development aid commitment in the early 1960’s gave Tunisia a needed boost at a time when its serious economic planning was just getting under way. Recently, we have provided loans at the level of $15 million a year along with other economic aid. This year we will have to reduce this to $10 million (a formal recommendation will be on your desk later this week). We would like to stay at $15 million, but Congressional cuts make this impossible. Bourguiba doesn’t know exactly what the level will be, but he must realize that the cut does not indicate any dissatisfaction with the way Tunisia uses our aid. We only wish more aid recipients would do as well. (Vice President Humphrey was extremely impressed by what he saw in Tunisia.)

You will be interested to know that one of our major aid efforts in Tunisia now is to help adapt the miracle wheat strains to North Africa by developing them in experimental areas in Tunisia. This could become the basis of a sub-regional program involving Morocco and Algeria if it goes well. We have also furnished PL–480 aid. Last September you approved a $21.7 million program for Tunisia and in March an additional $1.3 million.

4. Vietnam. If you have time, it would be worthwhile for you to look over again the letter (attached)² Bourguiba sent to Ho Chi Minh urging him to negotiate and pointing out the importance of a settlement with the United States. Bourguiba all along has recognized the importance of our commitment to stop Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. You will find him receptive to your point of view, but he will be deeply interested in your reflections on where you hope to go from here.

5. Soviet influence. Bourguiba is especially sensitive because his two main threats—Algeria and the UAR—stem partially from the Soviet-backed military in these two countries. He may be particularly interested in the buildup of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and may gear his pitch to you for possible security guarantees to the Soviet buildup and offer of the Bizerte Naval Base for our use. Our only answer is that we are, as usual, watching the Soviet Fleet carefully.

In sum, Bourguiba will want to discuss his security and development problems with you. He will be equally interested in your view of the world. He will be pleased to share his views of major problems with you.

I will give you a check list of talking points in the morning.³ I recommend you read Nick Katzenbach’s memo and attached talking points in the attached book (red Tab A under “General”).⁴

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Visit of President Bourguiba, Cables & Memos, 5/15–16/68. Secret.
2. Not attached. Telegram 4104 from Tunis, April 24, transmitted an English translation of President Bourguiba’s March 20 message to Ho Chi Minh. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Not attached. Briefing material is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Visit of President Bourguiba, Briefing Book Folder.