Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

158. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 18, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Military Assistance to Tunisia

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., of Tunisia
• His Excellency Rachid Driss, Ambassador of Tunisia
• Ambassador Trimble, Deputy Assistant Secretary of African Affairs
• James J. Blake, Director, Office of Northern African Affairs

The Foreign Minister referred to his meeting the previous day with Secretary of Defense McNamara² and to his conversation earlier that same day with the Secretary. From these talks he had drawn the conclusion that the essential question was whether the US agreed with his analysis of Tunisia’s security.

The Secretary stated that there were some elements in the Foreign Minister’s presentation on which he would appreciate clarification. An attack on Tunisia by the UAR or Algeria would clearly require “big battalions” which Tunisia with a population of four million could not meet with “big battalions” of its own. On the other hand, the assumption that such an attack could be made from the UAR side overlooked the existence of Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya. Wheelus would not be overrun or bypassed by the “big battalions”. The nature of the threat, how it could materialize, and how it could be met, were not clear.

The Secretary further noted the Foreign Minister’s reference to Tunisia’s interest in establishing a “special relationship” to the US. It was not clear to him what kind of relationship the Foreign Minister had in mind. The US had entered various military alliances but only to prevent Communist aggression. The type of threat described by the Foreign Minister did not appear to be a Communist threat. Parenthetically, he noted that US alliance relationships were now being subjected to substantial criticism because of some of the basic misunderstandings that had arisen among the partners, virtually from the outset, regarding their purposes. For example, the US and Pakistan were partners in SEATO. We regarded SEATO as a bulwark against Communism in Southeast Asia, but Pakistan from the beginning saw it as an instrument of its own policy against India. The Secretary wondered whether some kind of a regional defensive arrangement might not be the answer to Tunisia’s problems, but one which would leave the US in the background.

The Foreign Minister stated that a regional grouping was not possible because of the political and economic weakness of Morocco and the political and military weakness of Libya. Moreover, the Libyans were so frightened of the Egyptians that they would hesitate to engage in any kind of an arrangement that would become known to Cairo. Besides, he asked, to whom could one speak in Libya with confidence on such a sensitive subject?

The Foreign Minister stated that a further complicating problem was posed by France whose ambitions, he believes, extend to Libya as well as to the three Maghreb states. He expressed the opinion that any security arrangement in the region would be weakened by the willingness of France to play up to Nasser for its own purpose in North Africa and elsewhere.

The Secretary said that the problem described by the Foreign Minister had to be examined in terms of the risks that must be catered to or put aside. He could not say whether Tunisia’s assessment of the threat to its security was accurate but it was clear that the military solution envis-aged by the Foreign Minister to contain that threat would create very grave problems for Tunisia by diverting resources which would otherwise go to economic development. In his judgment Tunisia would have to face the fact that Tunisia could not compete militarily either with Algeria or the UAR. Moreover, the threat described by the Foreign Minister was not one that would develop overnight; as change in the political atmosphere would precede it.

The Foreign Minister agreed that Tunisia could not afford an expensive military establishment and that it would have to give priority to the allocation of its resources to economic development. This was precisely why Tunisia had included the cost of maintenance in the military assistance request it had submitted to the US. Moreover, all it hoped to do was to establish a force sufficiently strong enough to withstand the first shock of an attack and to hold off the aggressor until Tunisia’s friends came to its assistance. In this connection, he discounted any possibility of help from the UN.

The Secretary described the mounting criticism the Kashmir problem had provoked of military assistance programs, even among people who had been supporters of those programs. He noted that it would be dangerous for Tunisia to rely exclusively on one country for its military security. The Secretary then referred to the Foreign Minister’s indication early in the year that a certain amount of discretion would be desirable in connection with any military assistance by the US. He asked whether this was still the Foreign Minister’s view inasmuch as it would be difficult to be discreet about a military assistance program of the size suggested by the Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister replied that his earlier interest in discreet US military assistance had been overtaken by events; the important thing was that Tunisia needed military assistance because of the threat it faced. He declared it would be a mistake to regard Nasser as less dangerous because of his recent political and military reverses. He remains dangerous in the same way that a wounded boar remains dangerous. The UAR is basically expansionist. Population pressures require it to expand. Nasser himself is a crude, unsophisticated, immature colonel who still does not reflect fully before he acts and does not assess in advance the possible consequences of his actions.

The Secretary asked whether the evidences of continued French interest in Algeria might help to stabilize the Algerian situation and make the GOA more responsible and moderate in its external policies. The Foreign Minister replied that it was difficult to make any judgment on these points. The one thing that was clear was that France was pursuing its own nationalist ambitions in Algeria and was concerned primarily with the preservation of its economic interest in that country, and the exploitation of its petroleum resources. Algeria’s foreign policy would be no concern of France if it did not place those interests in jeopardy. The Foreign Minister reverted to what he regarded as the central issue: whether the US agreed that the threat to Tunisia was real. He had posed the same question to Secretary McNamara and he would like to have the Secretary’s views.

The Secretary stated that he recognized that Tunisia’s anxieties were proper and understandable. This did not mean that every risk the Foreign Minister envisaged could be catered to; certain risks would have to be put to one side. The problem then became one of the degree of any US assistance. He reminded the Foreign Minister that we had already agreed in principle to be of some assistance, but stated that he would have to review this matter more fully before providing an answer regarding the extent to which we might be of help. He would discuss the problem with Secretary McNamara in terms of priorities as well as requirements and would provide the Foreign Minister with an answer before the latter’s return to Tunis. The Secretary expressed the opinion that any such assistance should in some way support the Tunisian economic development effort. Perhaps this could be done by including a civic action component in US military aid. The Foreign Minister noted that Tunisia was already using its armed forces for economic purposes, such as road construction and in the technical training of youth; Tunisia would welcome military assistance that included civic action elements. The Secretary asked whether some of Tunisia’s anxieties would be eased by other things we might do, for example, by scheduling regular visits by the Sixth Fleet. The Foreign Minister replied that such visits would be very helpful.

The Foreign Minister concluded by telling the Secretary that Tunisia felt that it could trust the US. It has no fears of an American presence in Tunisia, and it would welcome a closer association with this country. The Secretary assured the Foreign Minister of the substantial US interest in Tunisia and of US good will toward Tunisia.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–TUN. Secret. Drafted by Blake on September 22 and approved in S on September 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.”
2. The memorandum of conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 331 Tunisia.