172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia1
209164. 1. Following FYI uncleared summary of Tunisian FonMin Bourguiba’s meeting with Secretary afternoon June 7:
2. FonMin expressed regret for “shame” mob action Tunis including destruction at American Embassy. Emphasized steps GOT undertaking make amends and reestablish control.
[Page 261]3. Explained background Tunisian attitude toward Palestine problem, going back to 1946. GOT considered birth of Zionist state colonial solution imposed by force. Injustice then committed will remain as focus of unrest until rectified. In 1965 Tunisia proposed new approach based on UN legality but this rejected by both sides. Since then Tunisia has in effect been saying to Nasser your policy not serious—you are promising but not producing.
4. When showdown actually came, Tunisia had no choice. It had to express support for the general Arab cause for two reasons: (1) to maintain its reputation and credibility with the Arab states; and (2) by continuing to demonstrate that it remained a member of the Arab community to be in a position to help pick up the pieces when the present trauma is over. Tunisia was appearing to offer help, but we would notice that its “troops were hastening slowly.”
5. Tunisian position is not comfortable. Only yesterday there were comments from Algiers suggesting that Bourguiba Jr in Washington plotting with his friends in USG to break the back of Arab unity. Tunisia remains very worried about its neighbor to the west. Algeria now completely in tow of UAR. After Arab defeat disgruntled Arab government might begin to look for a diversion.
6. Reminded Secretary Tunisian pleas for military assistance—more wanted then ever now. For present Tunisia had to be cautious about relying too openly on U.S. support. Effects of present events will certainly last for months if not longer. Tunisians look to Turks as perhaps closest friends in Mediterranean area. Understood from President Sunay during recent visit that perhaps possible GOT obtain surplus US military equipment which Turkey now releasing, if US agreed. Bourguiba said Tunisian need is more for feeling of security than security itself. (Secretary promised look into question.)
7. Neither Bourguiba Jr nor father, with whom he spoke yesterday on telephone, believes Egyptian charges US and UK aircraft involved in Near East crisis. This clearly smoke screen by Nasser to cover up his setback. Tunisia not going to break relations with US. However, will not take public position on Cairo charges and will pretend go along with Arabs in order “keep our credit for future.”
8. Secretary said there were certain things he wanted both FonMin and his father to know. USG used every argument at its command with all parties, particularly Israel, to dissuade them from initiating hostilities. What we had done in this sense with Israel, USSR agreed do with “other side.” We were aware situation extremely tense, particularly after closing Strait of Tiran, and that Israelis concerned about passing of time. (FonMin interjected that “objectively” Israel had to fight—time moving against them.) Egyptian troop movements into Sinai and repeated Cairo announcements time had come for destruction of Israel added to tension. [Page 262] Nevertheless, we were relying on commitments from both sides they would not initiate hostilities. We had absolutely no advance information hostilities would begin.
9. There was absolutely no truth to charges by Cairo about US military involvement. No one knows this better than USSR. Their destroyers 500 yards from our carriers. (Bourguiba emphatically agreed.)
10. Difficult understand what Nasser thought he was up to. By closing Strait of Tiran and moving troops he was handing Israel casus belli. Difficult to understand why he went on forcing Israel toward life and death decision when he so poorly prepared for consequences. (FonMin’s comment: “Bluffer is bluffer.” Like Hitler, Nasser did not know when to stop.) Nasser did not expect U Thant remove UN troops from Sharm-el-Sheikh. When this happened he felt obliged move in and then impose blockade.
11. As result 1957 settlement obtaining removal Israeli troops from Egyptian territory, US committed insist on right of free passage US ships through Strait of Tiran and we recognized similar right for Israeli vessels. We thus bound not only by our general commitment to principle free passage in international waters but by this specific commitment.
12. Difficult also understand Soviets. They had been equipping and training UAR army. They presumably were in position analyze Egyptian military capabilities. Moreover there were differences in what they had been saying to us privately and what they appeared to be saying to Arabs. (FonMin said he was sure Soviets would not press for showdown in this instance. It was not in nature of Soviet regime to come to “rescue of defeat.”)
13. Secretary wondered where we go from here. There increasing evidence revulsion to Nasser tactics setting in in Arab world, even in Egypt. There were some very difficult problems ahead and within USG we were already beginning study of what might be done after immediate problems are over on such basic issues as economic and social development in area, development of water resources, some form of arms limitation, and problem of Arab refugees.
14. In shorter term, opening of Strait again will be very difficult problem. Moreover, difficult to imagine situation in which Israel would agree neighbors could exercise rights of belligerent. Something must be done stabilize frontier situation. On these vital points it will be difficult for anyone outside have much influence on Israel.
15. FonMin pessimistic about early change in attitude of present Arab governments despite resounding military setback. Too much of Arab world still thought emotionally, not rationally. Practically all Arab governments except Tunisia (which announced support to Arab League) had lined up with Nasser and would now have to go along with his policies whatever the consequences. Nasser would continue refuse to admit [Page 263] his defeat, would struggle to retain his power, and other Arab governments would be bound to him. Feelings in Arab world on what had happened should not be underestimated. Even in Tunisia patient work of President Bourguiba over past twelve years had not proved enough to prevent emotional outbreak. Frustration over Palestine would be widespread and remain so. As result present trauma months to come would be very difficult. Tunisia’s aim was to remain part of Arab community so that its influence could be used constructively when the day for this arrived.
16. Secretary emphasized that Arab leader like President Bourguiba had responsibility and would have opportunities do just this. We appreciated FonMin’s exposition Tunisian actions at this time and he could be sure of our understanding.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Secret; Priority; Noforn/Limidis. Drafted by Root on June 7 and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Rabat.↩