163. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1

SUBJECT

  • Military Assistance for Tunisia

Recommendation:

Military assistance for Tunisia has been under close study, and debate, for many weeks. Decisions in favor of a $26 million military assistance program spread over five years have been made, and appealed, through the African Regional Group and the Senior Interdepartmental Group to me.

Subject to your concurrence, I have decided to recommend the $26 million five-year arms program subject to the following provisions:

a)
That we take soundings on the problem from the British, French, Germans and Italians to see how they might be prepared to help;
b)
That we inform the Tunisians of our intention to take such soundings before deciding on our own contribution;
c)
That the Department of Defense be asked to undertake maximum training of Tunisians in this country and to keep the number of military assistance personnel in Tunisia down to the absolute minimum;
d)
That we avoid if at all possible a public announcement of the magnitude of our help and that we phase our assistance gradually over the five years so that for the most part the “non-lethal” hardware is sent first and the more sophisticated arms arrive later.

Background:

Following an urgent Tunisian request and discussions which you, Secretary McNamara and I had with Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., we agreed about a year ago to provide some limited military assistance to Tunisia. The amount was left to be determined after we had sent a military survey team to study how to meet that country’s minimum requirements for security with the least adverse effect on Tunisia’s economic development, which we are helping.

The survey team visited Tunisia last November and completed its report in February of this year. The team recommended a $26 million military assistance program spread over five years which would provide a minimum deterrent to external attack. The program was approved first by the African Regional Group with A.I.D. dissenting and then by the [Page 246] Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). Because A.I.D. dissented in SIG, the matter was referred to me for decision.

There are serious arguments pro and con.

The Arguments in Favor

1.
President Bourguiba is of course an outstanding and courageous leader among statesman in the lesser developed countries and a friend of the U.S. He has given us, for example, strong support on Viet-Nam.
2.
While we tend to discount any present threat to Tunisia from its neighbors, Bourguiba is understandably concerned about the danger over the longer run from the massive input of Soviet arms into a still basically unstable Algeria and a unfriendly Egypt on the other side of a weak Libya.
3.
We are in any event obligated to provide him at least that portion of the survey team’s Report which gives the technical assessment of our military experts on what he requires to meet the threat of attack.
4.
Moreover, even with the added local costs of this proposed program, Tunisia’s defense expenditures would still be less than 10% of its annual budget.

The Arguments Against

1.
What we do in Tunisia will effect to some extent the Moroccan demand for increased assistance and the attitude in Algeria towards the U.S. role in North Africa.
2.
It is not, of course, feasible to arm Tunisia to the point where it could actually hold off the Algerians for more than a very short time.
3.
While we have made sales of military equipment in the past, the new program would put military aid on a different and more important basis, involving some military training.
4.
Tunisia’s economic resources are already strained and we are not eager to see funds diverted into military expenditures.
5.
It would obviously be preferable if we were able to disassociate ourselves from any kind of arms race in the Maghreb.

After balancing the above considerations, I have decided to go ahead with a military assistance program for Tunisia, subject to your approval.

Dean Rusk
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret.